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TOWARD A RIGHT OF PRIVACY
AS A MATTER OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW*
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1890 marked the official closing of the American frontier.,
For the first time there was no longer a clearly defined boundary of
unsettled land in the West. True, there remained isolated empty
areas. But the day of an ever-available frontier of vacant land had
come to a close. Henceforth, the United States could look forward to
denser settlement, scarcer resources, and, contemporary historians be-
lieved, definite changes in the American character.2
It was also in 1890 that the Harvard Law Review published an
article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis which proposed that
the courts recognize a right to privacy.3 Warren and Brandeis were
motivated by very personal concerns: they were outraged at the treat-
ment the Warren family had received in the social columns of the
Boston press. They proposed the recognition of what is now the tort,
"invasion of privacy." ...
The closing of the frontier in 1890 was a moment of symbolic im-
portance, marking a transition into an era of increasing population,
decreasing space, and diminishing resources. That era had already seen
significant changes in technology which foreshadowed privacy-
threatening developments of our own time. The telephone, the micro-
* EDITOR'S NOTE: An earlier version of this note won the Chesterfield Smith Award
for the best student paper on Florida's 1977-78 constitutional revision. The award was
established in honor of Chesterfield Smith, Past President of the American Bar Association
and Chairman of the 1968 Florida Constitution Revision Commission. It was created by a
gift from the law firm of Steel, Hector & Davis, of Miami.
AUTHOR'S NoTE: The writer wishes to express deep appreciation to Professor Patricia
Dore, Professor H.P. Southerland, Bradford Swing, Esq., and Judith Anne Bass for their
advice, insight, and aid in the preparation of this note for publication.
1. In a . . . bulletin of the Superintendent of the Census for 1890 appear these
significant words:
Up to and including 1880 the country had a frontier of settlement, but at
present the unsettled area has been so broken into isolated bodies of settle-
ment that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of its
extent, its westward movement, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer have a
place in the census reports.
This brief official statement marks the closing of a great historic movement.
Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, in THE TURNER THESIS I
(G. Taylor ed. 1956).
2. See id. at 1, 18. Turner's thesis that the "existence of an area of free land, its
continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American
development," id. at 1, held widespread acceptance at one time, but has been severely
criticized. See essays collected in THE TURNER THEsIs, supra note 1.
3. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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phone, and the Kodak camera were all invented during this period.4
With remarkable prescience, Warren and Brandeis wrote that
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next
step which must be taken for the protection of the person ....
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that "what
is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." 5
Present-day concerns over threats to privacy run remarkably parallel
to those of Warren and Brandeis. For example, at the opening session
of Florida's 1977-78 Constitution Revision Commission, Chief Justice
Ben Overton said:
Our technological advancements continue to surpass our imagina-
tion, but political and economic problems are also increased with
this advancement.
[W]ho, ten years ago, really understood that personal and
financial data on a substantial portion of our population could
be collected by government or business and held for easy distribu-
tion by computer operated information systems? There is a
public concern about how personal information concerning an in-
dividual citizen is used, whether it be collected by government or
by business. The subject of individual privacy and privacy law is
in a developing stage .... [M]any appellate courts in this nation now
have substantial ... privacy issues before them for consideration. It
is a new problem that should be addressed.6
Beyond this vexing issue lies the equally perplexing question how
much autonomy the individual citizen should have for making im-
portant decisions about his life and future, free from government in-
trusion.
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether Florida-or any
other state-should adopt a right of privacy section in its constitution.
At first glance, this inquiry may seem idle or unnecessary, for privacy
rights are already protected in certain ways. Perhaps best known is the
1965 declaration of the United States Supreme Court that there exists
a right of privacy, guaranteed by the federal constitution, which assures
4. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 338-39 (1967).
5. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195 (footnote omitted).
6. Address by Chief Justice Ben F. Overton to the Constitution Revision Commission
(July 6, 1977).
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the right to obtain birth control information.7 In addition, privacy
interests have been implicated in such diverse matters as the right to
be free from electronic surveillance in a public telephone booth;" the
right to obtain birth control devices;9 the right to private possession
of obscene materials; 1° the right to private possession of marijuana in
the home;- the right to obtain an abortion; 1 2 the right to be free from
being secretly recorded and photographed in one's own home by
disguised reporters who then publish the results; 3 the right of a student
to choose his hairstyle; 14 the right of a guardian to order that life
support systems be disconnected from a comatose person; 5 the right
to privacy in one's associations; 6 the right to be free from being over-
zealously shadowed by private detectives; 7 the right to be free from
offensive intrusions by an aggressive photographer;' the right not to
be placed in a false light in the public eye;' 9 the right not to have one's
name or likeness appropriated for commercial purposes without one's
permission; 20 and the right to be free from certain central data collec-
tion schemes. 2 1 Rights of privacy have been asserted, but not recognized,
in an even broader variety of contexts.22
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See also Omnibus Crime Control & Safe
Streets Act, Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (federal wiretapping
statutes).
9. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
10. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
11. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975). Contra, e.g., State v. Baker, 535 P.2d 1394
(Hawaii 1975). See also Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977).
12. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
13. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
14. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1972).
15. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
16. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
17. Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
18. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affirmed and modified, 487 F.2d
986 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 812-14 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
PROSSER, TORTs].
20. Id. at 804-07.
21. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F.
Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Both decisions are reviewed in detail in Section II.
22. E.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (circulation of inaccurate report that
plaintiff was active shoplifter not actionable as a violation of constitutional right of
privacy); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (privacy of passers-by
not invaded by observing nude scenes on screen of drive-in theater); Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974) (right to choose one's living companions does not override zoning
limitation of number of unrelated individuals who may live in household); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (privacy not invaded by "Fuck the Draft" insignia worn on
jacket in public courthouse halls); Pollak v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 343 U.S. 451 (1952)
(privacy of passengers not infringed by FM radio played on bus). But see Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977) (zoning regulation restricting occupancy of
1977]
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Privacy has been described as a fundamental right-for certain
purposes-by the Supreme Court and by Congress.2 s Legal recognition
of privacy rights has received acclaim and advocacy.24 The intense
American interest in privacy is paralleled by similarly vigorous discus-
sion in other countries.2 5
Despite these developments, the legal protection afforded privacy
remains limited, inconsistent, and fragmentary. Some important privacy
interests are protected, but they are narrow in scope. Simply put, there
is no general constitutional or statutory right of privacy as a matter of
federal or state law. Instead, there are certain specific privacy rights, or
privacy interests, in certain very carefully defined areas. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to
be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property
and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual states.26
Ten states now have provisions in their constitutions which ex-
pressly protect privacy.2 7 Alaska and Montana have adopted what might
be called a "free-standing" declaration of the right of privacy: that
is, a separate section of the constitution which deals only with the
right of privacy. Similarly, California has declared privacy an "in-
alienable right. '" 28
Seven other states confer more limited recognition on the privacy
right by tying it closely to another constitutional provision, the pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Florida, for
example, extends protection "against the unreasonable interception of
single-family dwellings to members of the nuclear family violates due process clause of
fourteenth amendment).
23. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 485 (by implication); Privacy Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1896 (reproduced in comment to 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(Supp. V 1975)): "[T]he right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by
the Constitution of the United States."
24. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 19, at 802: "Although there was at first some hesitation,
a host of other legal writers have taken up the theme, and no other tort has received such
an outpouring of advocacy of its bare existence." (footnote omitted).
25. E.g., D. MADGWICK & T. SMYTHE, THE INVASION OF PRIVACY (1974) (Great Britain);
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF JUsTICE, PRIVACY & COMPUTERS (1972)
(Canada).
26. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350-51 (footnotes omitted).
27. ALAS. CONsT. art. I, § 22; ARIz. CoNsT. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONsT. art. I, 1; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 12; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§6, 12; LA. CONS?. art. I,
§ 5; MONT. CONST. art. I1, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; WAsH. CONST. art. I, § 7. See
Appendix for full text of each. The Florida Constitution protects "private communica-
tions." The Arizona and Washington Constitutions protect "private affairs." The re-
maining states protect "privacy."
28. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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private communications by any means. ' The Illinois, Hawaii, Louisi-
ana, and South Carolina privacy provisions are somewhat broader, pro-
tecting against "invasions of privacy"; the Washington and Arizona
privacy sections are narrower, serving as the functional equivalent of
the prohibition against illegal searches and seizures.
States have also responded by protecting privacy through judicial
interpretation. As a result, some state courts have, like the federal
judiciary, imported a constitutional right of privacy into some more
general provision of the state constitution.3 0 The privacy rights so
created have often been very limited; indeed, some of the states which
extended recognition to a state right of privacy through court decision
have later inserted an express privacy provision into the state constitu-
tion.31
A decade ago, in the revision effort that created Florida's 1968
constitution, attention was given to the privacy rights of Florida citizens.
The result was the provision protecting private communications against
unreasonable interception. Today, as the current revision process pro-
ceeds, it is both fitting and essential to reopen consideration of the
right of privacy.
It is a commonplace to observe that with the abrupt transition from
the Warren Court to the Burger Court, the federal judicial attitude
toward the protection of individual liberties has drastically altered.
The states have not been slow to fill the void. Justice Brennan has
eloquently argued that the states now occupy a crucial role in deciding
precisely the character and extent of rights to be enjoyed by their
citizens. 32 Justice Brennan points out that "when during the 1960's
our rights and liberties were in the process of becoming increasingly
federalized, state courts saw no reason to consider what protections, if
any, were secured by state constitutions." 3 He surmises that dissatisfac-
tion with the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions has led state
courts to be much more solicitous of their own citizens' rights, rest-
ing their decisions on their own state constitutions. Many state courts
have now "independently considered the merits of constitutional argu-
ments and declined to follow opinions of the United States Supreme
29. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
30. See, e.g., Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1972) (right to be let alone-hair
length); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 97 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (invasion of privacy tort);
Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944) (invasion of privacy tort).
31. The states listed in note 30 supra all adopted privacy provisions subsequent to the
dates of the indicated court decisions. See Appendix.
32. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1977).
33. Id. at 495.
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Court they find unconvincing, even where the state and federal con-
stitutions are similarly or identically phrased.
' ' 4
Despite their crucial role, the majority of states have not responded
forcefully. The Privacy Protection Study Commission commented, in
its just-completed two-year national study,
The States have been active in privacy protection, and in many
cases innovative, but neither they nor the Federal government have
taken full advantage of each other's experimentation. Altogether,
the Commission's inquiry into State record-keeping practices forces
it to conclude that an individual cannot rely on State government to
protect his interest in the records and recordkeeping practices of
either State agencies or private entities.3 5
Moreover, relying on National League of Cities v. Usery,8 the Commis-
sion concluded that the Federal Constitution stands as an absolute
barrier to congressional legislation to regulate state government record-
keeping, except as a condition of federal funding.
3 7
There are, of course, exceptions to the general pattern of state in-
action, and the Commission cited some of the constitutional provisions
mentioned above. Nonetheless, the Commission's general indictment
underlines the point made in Katz: the protection of a person's general
right to privacy is left largely to the law of the individual states. The
question is squarely before the states-and, in Florida, before the 1977-
78 Constitution Revision Commission-to decide exactly what protec-
tion, if any, should be conferred on the people's right of privacy.
This note will begin by suggesting that the existing protection of
privacy under federal and state court decisions is inadequate. To this
34. Id. at 500 (footnote omitted).
35. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY 489 (1977). The Privacy Protection Study Commission was created by the Privacy
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1896 (reproduced in comment to 5 U.S.C. §
522a (Supp. V. 1975)). The Commission filed its final report in July, 1977.
36. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
37. The Commission reasoned:
[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the commerce clause would seem to
enable the Federal government to regulate State activities that are essential to the
performance of internal governmental functions, such as record-keeping. As recently
as 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in National League of Cities v. Usery, that
the Federal government may not legislate in ways that "operate to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
ment functions." The national government, in other words, may not use coercion
to influence, for example, State government record-keeping practices, but the
National League of Cities decision does not preclude the use of inducements, such
as making certain record-keeping practices a condition of Federal funding.
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 488-89.
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end, there is first a brief consideration of technology and privacy,
followed by a review of the evolution of the privacy idea. This in-
cludes the development of the "invasion of privacy" tort, which evolved
from Warren and Brandeis' 1890 law review article; the gradual
recognition by the United States Supreme Court that privacy is an
interest protected by the Bill of Rights; and the establishment of a
limited right of privacy by the Supreme Court in 1965. These lines of
legal development have not culminated in a general privacy right.
Indeed, as the succeeding sections of this note indicate, commentators
have been unable to agree on a general definition of privacy-or even
to agree that the term "privacy" has an ascertainable meaning at all.
The focus of this paper then shifts to the express privacy provisions
of state constitutions. With two exceptions, the right of privacy has
been included in state constitutions for ten years or less. While state
constitutional privacy is, therefore, a recent phenomenon, enough case
law and constitutional convention proceedings are available to indicate
what privacy interests the states have sought to protect and how well-
or poorly-they have succeeded in doing so. The privacy sections of
each of the ten states are subjected to individual examination.
The note concludes with an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of the state privacy provisions. The experiences of the states to date
reveal some very promising avenues for success, as well as some pitfalls
to be avoided. These considerations would be applicable to any state
that is contemplating the addition of a right of privacy to its constitu-
tion. The analysis culminates in a recommendation that the 1977-78
Constitution Revision Commission propose a right of privacy for the
Florida Constitution. The suggested language, adapted from the Mon-
tana and Alaska Constitutions, is
The right of the people to privacy is essential to the well-being
of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing
of a compelling state interest.
II. PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY
Chief Justice Overton's opening remarks before the 1977-78
Constitution Revision Commission are representative of one wide-
spread contemporary concern about privacy. 38 As Chief Justice Overton
indicated, much discussion centers on technological advancements
which have made possible the collection, storage, and dissemination of
enormous amounts of information about individual citizens.3 9
38. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
39. While Justice Overton did not say so, in the opinion of this writer the national
Watergate scandal has had a galvanizing effect in the privacy area, as in other areas of
1977]
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The numerous ways in which technology threatens privacy have
been thoroughly examined elsewhere 4 0 and it is unnecessary to engage
in a comprehensive survey here. Rather this section will consider as
examples two court decisions which illustrate the potential for abuse
in current information systems. 41
In Merriken v. Cressman,4 2 a parent and child successfully sought
American life. Who among the general public would ever have imagined the existence
of the elaborate White House taping system which secretly recorded individual meetings
and telephone conversations with the President? Yet few today are unaware that such a
system did exist. Few are unaware of the Watergate and Ellsberg burglaries, or the im-
proper uses of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency
for domestic information-gathering purposes. See generally THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (G.
McClellan ed. 1976); WAR ON PRIVACY (L. SOBEL ed. 1976); Towe, A Growing Awareness of
Privacy in America, 37 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1976).
Significantly, Watergate did not involve new privacy-threatening technological de-
velopments. Rather, it involved tape recording, wiretapping, and old-fashioned burglary.
The significant feature of the Watergate scandal was the clear demonstration that one
cannot always rely on the self-restraint of public officials or private organizations in order
to protect the privacy of the citizenry. The potential for abuse, then, arises not from
technological development alone, but rather from the decisions made by those who have
technological tools at their disposal.
40. See, e.g., CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED
STATES, PRIVACY IN A FREE SOCIETY (1974); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PRIVACY (1975);
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS & DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 25; A. HARRISON,
THE PROBLEM OF PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (vol. 1, 1967;
vol. 2, 1969); E. LONG, THE INTRUDERS (1966); D. MADGWICK & T. SMYTHE, supra note 25; M.
MAYER, RIGHTS OF PRIVACY (1972); A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY (1972); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, PRIVACY: PERSONAL DATA AND THE LAW (1976); ON RECORD: FILES AND
DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE (S. Wheeler ed. 1976); PRIVACY, COMPUTERS AND You (B. Rowe
ed. 1972); PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 35; PRIVACY PROTECTION
STUDY COMMISSION, TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY (1977) (Appendix 5 to the Commission's
final report, printed separately); J. RAINES, ATrACK ON PRIVACY (1974); THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY, supra note 39; SURVEILLANCE, DATAVEILLANCE AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS: USE AND
ABUSE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (Columbia Human Rights Law Review ed. 1973)
(original version 4 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1972)); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973);
WAR ON PRIVACY, supra note 39; A WESTIN, supra note 4; Towe, supra note 39; Westin,
Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1003 (1966) (Part I); Project, The Computerization of Government Files: What Impact
on the Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1371 (1968).
41. For a similar approach, see PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 35,
at 6-8. To illustrate the privacy problems posed by governmental and private record-
keeping, the Privacy Protection Study Commission chose State ex rel. Tarver v. Smith,
470 P.2d 172 (Wash. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1000 (1971), and United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Tarver involved the unsuccessful quest of a welfare mother
to have removed from her case file a derogatory report by a caseworker which Ms. Tarver
asserted was false and could be prejudicial if made available to other state social agencies.
Miller sustained government access to a bank's records regarding individual depositors,
on the theory that they are business records of the bank rather than property of the
individual accountholder. The latter case is discussed more fully in note 228 infra.
42. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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to enjoin the Norristown, Pennsylvania, School Board from imple-
menting a special program, called Critical Period of Intervention, de-
signed to identify potential drug abusers among eighth grade students.
As the program was formulated by the school district, all children
were to answer questionnaires exploring details of their family com-
position and relationships, including such questions as whether the
parents "make me feel unloved. '" 43 In addition, students and teachers
were "to identify other students . . .who make unusual or odd re-
marks, get into fights or quarrels with other students, make unusual
or inappropriate responses during normal school activities, or have
to be coaxed or forced to work with other pupils." 44 No guidance was
given to explain what was an "odd or unusual remark" or "inappropri-
ate response."
Affirmative consent of parents was not, at first, required for partici-
pation of the child in this program. Acquiescence would be deemed
consent. The disclosure to parents about the program, however, was
"far from candid"; 4 5 it was "a 'selling device', 'an attempt to convince
the parent to allow the child to participate.' "46 The affirmative consent
of the child was not required, though the questionnaire could be
returned blank. Refusal of the plaintiff child to participate-which fact
became known to his classmates-led to accusations by other students
that he was a drug abuser.4 7
The school district planned to enter the questionnaire data into a
"massive data bank."- The information was to be available to a wide
variety of personnel throughout the school system. There was no
certainty that the information might not also find its way to sources
outside the school system, such as, in the judge's words, "an enterprising
district attorney. ' ' 49 The data were to be used to identify potential drug
abusers, though the program had not formulated a very specific defini-
tion of "abuse." Students so identified were to be referred to compulsory
guided group interaction sessions or to community agencies. Psychia-
trists testified about the possibility of a "self-fulfilling prophecy,"
whereby the process of labeling a child a potential drug abuser could
convince the child that he was one, thus causing the child to begin to
behave according to the expectation.
The federal district court concluded that the proposed program im-
43. Id. at 916.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 920.
46. Id. at 915.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 916.
49. Id.
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permissibly interfered with fundamental family relationships and child-
rearing, thereby violating the right of privacy under the United States
Constitution. The district court entered a permanent injunction for-
bidding the school system to implement the Critical Period of Inter-
vention project.5 s
A second example illustrating the impact of current technology is
Menard v. Saxbe.51 The plaintiff in that case was arrested and detained
for a crime he denied all knowledge of.52 Although he was held in
custody for over two days, no information was adduced linking him
with any crime, and he was released without being charged.5 Even so,
the Los Angeles Police Department routinely forwarded his fingerprints
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with the notation "Released-
Unable to connect with any felony or misdemeanor at this time."54 The
FBI entered the record into its criminal files.
At the time of the arrest, plaintiff was a 19-year-old college student
who, during the pendency of the litigation, became an officer in the
Marine Corps.5 5 Plaintiff and his family tried for over a year to obtain
expungement of the arrest record; "the FBI, the Los Angeles police,
and the California Department of Justice each [took] the position that
it was powerless to effect the removal of the record from the FBI's
50. Id. at 922.
51. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Earlier opinions in the same case are reported in
Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), on remand from 430 F.2d 486 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
52. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
summarized the facts as follows:
At the time of his arrest, Dale Menard was a 19-year-old college student spend-
ing the summer working in Los Angeles. On the evening of August 9, 1965, he
visited with friends in the vicinity of Sunland Park, a recreational area in Los
Angeles. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Menard walked to the park to wait for a
friend who had arranged to pick Menard up and drive him to his room in a
Los Angeles suburb. . . . The friend failed to arrive at the agreed time, and in
the early hours of August 10th, after dozing on a park bench and then walking
across the street to look through the window of a rest home in search of a clock,
Menard returned to the bench to wait once more....
At approximately 3:00 a.m., Menard was approached by two Los Angeles
police officers . . . , who questioned him about a prowler report from the rest
home. They also confronted him with a wallet they evidently had found on the
ground near the park bench. . . . The wallet contained $10 and bore the name
and address of an individual who lived about three miles from Sunland Park. ...
Despite Menard's insistence that he knew nothing of the wallet, and despite the
subsequent arrival of Menard's friend, who corroborated his account, Menard
was placed under arrest, booked and fingerprinted at the stationhouse, and held in
police custody for over two days.
498 F.2d at 1019.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 328 F. Supp. at 720.
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files."56 The Los Angeles Police Department advised, and the FBI
confirmed, that "removal of the record would be possible 'only upon
order of a court of competent jurisdiction.' "5 The FBI did, however,
have a special agent review the Los Angeles Police file. The FBI then
changed its record to read, "Released-Unable to connect with any
felony or misdemeanor-. not deemed an arrest but a detention
only." 58
The FBI continued to refuse to expunge the record; by policy, ex-
pungement would be granted only by request of the local police. No
individual request for expungement would be honored, regardless of
circumstances. Indeed, the FBI would not reveal to an individual
whether or not any information about him or her existed in its files.5 9
At the time of the litigation, the FBI had some two hundred million
sets of fingerprints in its criminal and applicant files; the criminal file
alone contained information on "some sixty million arrests of ap-
proximately nineteen million people."60
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit made the chilling comment that "[w]hat began modestly in
1924 is now ... 'out of effective control.' "61 The court continued:
Due primarily to the Bureau's limited resources, there is no followup
to assure that records of arrest frequently are amended to show an
ultimate non-criminal disposition. There are no controls on the
accuracy of information submitted by the contributing agencies. The
Bureau exercises little supervision and control over contributing
agency uses of the records the FBI disseminates .... The FBI cannot
take the position that it is a mere passive recipient of records re-
ceived from others, when it in fact energizes those records by main-
taining a system of criminal files and disseminating the criminal
records widely [and thus creating] . . .a capacity for both good and
harm.
...It would be monstrous to suppose that all persons questioned
by the police, many of them "cooperative and law abiding citizens[,]"
could properly be enshrined, for reasons of bureaucratic practice,
in the FBI's criminal records.62
56. 498 F.2d at 1020.
57. 328 F. Supp. at 723.
58. 498 F.2d at 1020 (footnotes omitted).
59. Id. at 1002.
60. 328 F. Supp. at 721. The applicant file contained fingerprint cards submitted by
state and federal agencies and certain others who sought information about prior criminal
activity in connection with employment, license, or permit applications.
61. 498 F.2d at 1026, citing the opinion of the district court, 328 F. Supp. at 727.
62. 498 F.2d at 1026, 1029 (footnotes omitted).
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The plaintiff's concern centered on the use of FBI records by em-
ployers. State and local agencies could obtain criminal record data
for employment purposes "whenever authorized by local enactment";6"
such enactments called for FBI data as a prerequisite for all sorts of
jobs, ranging from any applicant for a driver's license in Denver, Colo-
rado, to all nonresidents seeking employment in Provincetown, Massa-
chusetts. 6 4 The FBI had no ability to verify that the information dis-
seminated would be used for proper purposes; "[i]t is apparent that
local agencies may on occasion pass on arrest information to private
employers."5
The court of appeals focused on the adverse consequences of an
arrest. In a careful analysis, the court documented from empirical
studies and court decisions the numerous ways in which arrest records
may adversely affect the arrestee. Studies of employment agencies and
employers, for example, indicated that over half would reject an appli-
cant who had an arrest record "even if followed by acquittal or com-
plete exoneration . 6.. .6 Arrest records are used in law enforcement
decisions whether or not to make a subsequent arrest or to bring
formal charges; they play an important role in the grant or denial of
bail, in impeachment at trial, and in sentencing.6 7 Opportunities for
schooling as well as professional and occupational licensing are likewise
affected by arrest records.68
The court of appeals recognized, given the uses to which the in-
formation was put, that serious constitutional issues were raised:
[I]t is clear that the government may not, wittingly or unwittingly,
engage in wanton defamation of individuals and groups, and there is
[a] limit beyond which the government may not tread in devising
classifications that lump the innocent with the guilty.6 9
The court chose to avoid the issue "whether or to what extent the
Constitution forbids the Government from contributing to the harm
to the individual that may attend maintenance of a criminal file show-
ing, as an arrest, what was only a chance encounter."' 70 Instead, the court
ordered expungement of Menard's arrest record from the criminal files
63. 328 F. Supp. at 726-27 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 728. The court's Appendix A contains a sampling from throughout the
United States.
65. Id. at 722.
66. 430 F.2d at 490 & n.17.
67. Id. at 491 (footnotes omitted).
68. Id. at 490 (footnote omitted).
69. Id. at 492 (footnotes omitted).
70. 498 F.2d at 1029 (footnote omitted).
TOWARD A RIGHT OF PRIVACY
on the theory that the agency had exceeded its statutory authority.
The court reasoned that a showing had been made that plaintiff's en-
counter with the police should not be deemed an arrest; therefore, the
FBI had exceeded its statutory authority by maintaining in its arrest
files a record shown conclusively not to be an arrest.71
While the court of appeals consciously sought statutory grounds on
which to avoid the constitutional issue, 2 the district court had per-
ceived that Menard's case was simply a manifestation of more funda-
mental changes in society:
The increasing complexity of our society and technological advances
which facilitate massive accumulation and ready regurgitation of
far-flung data have presented ... problems not contemplated by the
framers of the Constitution. These developments emphasize a press-
ing need to preserve and to redefine aspects of the right of privacy
to insure the basic freedoms guaranteed by this democracy.73
Societal complexity and interdependence have created the demand for
background information about individuals; technology has created the
means to capture and produce it.
Systematic recordation and dissemination of information about in-
dividual citizens is a form of surveillance and control which may
easily inhibit freedom to speak, to work, and to move about in this
land. If information available to Government is misused to publicize
past incidents in the lives of its citizens the pressures for conformity
will be irresistible. Initiative and individuality can be suffocated and
a resulting dullness of mind and conduct will become the norm. We
are far from having reached this condition today, but surely history
teaches that inroads are most likely to occur during unsettled times
like these where fear or the passions of the moment can lead to
excesses. The present controversy, limited as it is, must be viewed
in this broadest context.7 4
Menard was decided in the spring of 1974. On the last day of the
same year, the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 became law.75 This signifi-
cant legislation imposed restrictions on the scope and operation of
manual and computer information systems maintained by federal
agencies. Though law enforcement agencies are permitted to exempt
71. Id. at 1029-30.
72. Id.
73. 328 F. Supp. at 725 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 726.
75. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §
552a (Supp. V 1975).
1977]
646 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:631
themselves from certain of the Act's requirements, 76 to its credit, the
FBI has not utilized the full scope of the available exemptions.77
Menard's significance, however,-and that of Merriken-lies in the
illustration of the dynamics of data systems.
It is important to note that in the Menard case, as in Merriken,
there was no showing of malicious or intentional abuse of power by the
governmental agencies involved. Rather, the agencies openly pursued
objectives they considered permissible or even laudable. Indeed, the
federal district court in Menard said, "Given the very general nature of
its purported authority the Bureau has proceeded cautiously .... The
Division has carried out its work in a responsible, meticulous
manner."7s Despite good intentions, then, the agency had succeeded
in creating a national system of far-reaching scope which was "out of
effective control," 79 just as the school district in Merriken, pursuing
what it considered to be a highly meritorious purpose, created extensive
infringements on privacy. Societal complexity, together with techno-
logical advance, create conditions ripe for negligent or inadvertent
abuse-perhaps a more substantial danger than intentional privacy in-
vasion.
Examples could be multiplied, but Merriken and Menard illustrate
the fundamental point. In the former case, the abuse grew out of a
locally originated, locally governed program; in the latter, the privacy
problem was national in scale. While there has always been a concern
in our system for the rights of the individual in relation to the demands
of the society, technological advance has posed the issue in new and
unexpected ways.
Although the computer is the topic of much contemporary debate
about privacy, the privacy idea originated in a pre-computer era. The
next sections explore the early development of the idea that privacy is
an interest deserving of legal protection.
III. THE INVASION OF PRIvACY TORT
It is obligatory for anyone writing about privacy to consider the
contribution made by two works published during the nineteenth
century. The first of these is A Treatise of the Law of Torts by Judge
76. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (Supp. V 1975); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS
GENERAL, supra note 40, at 52-55.
77. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 40, at 54, citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 20.34 (1976). The court of appeals made note that the Department of Justice had pro-
posed several regulations relating to criminal record data, which were pending at the
time Menard was decided. 498 F.2d at 1030 n.53.
78. 328 F. Supp. at 722.
79. Id. at 727.
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Thomas M. Cooley.80 It was Cooley who coined the phrase "the right
to be let alone.""1 For all that appears in his treatise, Cooley had a rather
limited meaning in mind. He discussed the right to be let alone in a
chapter dealing generally with personal rights; the only specific torts
included in the discussion were those of assault and battery.
Regardless of what Cooley originally intended the phrase to mean,
it was repeated in Warren and Brandeis' 1890 Harvard Law Review
article, entitled The Right to Privacy."2 It may be that these two happy
turns of phrase-"the right to be let alone" and "the right to privacy"-
were in and of themselves responsible for the instant popularity of the
privacy idea, because they crystallized a concept that until then had
been expressed in terms of property and contract.
It is now legendary that the Warren-Brandeis article was written
in a fit of exasperation over stories written about the Warren family
in the society pages of the Boston papers.8s It was to that sort of in-
80. T. COOLEY, A TREASE OF THE LAW OF ToRTS 29 (1st ed. 1880).
81. Cooley's exact statement was: "The right to one's person may be said to be a
right of complete immunity: to be let alone." Id.
82. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3.
83. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960). Warren and Brandeis had been
classmates in the Harvard Law School class of 1877, where they had stood second and
first, respectively. Id. at 383-84. From 1879 to 1889, they practiced law together. Warren
gave up the practice in order to manage an inherited business. A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE
MAN'S LIFE 56, 68 (1946). Prosser reported that:
It was the era of "yellow journalism," when the press had begun to resore to excesses
in the way of prying that have become more or less commonplace today; and Boston
was perhaps, of all the cities in the country, the one in which a lady and a gentle-
man kept their names and their personal affairs out of the papers.
Prosser, Privacy, supra at 383 (footnote omitted).
A minor mystery surrounds the precise event which motivated Warren and Brandeis
to write the article. Prosser stated:
In the year 1890 Mrs. Samuel D. Warren, a young matron of Boston, which is
a large city in Massachusetts, held at her home a series of social entertainments
on an elaborate scale. . . . [T]he newspapers of Boston . . . covered her parties
in highly personal and embarrassing detail. . . . The matter came to a head
when the newspapers had a field day on the occasion of the wedding of a daughter,
and Mr. Warren became annoyed.
Id. at 383, citing A. MASON, supra at 70.
Prosser must almost certainly be wrong about the "wedding of a daughter." Mason,
Brandeis' biographer and Prosser's cited source, recounted:
Though no longer partners in practice, Warren and Brandeis, in 1890, collabo-
rated on an article published in December of that year in the Harvard Law Re-
view as "The Right to Privacy." Quite characteristically, for Brandeis, this study
grew out of a specific situation. On January 25, 1883, Warren had married Miss
Mabel Bayard, daughter of Senator Thomas Francis Bayard, Sr. They set up house-
keeping in Boston's exclusive Back Bay section and began to entertain elaborately.
The Saturday Evening Gazette, which specialized in "blue blood items," naturally
reported their activities in lurid detail. This annoyed Warren, who took the
matter up with Brandeis. The article was the result.
A. MASON, supra at 70. Presumably there was no 1890 wedding of a child of the 1883
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trusion that the law review article was directed, and certain portions of
it-particularly those dealing with the press and the prevailing social
norms-strike the modern reader as quaint.8 4
The singular contribution of Warren and Brandeis was to recon-
ceptualize certain then-existing legal rules by suggesting that they rested
on an underlying right of privacy. Warren and Brandeis carefully
analyzed a series of English and American common-law decisions,
chiefly from the nineteenth century, dealing with the publication of
information about a person (or a person's writings, belongings, or
photographs) without that person's consent. The cases showed a con-
sistent pattern of protection of privacy, but the courts had rested their
decisions on theories of invasion of a property interest or a breach of
contract or trust. Warren and Brandeis argued that the interest really
being protected was privacy. That principle, they asserted, better
explained the line of cases; the courts had simply stretched the property
marriage. As Mason's account implies, the 1883 event was Warren's only marriage. See I
MARQUIS-WHO'S WHO, WHO WAS WHO IN AMmRICA 1303 (1968) (Vol. I 1897-1942).
Regardless of the precise event which stimulated Warren and Brandeis to write, it was,
as Prosser observed, "an annoyance for which the press, the advertisers and the entertain-
ment industry of America were to pay dearly over the next seventy years." Prosser, Privacy,
supra at 383.
84.
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and
of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a
prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns
of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with
idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The
intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining in-
fluence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain
and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. Nor is the
harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those who may be
made the subjects of journalistic or other enterprise. In this, as in other branches
of commerce, the supply creates the demand. Each crop of unseemly gossip,
thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct proportion to its circula-
tion, results in a lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently
harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles
and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing
the thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip attains the dignity of
print, and crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community,
what wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance.
Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side of human nature which is never
wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be
surprised that it usurps the place of interest in brains capable of other things.
Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthu-
siasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 196.
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and contract rules in order to reach that result. Thus, argued the
authors, there should be explicit recognition that the common law had
already conferred protection on privacy interests:
The principle which protects personal writings and any other pro-
ductions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy,
and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this
protection to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal
relation, domestic or otherwise . 5
The authors went on to suggest limitations on this proposed right to
privacy 6 and remedies for its breach. 7
In its inception, therefore, the proposed right to privacy was in-
tended to be a new branch of tort law. The right to privacy bore a
relationship to constitutional law only insofar as the first amendment
might prove to be a barrier to recovery in some cases. While the Bill
of Rights has been the touchstone for the constitutional right to privacy
in the sixties and seventies,88 it is not mentioned by Warren and
Brandeis: theirs is a common-law rule.88
The invasion of privacy tort has now been adopted through court
decision or legislation in virtually all American jurisdictions. 0 Prosser
asserted that "[t]o date, the law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds
of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied
together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing
85. Id. at 213 (footnote omitted). "The cases referred to above show that the common
law has for a century and a half protected privacy in certain cases, and to grant the
further protection now suggested would be merely another application of an existing
rule." Id. n.l.
86. Id. at 214-19.
87. Id. at 219-20.
88. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and section V infra.
89. Warren and Brandeis' silence about the first amendment may surprise present-day
readers. The proposed action for invasion of privacy was aimed directly at newspapers,
which Warren and Brandeis held in low esteem. See note 84 supra. They proposed a
strong set of remedies, including an action in tort for injury to feelings and, in some
cases, injunctive relief; they suggested legislative consideration of possible criminal penal-
ties and included a proposed statute in a footnote. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at
219 & n.3. While public-interest exceptions were provided for, id. at 214-19, nonetheless
the potential for conflict with the first amendment seems clear. By contrast, the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts devotes attention to first amendment limitations to the
action for invasion of privacy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Special Note
on Relation of § 652D to the First Amendment to the Constitution; § 652E, Comment d;
§ 652H, Comment c. Warren and Brandeis' position is not surprising, however, in view
of the state of first amendment law in that period. A constitutional privilege in defama-
tion and invasion of privacy cases is a very recent development. See New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Note, Media Liability for Libel of Newsworthy
Persons: Before and After Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 446 (1977).
90. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 19, at 804.
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in common except that each represents an interference with the right
of the plaintiff 'to be let alone.' "91 Prosser's formulation, which has
gained general acceptance,9 2 consists of the following categories:
(1) Appropriation: the unauthorized use of a person's name or
likeness for some advantage, usually pecuniary.92
(2) Intrusion: invading one's solitude by intruding in one's home
or business quarters, physically or by electronic eavesdropping.
94
(3) Public Disclosure of Private Facts: private information about a
person which is true, and therefore not defamatory, but which a reason-
able person would find highly objectionable if given wide publicity.
Examples have included posting a sign that a person owed money and
would not pay; disclosure of the present identity and past history of a
reformed criminal; medical pictures of intimate anatomy; and highly
personal portrayal of intimate private characteristics. 5
(4) False Light in the Public Eye: widespread publicity to facts
which will show the person in a false light even though the facts them-
selves may or may not be defamatory. Examples include falsely attribut-
ing an opinion or statement to a person, or the use of a plaintiff's
picture with an article to which it bears no relationship, for example,
using an honest taxi drivers's face to illustrate an article about dishonest
taxi drivers.98
Each of the above tort actions is designed to vindicate a privacy
interest. In some instances the invasion of privacy tort will overlap
other torts. Intrusion may in some circumstances also be actionable as
trespass to property or assault, and false light invasion of privacy will
often be actionable as defamation. The underlying privacy interest,
however, differs from the property interest vindicated in a trespass
action, or the interest in being free from apprehension of harm which
is rectified by an action for assault, or the interest in unsullied reputa-
tion which is protected by a defamation action.
91. Id.
92. Bloustein described Prosser as "by far the most influential contemporary exponent
of the tort," supporting the assertion by reference to the number of reported decisions
relying on Prosser and to the reflection of Prosser's views in the drafting of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 964 (1964); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
ch. 28A (1976). Prosser served as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) until his resigna-
tion in 1970.
93. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 19, at 804-07; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652C (1976).
94. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 19, at 807-09; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652B (1976).
95. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 19, at 809-12; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652D (1976).
96. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 19, at 812-14; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652E (1976).
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Confusion may be avoided if a bright line is drawn between the
foregoing common-law invasion of privacy tort on the one hand, and
the federal constitutional right of privacy on the other. Despite the
popularity of the invasion of privacy tort, it is not the source from
which the United States constitutional right of privacy evolved. Instead,
the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut"7 rested
on the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment. As the next
sections make clear, there is no linkage between the invasion of privacy
tort and the constitutional right of privacy.
IV. PRIVACY INTERESTS IN UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The word "privacy" does not appear in the United States Constitu-
tion or the Bill of Rights. Not until the late nineteenth century did the
United States Supreme Court begin to discuss privacy as an interest
protected by the fourth and fifth amendments, and not until 1965 did
it confer on privacy the status of a constitutional right.
This development followed two separate, but related, lines. The
earlier was the gradual recognition by the Court that existing provisions
of the Bill of Rights protect privacy interests. The later involved actual
recognition of a constitutional right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.98 Oddly enough, the constitutional privacy right did not follow
automatically from an earlier line of decisions. Nor did Griswold
produce a unified, general privacy right, but rather one of limited
scope.
To the modern reader, it may appear obvious that the Bill of Rights
protects privacy interests. Professor Westin has argued, on admittedly
slender evidence, that contemporaries of the Framers expressly
recognized that privacy was the interest being protected.
The technological realities of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century America limited communication to direct speech or letter.
Eyes and ears were the only instruments for physical surveillance;
penetration of the mind was possible only by torture or compelled
testimony; and there was little extensive record keeping about in-
dividuals. Given this setting, American constitutional, statutory, and
common law concentrated on establishing shields of privacy to pro-
tect individual and organizational autonomy, ensure personal and
family privacy in the home, and safeguard confidentiality in the basic
modes of communication."
97. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
98. Id.
99. A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 330,
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According to Westin, the Framers defined privacy in modes of thought
heavily influenced by John Locke: belief in individualism, the principle
of limited government, and the "central importance of private property
and its linkage with the individual's exercise of liberty."1 °°
As Westin explains, there are no significant cases interpreting the
free speech and free press provisions of the first amendment prior to
the Civil War, and no important federal cases on the fourth amend-
ment until the 1880's.101 Consequently, there is no authoritative state-
ment by the Supreme Court from the period of time in which the
intent of the Framers would have been common knowledge. Westin
has relied in part on inference and in part on the writings of figures
like Justice Story, who wrote of the rights of "private sentiment" and
"private judgment,"10 and Francis Lieber, who wrote of "freedom of
communion" and "liberty of silence."1 0 3
Whatever may have been the degree of express recognition that
privacy was an important interest protected by the Bill of Rights, the
Lockean conceptual framework was controlling. Individualism and
private property were themselves values to be protected. One student
has also suggested that the prevailing modes of legal thought have had
a significant influence in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, given
the shift from the legal formalism of the nineteenth century to legal
realism in the twentieth. 0 4
The Supreme Court's early handling of privacy interests may be
illustrated by reference to several decisions. One leading case was Boyd
v. United States,10 5 decided in 1886, which Brandeis once described as
"a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the
United States.""00 The Supreme Court held that production of private
papers could never be compelled in a criminal prosecution; to do so
would violate the fourth and fifth amendments.
The crucial point in Boyd was the method of analysis: the focus
was on the nature of the object seized, rather than on the process by
which it was obtained. The Court noted that "the act of 1863 was
the first act in this country. . . which authorized the search and seizure
of a man's private papers, or the compulsory production of them .. .
100. Id.; see Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 949-51 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Formalism].
101. A. WESnTN, supra note 4, at 331, 333.
102. Id. at 331.
103. Id.
104. See Note, Formalism, supra note 100, for an excellent treatment of this topic.
105. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
106. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
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in a criminal case."' 10 7 The court then distinguished between the seizure
of stolen or forfeited goods, in which the possessor had no property
interest, and the seizure of one's books and papers-one's rightful
property-in order to obtain information or evidence. "In the one case,
the government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the
other it is not."'08 Even with the assistance of court process, the com-
pulsory production of private papers was per se an unreasonable search
and seizure:
The principles . . . affect the very essence of constitutional liberty
and security .... [T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the
government ... of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the in-
vasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty
and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his
conviction of some public offence .... Breaking into a house and
opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any
forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of
his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime
or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment.
In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into
each other.109
Two justices concurred in the Court's view of the fifth amend-
ment but did not believe the fourth amendment to be applicable." 0
Foreshadowing the modern view, they argued that searches-even of
private papers-"founded on affidavits, and made under warrants which
described the thing to be searched for, the person and place to be
searched, are still permitted.""'
Decisions in subsequent decades eroded Boyd, bringing the Court
ever closer to the position of the dissent." 2 Finally, in Warden v.
Hayden,"51 the Court discarded fourth amendment classifications based
on the character of the property seized. Rejecting distinctions between
"mere evidence" on the one hand, and "instrumentalities, fruits of
crime, or contraband"1' 4 on the other, Justice Brennan wrote:
107. 116 U.S. at 622-23.
108. Id. at 623. - 'Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest
property . I..."' d. at 627-28 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 630.
110. Id. at 638-41 (Miller, J., and Waite, c.J., concurring).
111. Id. at 641.
112. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967) for a detailed analysis of the
property and privacy interests involved in .the line of decisions after Boyd.
113. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
114. Id. at 301.
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The premise that property interests control the right of the Govern-
ment to search and seize has been discredited .... We have recognized
that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection
of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded
fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts. 115
The Hayden majority was at pains to point out that a privacy analysis
permits motions to suppress to be made by persons who do not have
a sufficient possessory interest to maintain trespass or replevin, the
historic methods of obtaining exclusion of illegally seized evidence." 6
But the shift to a privacy analysis was double-edged, for it enlarged the
area of permissible searches, subject only to the fourth amendment
procedural requirements of probable cause, particularity, and approval
by a neutral and detached magistrate."1 7 Arguably the express recogni-
tion that privacy was the interest protected by the fourth amendment
occurred at the expense of that same interest, since a previously shielded,
albeit ill-defined, zone of privacy was removed by the decision. 18
The Court's early method of analysis may also be illustrated by the
decision in Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford."9 There plaintiff sued
in federal court for physical injuries sustained while traveling on one
of the defendant's trains. Defendant's motion for a physical examina-
tion of the plaintiff was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, reason-
ing that
115. Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 303-04.
117. Id. at 309-10 (by implication), 306--07, 310-12 (Fortas, J., and Warren, C.J., con-
curring); 312-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 312-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting). But cf. id. at 309 (questioning whether
the "mere evidence" rule afforded any meaningful protection of privacy).
While the Court has not directly overruled Boyd, it has questioned its continuing
authority:
It would appear that ... the precise claim sustained in Boyd would now be rejected
for reasons not there considered.
The pronouncement in Boyd that a person may not be forced to produce his
private papers has nonetheless often appeared as dictum in later opinions of this
Court. . . .To the extent, however, that the rule against compelling production
of private papers rested on the proposition that seizures of or subpoenas for "mere
evidence," including documents, violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore
also transgressed the Fifth, . . . the foundations for the rule have been washed
away.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408-09 (1976) (citations omitted); accord, United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 n.l (1976); Andreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 &
n.6 (1976); see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 483 n.19 (1976). Justice Brennan, in his
concurring opinion in Fisher, vigorously disagreed with the majority's privacy analysis and
asserted that Fisher is "but another step in the denigration of privacy principles settled
nearly 100 years ago in Boyd v. United States .... " Id. at 414 (citation omitted).
For an excellent analysis of this line of decisions and the implications for privacy, see
Note, Formalism, supra note 100.
119. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
TOWARD A RIGHT OF PRIVACY
No right is held more sacred . . .by the common law, than the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law .... The right to one's
person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let
alone."
The inviolability of the person is as much invaded by a compul-
sory stripping and exposure as by a blow. . . . [It is] an indignity,
an assault and a trespass; and no order or process ... was ever known
to the common law ... except in a very small number of cases...
coming down from ruder ages ... and never.., introduced into this
country.1
20
The decision rested, it should be noted, on common-law, rather than
constitutional, principles.
A half-century later, in Sibbach v. Wilson &' Co.,"' the Court dis-
tinguished Botsford on technical grounds, thus sustaining the validity
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provided for precisely
the sort of physical examination found so objectionable in Botsford.122
The Sibbach majority scarcely mentioned the privacy issue, stating
"The suggestion that the rule offends the important right to freedom
of invasion of the person ignores the fact that, as we hold, no invasion
of freedom from personal restraint attaches to refusal so to comply with
its provisions. ' '"M Four dissenting justices conceded that the rules did
not allow a contempt citation for the plaintiff's refusal submit to a
physical examination, but argued that available sanctions were com-
pulsive nonetheless. 24 Justice Frankfurter wrote
The problem seems to me to be controlled by the policy underlying
the Botsford decision....
[A] drastic change in public policy in a matter deeply
120. Id. at 251-52, quoting Judge Cooley. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying
text.
121. 12 U.S. 1 (1941).
122. The majority reasoned that Botsford had been decided at a time when no
federal or state statute was controlling with regard to the validity of a physical examina-
tion; thus the issue was decided in federal court on common-law principles. In 1934, how-
ever, Congress had legislated, granting the Court the authority to adopt rules of civil pro-
cedure. The remaining question, therefore, was whether the rules were substantive or
procedural; they were found to be procedural.
Sibbach dealt with the validity of the Federal Rules as applied to a plaintiff; the
Rules were sustained as applied to a defendant in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104
(1964).
123. 312 U.S. at 14.
124. 312 U.S. at 17-18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to
privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to
formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of
business on the civil side of the federal courts. 12 5
While Boyd dealt with the sanctity of papers and personal effects,
and Botsford with the sanctity of one's person, the wiretap cases indi-
cate the Court's position on yet another privacy issue. In Olmstead v.
United States,126 the Court affirmed, 5-4, convictions for bootlegging
which were based on information gathered by wiretapping. Taking a
literal reading of the fourth amendment, the Court first reasoned that
conversations are not tangible, and therefore are not "things to be
seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.127 Since the
conversations were not protected, the only remaining inquiry was
whether there had been a physical intrusion into the defendants'
houses or offices which would constitute an "unreasonable search." The
Court answered in the negative, because the taps had been made "with-
out trespass upon any property of the defendants.' 28 Since the tele-
phone wire stretched beyond the defendants' houses, reasoned the
Court, the wires were not protected, nor could defendants have any
reasonable expectation that the telephone messages would be pro-
tected.112
Justice Brandeis, already spiritual father of a common-law right
of privacy by virtue of the 1890 law review article, dissented.2 0 He
argued that the Constitution should be flexibly construed to meet
changed conditions of society. In his view, wiretapping made eaves-
dropping possible on a scale which made the former writs of assistance
and general warrants "puny" by comparison:"
125. Id.
We are left to wonder in what direction lies progress. While (as will be explored
below) the law presently affords protection to certain expectations of privacy apart from
one's home, person, or property, the shift in focus to the reasonableness of the process
by which one's privacy is invaded has left us subject to a variety of poking and probing:
blood tests to determine intoxication, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); stop
and frisk, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); body cavity searches, e.g., United States v.
Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1974); and physical examinations of the type disallowed
in Botsford. All with due process of law, of course.
126. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
127. Id. at 464. Italics in original.
128. Id. at 457, 464, 466.
129. Id. at 465-66. The Court stated that there was "no room in the present case for
applying the Fifth Amendment unless the Fourth Amendment was first violated. There
was no evidence of compulsion to induce the defendants to talk over their many tele-
phones." Id. at 462.
130. Id. at 471.
131. Id. at 475-76.
TOWARD A RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect ...
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment .2
The Brandeis view was ultimately to prevail, but several decades
intervened before the Court changed its position. Until the Court re-
versed itself, the legitimacy of wiretapping continued to depend on
the law of trespass. Thus, in Goldman v. United States,'33 a detectaphone
placed against the wall of an adjoining office did not constitute a
trespass and therefore did not violate the fourth amendment,"4 but in
Silverman v. United States s35 a "spike mike" which penetrated the
defendant's wall by "a fraction of an inch''13 6 did constitute an in-
trusion sufficient to violate the Constitution.
Finally, in Katz v. United States'13 7 the Court abandoned the notion
of constitutionally protected places and reaffirmed the view of Warden
v. Hayden that the fourth amendment protects privacy interests. In so
doing, it overruled Olmstead and Goldman:138
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected. 39
132. ld. at 478.
133. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
134. Id. at 134.
135. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
136. Id. at 512.
A distinction between the detectaphone employed in Goldman and the spike
mike utilized here seemed to the Court of Appeals too fine a one to draw. The
Court was "unwilling to believe that the respective rights are to be measured in
fractions of inches." But the decision here does not turn upon the technicality of
a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local law. It is based upon the reality
of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. . . . We find no
occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but we decline to go beyond it, by even
a fraction of an inch.
Id.
137. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
138. Id. at 353.
139. Id. at 351-52 (citation omitted).
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In Katz, the petitioner's telephone call from a public telephone booth
had been wiretapped without a physical intrusion. In reversing the
conviction, the Court ruled that a warrant should have been obtained.
The expectation of privacy, rather than the character of the place,
became controlling; the rules of property law were specifically dis-
avowed.140 While the shift away from the Court's early method of fourth
amendment analysis arguably resulted in a diminution of privacy in
Warden v. Hayden and Sibbach, in Katz the protection of fourth amend-
ment privacy interests resulted in an enhanced privacy safeguard: tele-
phone conversations were brought into the zone of protection.
Katz illustrates one other important aspect of the Supreme Court's
treatment of privacy. Warden v. Hayden and Katz were both decided
in 1967, two years after the Court had announced the limited constitu-
tional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.141 While it is sig-
nificant that the Court in Warden v. Hayden and Katz ruled that the
fourth amendment protected privacy interests, thereby making a full
transition away from nineteenth century analysis, it is equally significant
that the Katz Court emphatically refused to blend the fourth amend-
ment privacy interest into the Griswold constitutional right of privacy:
MThe Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general consti-
tutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual
privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its pro-
tections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.
Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from
other forms of governmental invasion.42 But the protection of a
person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
people143-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life,
left largely to the law of the individual States.:4 4
140. Id. at 352-53, citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in elec-
tronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
389 U.S. at 353.
The phrase "expectation of privacy" appears in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion,
id. at 360.
141. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
142. Citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (first amendment associa-
tional privacy); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (fifth amendment; prohibiting
comment on refusal to testify-retroactive application).
143. Citing Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3.
144. 389 U.S. at 350-51 (footnotes omitted). As examples of matters left to the states,
the Court cited three cases involving conflict between privacy rights and the first amend-
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The line between Griswold's right of privacy and other privacy interests
is thus drawn very clearly by the Court.
Other cases may be briefly mentioned, for privacy interests have
been implicated in connection with several amendments. In NAACP
v. Alabama'145 for example, the first amendment was held to protect
"freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations."' 4 In Stanley v.
Georgia,'1 47 the Court ruled that the first and fourteenth amendments
protect private possession of printed or filmed matter-in that case,
obscene materials-in one's home. 4 1 The third amendment "prohibition
against the unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers protects an-
other aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion. '' 14 9 A con-
temporary statement of the policies underlying the fifth amendment,
in some ways reminiscent of Boyd, reasoned, "[the fifth amendment]
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations:
* . .our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of
the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead
a private life' ...... 15 To similar effect, the Court has said, "The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man.'' 151
The foregoing cases are illustrative of the gradual process by which
the Court has shifted away from the Lockean values-a formal protec-
tion of person, place, and property-and has substituted instead an
examination of underlying privacy interests. Privacy has gradually
become part of the federal constitutional lexicon, and privacy interests
have been recognized in connection with several important provisions
of the Bill of Rights. Remaining to be considered is the related but
distinct development of the federal constitutional right of privacy itself.
V. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Though the opinion nowhere mentions a "right of privacy," Skinner
v. Oklahoma,'5 2 decided in 1942, is generally regarded as having "pro-
ment. Id. at 351 n.7; see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (state invasion of privacy
action can be maintained against publisher if misstatements in article were made with
knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth); Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951) (municipality may protect householders' desire for privacy by prohibiting
door-to-door magazine sales by publisher); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (munici-
pality may protect privacy of citizens by prohibition of "loud and raucous" sound trucks).
145. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
146. Id. at 462; see id. at 466.
147. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
148. Id. at 564-68.
149. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350 n.5.
150. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
151. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
152. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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vided the modern genesis for its constitutional status."'' 5 In Skinner, the
United States Supreme Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute which
allowed the sterilization of "habitual criminals"-persons who, having
been twice convicted of "felonies involving moral turpitude," were
again convicted of such a felony and sentenced to prison. 5 4 Proceed-
ings could be instituted by the state attorney general against such an
offender, who then had a right to jury trial on the sole issue of whether
or not he or she could undergo the necessary sterilization operation
without impairment of his or her general health. 55
While the petitioner argued for invalidation of the law on a variety
of theories, the Court chose to rely on the equal protection clause.
Under the peculiarities of the Oklahoma scheme, a person thrice guilty
of larceny of $20 was liable to be sterilized; a person convicted three
times for embezzlement of the same amount was not.'56
Skinner foreshadowed the Griswold decision, however, in its treat-
ment of the right of procreation. Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, was emphatic that such fundamental interests called for the
strictest scrutiny of the Oklahoma statute:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race .... There is no redemp-
tion for the individual whom the law touches .... He is forever de-
prived of a basic liberty. 157
It was in Griswold v. Connecticut5" that the Supreme Court pro-
vided express recognition of a constitutional right of privacy. Griswold
involved a criminal prosecution. The defendants were the Executive
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and the
Medical Director for the League's center in New Haven. Connecticut
law at that time prohibited the use of contraceptives; violation was a
misdemeanor. In addition, Connecticut law provided that one who
assists, abets, or counsels another "to commit any offense may be prose-
cuted and punished as if he were the principal offender."" 59 The de-
fendants were convicted as accessories and fined. The Supreme Court
reversed the convictions, holding that the statute forbidding the use
of contraceptives violated the right of privacy.
153. W. LOCKHARDT, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1491 (1975).
154. 316 U.S. at 556.
155. Id. at 536-37.
156. Id. at 538-39.
157. ld. at 541.
158. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
159. Id. at 480.
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Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. He emphasized
the "intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role
in one aspect of that relation."'16 0 Douglas then reviewed a variety of
rights which, although not expressly mentioned in the Bill of Rights,
had been found to exist by necessary implication. These included "the
right to educate one's children as one chooses";' 6 ' freedom of inquiry
and thought; 16 2 "freedom to associate and privacy in one's associa-
tions" 16 and "the right of belief.' ' 16 4
"The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras," Douglas said, "formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. ''1 6 He cited
the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments as the source of
this penumbral right, quoting the language from Boyd about "the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,"1 6 and citing several
other cases, including Skinner.'6 7
Douglas concluded: "The present case . . . concerns a relationship
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees."' 68 The Connecticut law was particularly obnoxious
because it prohibited use of contraceptives:
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights .... 169
The members of the Court took divergent views regarding the
existence, dimensions, and source of the right of privacy. Only Justice
Clark was content to join Justice Douglas's opinion without further
elaboration. Justices Goldberg, Brennan, and Chief Justice Warren
joined in the opinion of the Court, but the three also joined in Justice
Goldberg's lengthy concurring opinion. Justices Harlan and White con-
curred only in the judgment, each writing separately. Justices Black and
Stewart dissented vigorously.
160. Id. at 482.
161. Id., citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 483, quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 485.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 485-86.
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg agreed that the right
of marital privacy was embraced in the concept of liberty.10 He placed
particular emphasis on the ninth amendment; that amendment, he
contended, clearly indicated that not all fundamental rights were
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 171 Thus it was unnecessary to find a
specific privacy guaranty in the Bill of Rights. The ninth and
fourteenth amendments in combination, he argued, prohibited the
states from abridging rights that were fundamental. 1 72
Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment only, preferred to
anchor a fundamental right of privacy to the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment "because the enactment violates basic values
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "173 Justice White likewise
concurred in the judgment only. He argued that the justification for
the statute-a state policy of prevention of illicit relationships-was
"purely fanciful." The law swept unnecessarily broadly into the
marriage relationship, and therefore deprived "persons of liberty with-
out due process of law.'
1
1
7 4
Justices Black and Stewart dissented strenuously. Black argued that
there is no express constitutional right of privacy, and he objected to
any effort to import such a right into other constitutional guarantees.
"One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words
... another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less re-
stricted in meaning."'' 5 Conceding that he liked his "privacy as well as
the next one," he said, "I am ... compelled to admit that government
has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional
provision. ' ' 1 71 Justice Stewart, while suggesting the Connecticut law was
170. Id. at 486.
171. ld. at 487-93.
172. Id. at 493.
173. Id. at 500, citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Justice Harlan did not explicitly use the word "privacy" in his concurrence. But
in reaching the conclusion that the Connecticut statute infringed the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, Harlan referred to the "reasons stated at length in my
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman [367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961)] .... ." 381 U.S. at 500.
Poe was a declaratory judgment action brought to challenge the same Connecticut statutes
found unconstitutional in Griswold. The appeal in Poe was dismissed on ripeness grounds
by the Supreme Court. Harlan's dissent thoroughly explored the privacy issue, 367 U.S.
at 539-45, and characterized the Connecticut statute as "an intolerable and unjustifiable
invasion of privacy ...." Id. at 539. Thomas Emerson, counsel for appellants in Griswold,
regarded Harlan as the sixth justice supporting the existence of the right of privacy.
Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 219, 229 (1965).
174. 381 US. at 506-07.
175. Id. at 509.
176. Id. at 510.
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"asinine, ' ' 17 7 likewise found no constitutional source for a right of
privacy.
Thus a clear majority of six justices agreed on the existence of the
right of privacy. 178 It is interesting, though perhaps not very fruitful,
to speculate why the Court chose to recognize a separate "right of
privacy." Clearly, an alternative was available. Justice White argued
persuasively in his concurrence that the Connecticut statute deprived
married couples of liberty without due process of law, in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In so doing, he
cited many of the same cases relied on by the majority to support the
existence of the privacy right. If one's historic entitlements under the
United States Constitution include rights to life, liberty, and
177. Id. at 527.
178. Two underlying issues divided the Court. The first revolved around the "in-
corporationist," "selective incorporationist," and "non-incorporationist" views taken of
the fourteenth amendment. Justice Douglas' majority opinion was believed by the other
members of the Court to indicate that the first eight amendments are completely in-
corporated in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, thus making them
directly applicable in their entirety to the states. See 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J.,
Warren, c.J., and Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 499, 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); id.
at 528 & n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg might be characterized as a "selec-
tive incorporationist": "Although I have not accepted the view that 'due process' as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of the first eight Amendments . . .
I do agree that the concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental,
and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 486 (emphasis added;
citations omitted). Cf. id. at 528 n.1 ("But the Court has held that many of the provisions
of the first eight amendments are fully embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment as limita-
tions upon state action .... " (Stewart, J., dissenting; citations omitted)). Justice Harlan,
the "non-incorporationist," argued that the relevant inquiry was whether the enact-
ment violated "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . . . . While the
relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations." Id. at 500 (citations
omitted).
The other basic dimension of conflict involved the content of the Bill of Rights..
Justice Douglas found the source of the privacy right in "emanations" and "penumbras"
of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 484 (citation omitted). Although Justice Black was, like
Justice Douglas, an "incorporationist," Black vehemently disagreed with Douglas' view
of the content of the Bill of Rights. For Black, the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
must be found in the specific constitutional language. See id. at 508; accord, id. at 527-29
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (by implication).
While the debate is of considerable interest from the standpoint of constitutional
theory, its relevance is now academic. As indicated later in this section, the Court has
concluded that the constitutional source of the right to privacy is the liberty protected
by the fourteenth amendment.
For the view that the privacy decisions rest on the same theoretical basis as the economic
due process decisions beginning with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), see Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). But
compare Professor Kurland's thoughtful analysis, summarized in note 182 infra, arguing
that it is essential to distinguish the doctrine of substantive due process from the related
doctrine of economic due process.
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property, 1" 9 why was it necessary to create a new right to privacy? Would
not the notion of liberty include the idea of a zone of individual privacy
which could not be invaded, absent a showing of a compelling state
interest? If the Court had adopted Justice White's approach, one's
liberty would be protected; privacy would be an interest embraced in
the concept of liberty, although not a separate rightis° Such an analysis
could have proceeded by developing the concept of liberty along the
lines explored by John Stuart Mill in his classic essay, On Liberty,
reviewed in more detail in section VI below.""' The majority's reasons
for rejecting this approach were not explained and Justice White's
opinion was not criticized or commented on by the majority.18 2
Too, it is not clear why the Court chose to utilize the phrase, "right
to privacy." As Justice Black pointed out in a caustic footnote, it has
179. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. ... U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
180. Justice Harlan's approach would yield the same result. However, Justice Harlan's
concurrence focused on his objections to the "incorporationist" approach to the inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment. Justice White's concurring opinion, by contrast,
was devoted to a demonstration that earlier cases directly supported invalidation of the
Connecticut statute on a conventional due process theory.
181. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1956).
182. Professor Emerson has suggested that the Court was reluctant to rest its decision
on substantive due process grounds, because it would involve dealing with two significant
unresolved issues:
The first was whether the Court would undertake to elaborate a distinction between
the application of substantive due process to cases involving personal rights and
its application to cases concerning economic rights. The second involved the ques-
tion as to what standards of due process are to be employed in considering legisla-
tion based not on objective facts related to the public welfare, but rather on
grounds of purely moral principle.
Emerson, supra note 173, at 223. Only Justice White rested his opinion directly on sub-
stantive due process grounds. He did so without, as Emerson put it, entering "into more
subtle analysis of the due process clause." Id. at 225.
While recognition of a constitutional right of privacy allowed the majority to avoid
the analytical difficulties of the due process issue, this created theoretical issues that
appear to be equally difficult. Moreover, to the extent that the majority's privacy analysis
rested on the fourteenth amendment, it appears that the substantive due process dilemma
was not avoided at all.
Professor Kurland has argued that the privacy cases can only be understood as substan-
tive due process decisions. Kurland, The Private 1, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO MAGAZINE,
Autumn, 1976, at 11. See also notes 223-24 and text accompanying notes 197, 230, and
257 infra. Kurland is careful to distinguish substantive due process from the related
doctrine of economic due process.
In the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, the concept of individuals
and individual freedom was perverted into a form of constitutional protection
against the regulation of corporate and organizational economic activities. It should
be clear that privacy is an individual's right and not that of a corporation, or a
class, or an association. When the affairs regulated are not those of individuals but
those of groups, the concern is not privacy. This is not, of course, to suggest that
corporations, classes, organizations, and associations are not entitled to constitu-
tional protections, including certainly those of due process of law and freedom of
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little in common with Warren and Brandeis' tort except for the name. 183
It must have been predictable that use of the phrase to describe the
tort, as well as an unrelated constitutional right, would cause con-
fusion. The new right could have been defined more narrowly-as a
right of intimate decision-making, for example' 4-or it could have been
connected to fundamental decisions regarding marriage and procrea-
tion, without being given a general description like "privacy."
On the other hand, by the time of the Griswold decision in 1965,
privacy had been part of the lexicon of constitutional interpretation for
nearly eighty years. The Boyd decision had spoken of "the privacies of
life"' 8 5 in 1886, four years before the appearance of Warren and
Brandeis' famous Harvard Law Review article. Indeed, Brandeis, ad-
vocate for a common-law right of privacy, also championed the constitu-
tional protection of privacy in his eloquent Olmstead dissent., 6 As
illustrated above, a long line of cases had come increasingly to treat
privacy as the interest protected by a number of constitutional
guarantees. If one adopts the view that privacy is the basic interest pro-
tected by key provisions of the Bill of Rights, then explicit recognition
of a "right of privacy" makes a great deal of sense.
It is even more intriguing to inquire what the individual members
of the Court had in mind when they recognized a constitutional privacy
right. The opinions of the justices give no clue to what the majority
believed the scope of the right to privacy would be. Having extracted
an abstract privacy concept from the concrete provisions of the Bill
of Rights, the Court was free to apply the privacy idea to situations
not reached by the specific prohibitions of the Bill of Rights, precisely
as Justice Black feared.'1 7 But the Griswold opinions do not reveal how
far the members of the 1965 Court believed this new right of privacy
ultimately would reach. The majority did cite two law review articles;
in addition, Justice Douglas had published a series of lectures on
privacy, though his book was not cited in any of the opinions. 18
speech and press and political activities. It is simply to say that the right of
privacy is essentially the right of a person, an individual, a human being.
The right of privacy cannot bear the burden of including freedom of corpora-
tions and unions from regulation. To broaden it so is to destroy it.
Kurland, supra at 34.
183. 381 U.S. at 510 n.1.
184. See Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision,
64 CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1450 (1976) [hereinafter Taxonomy].
185. 116 U.S. at 630, quoted in section IV supra.
186. 277 U.S. at 438, quoted in section IV supra.
187. See 381 U.S. at 509.
188. Douglas cited Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Su'. CT. REV.
212; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960). Douglas did not
cite his own book, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE (1958).
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Neither the articles nor Justice Douglas' book, however, described the
scope of a constitutional privacy right in other than very broad terms.18
189. Beaney's article, supra note 188, contains a careful review of the protection of
privacy by the fourth and fifth amendments, and to some extent, the fourteenth. He
concluded that, as of 1962, the Court's "niggardly" construction of the fourth amend-
ment, even combined with the protection of the fifth amendment, furnished "only
modest protection of the right to privacy." Beaney, supra note 188, at 250-51. He con-
cluded that a broader right to privacy was needed, "based on the 'liberty' concept in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 250. He added, "[P]erhaps the immediate
objective should be to define the right, without so much initial concern for the remedy."
Id.
Griswold's article, supra note 188, was a much narrower inquiry, reviewing the role of
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination-then under considerable attack
-in the protection of liberty. He focused on the function of the fifth amendment as a
restraint on governmental power against the individual, with particular reference to
Congressional investigations of the 1950's.
Douglas' book, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE, was "in substantial part" a series of lectures
delivered at Franklin and Marshall College in 1957. Organized into three major sub-
divisions, Lecture II is entitled "The Right to be Let Alone" and treats the topic of
privacy. (Lecture I deals with the related topic of "Freedom of Expression"; Lecture III,
entitled "The Civilian Authority," deals with the relationship between civilian and mili-
tary courts.)
About the right of privacy Justice Douglas said,
The individual needs protection from government itself . . . . The Framers
of the Constitution realized this and undertook to establish safeguards and guaran-
tees. Some of these concern the procedure that must be followed if government
undertakes to move against the citizen. Others concern substantive rights such
as freedom of religion and freedom of assembly.
There is, indeed, a congeries of these rights that may conveniently be called
the right to be let alone. They concern the right of privacy-sometimes explicit
and sometimes implicit in the Constitution. This right of privacy protects free-
dom of religion and freedom of conscience. It protects the privacy of the home
and the dignity of the individual. Under modern conditions, it involves wire-
tapping and the use of electronic devices to pick up the confidences of private con-
versations. It also concerns the problem of the captive audience presented in
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 . . . . I should also mention
the right to travel . . . . This right to be let alone is a guarantee that draws
substance from several provisions of the Constitution, including the First, the
Fourth, and the Fifth Amendments.
Id. at 57-58. After quoting Brandeis' famous passage from his dissent in Olmstead (set
forth in section IV supra), Douglas continued,
The natural rights of which I speak . . . have a broad base in morality and
religion to protect man, his individuality, and his conscience against direct and
indirect interference by government. Some are written explicitly into the Constitu-
tion. Others are to be implied. The penumbra of the Bill of Rights reflects human
rights ....
Much of this liberty of which we boast comes down to the right of privacy.
Id. at 58-59.
Saying that "[t]his right-the right to be let alone-has suffered greatly in recent
years," id. at 59, Douglas proceeded to examine the events of the 1950's which he be-
lieved posed the greatest threats to individual privacy. Major topics included legislative
investigations, loyalty investigations, religious freedom, the sanctity of the home, and the
right to defy an unconstitutional statute.
Douglas' view of privacy and its relationship to individual liberty was an expansive one.
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Events since Griswold have done little to bear out Justice Black's
fears. Though the decision triggered much debate and criticism, 90 and
left great uncertainty over the future course of the right of privacy, 9'
delineation of scope and boundaries has proceeded by the familiar
common-law process of case-by-case explication. Through its subsequent
cases, the Court has for the most part confined the right of privacy to
carefully drawn boundaries rather than undertaking sweeping constitu-
tional initiatives. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,'92 the Court extended the
privacy right to unmarried persons, invalidating a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives (for purposes of contra-
ception, rather than disease prevention) to anyone other than a married
person. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'93
In Roe v. Wade 94 and Doe v. Bolton,'9s the right of privacy was
extended to another aspect of "the decision whether to bear or
beget a child": the right to an abortion. These companion cases in-
validated the Texas and Georgia abortion statutes, respectively. Roe
As his book was not cited by the Court, it is impossible to know whether other members
of the Court held similar views or had developed any clear theory of the scope of the
constitutional privacy right.
190. See, e.g., the symposia in PRIVACY (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971) [herein-
after cited as PRIVACY] and in 64 MICH. L. REv. 197-288 (1965). One writer, in raising
questions about the implications of Griswold, characterized the decision as "well-meaning
sloppiness of thought." Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIvACY, supra at 182,
192-93. Another wrote:
[D]ifferent senses of the word "privacy" were punned upon, and the legal concept
generally mismanaged in ways too various to recount here .... The opinion was not
illuminating on the question of what are proper bounds for the exercise of legisla-
tive power, which was the crucial matter before the court. It is precisely the issue
of what rights to autonomous determination of his affairs are enjoyed by a
citizen. . . . If the confusion in the court's argument was inadvertent, one may
sympathize with the deep conceptual difficulties which produced it, and if it was
deliberately contrived, admire its ingenuity.
Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY, supra at 169, 180-81.
191. Included among those uncertain of the future dimensions of a constitutional
right to privacy was Professor Emerson, counsel in Griswold, who had argued the privacy
theory before the Court. The appellants' case had dealt with "a relatively narrow area."
Emerson, supra note 173, at 251. The privacy argument had centered on the privacy of
the home and the privacy of the marital relationship. See Brief for Appellants at 85;
Emerson, supra note 173, at 231. While Emerson characterized the recognition of the
right of privacy as "a bold innovation" and "a step with enormous consequences," id. at
229, he was left to speculate over its future scope. See id. at 228-34.
192. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
193. Id. at 453 (citation omitted).
194. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
195. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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articulated the nature of the state interest in the abortion decision and
defined the point at which the state's interest becomes compelling; at
that point regulation of the abortion decision might occur. Roe further
expounded the dimensions of the privacy right, indicating that it is
founded upon a person's protected liberty:
[The Court's] decisions make it clear that only personal rights that
can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" . . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They
also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities re-
lating to marriage, . . . procreation . . . contraception. . . . family
relationships .... and child rearing and education .... 196
The Court went on to settle the heated Griswold debate about the
source of the right to privacy by adopting, in effect, Justice White's
view:
This right of privacy, whether it be found in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termin-
ate her pregnancy. 9 7
196. Id. at 152-53. As to education, the Court has ruled that the privacy right
is not absolute. In Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the Supreme Court held
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, prohibited racial exclusion in private
schools, since such exclusion abridged the § 1981 guaranty of "the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " 427 U.S. at 170.
The proprietors of the private school contended unsuccessfully that § 1981, as applied,
violated the right of privacy. Id. at 175. The Court said:
But it does not follow that because government is largely or even entirely pre-
cluded from regulating the child-bearing decision, it is similarly restricted by the
Constitution from regulating the implementation of parental decisions concerning
a child's education.
... [W]hile parents have a constitutional right to send their children to private
schools . . . . they have no constitutional right to provide their children with
private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.
Id. at 178.
197. 410 U.S. at 153. The quoted language is subject to the interpretation that the
Court had not decisively resolved the issue. However, in Whalen v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 869
(1977), any possible doubts were dispelled. The Court repeated the quoted language,
adding emphasis to the phrase, "as we feel it is." Id. at 876 n.23. It explained:
Language in prior opinions of the Court or its individual Justices provides support
for the view that some personal rights "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" . . . are so "fundamental" that an undefined penumbra may provide them
with an independent source of constitutional protection. In Roe v. Wade, . . . how-
ever, after carefully reviewing those cases, the Court expressed the opinion that
the "right of privacy" is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty.
Id. (citations omitted).
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In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,"", the Court ruled that the
right of consent to an abortion belonged to the mother. The Court
invalidated a Missouri statute requiring consent by the spouse, or by
the parent of a minor child.19 As in Eisenstadt, the right of privacy is
personal to the individual and is not restricted to the marital unit only.
Last Term, in Carey v. Population Services International,2°0 the
Court invalidated a New York statute which forbade any sale or dis-
tribution of contraceptives to minors under the age of 16, authorized
distribution of contraceptives to minors 16 and older only by licensed
pharmacists, and forbade the advertising or display of contraceptives.2 0 '
The key word here was "decision." The Court noted that "[tihis right
of personal privacy includes 'the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of decisions,' " and added that "the outer limits of this
aspect of privacy have not been marked .... ,202 After reviewing Gris-
wold and related cases, the Court said,
These decisions put Griswold in proper perspective. Griswold may
no longer be read as holding only that a State may not prohibit a
married couple's use of contraceptives. Read in light of its progeny,
the teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual
decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by
the State.203
Since availability of contraceptives was an integral part of the ability
to make a meaningful choice, the state could not impose such dramatic
limitations on access to contraceptives absent a showing of a compelling
state interest. The Court ruled that the state had not made the necessary
showing.20 4
The outer limit of the Griswold-Roe constellation of procreation,
family relationships, child rearing, and education may be represented
198. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
199. Id. at 67-75. An examination of the opinions suggests that a less sweeping re-
quirement for parental consent might be sustained, if it provided an alternative, such as
judicial review, in case of serious conflict between child and parent. See id. at 74-75 (ma-
jority opinion), citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); 428 U.S. at 90-91 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 94-95 (White, J., Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
200. 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
201. As in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, there was substantial disagreement re-
garding the permissible scope of state regulation of the activities of minors. Justice
Brennan, author of the majority opinion, spoke only for a plurality on this issue. Id. at
2020 n.12; see the concurring opinions of Justices White, Powell, and Stevens and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger dissented without opinion.
202. Id. at 2016.
203. Id. at 2018.
204. Id. at 2019-20.
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by Moore v. City of East Cleveland.20 5 There, a zoning ordinance of
East Cleveland contained a restrictive definition of "family" to be
followed in areas zoned for single-family dwellings. The definition of
"family" specified close degrees of relationship, essentially requiring a
"nuclear" family of parents and children. Appellant, a 63-year-old
grandmother, had living in her home two of her grandsons. One was
the child of her son Dale; the other was the child of her son John.
Thus the grandsons were cousins, not brothers. The relationship was
too distant to satisfy the Cleveland ordinance. Incredibly, the City chose
to prosecute, asserting that one of the grandsons must move out.2"'
Distinguishing its earlier decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,2 0 7
a five-justice majority ruled that the ordinance violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Four of the five justices concluded
that the ordinance infringed a "private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter." 20
These post-Griswold decisions, then, have refined and clarified the
nature of the privacy right. As Roe indicates, the right centers rather
closely around the categories of marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education. While the fore-
going cases were all found to fall within the protection of the constitu-
tional right of privacy,0 " another line of cases illustrates the Court's
consistent refusal to expand the right of privacy beyond existing
boundaries. In Paul v. Davis2 1o the Court refused to expand the constitu-
tional right of privacy to an area traditionally covered, at least in part,
by the tort actions of defamation and invasion of privacy. Respondent
205. 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977).
206. As Justice Brennan viewed the matter,
I agree that the Constitution is not powerless to prevent East Cleveland from
prosecuting as a criminal and jailing a 63-year-old grandmother for refusing to expel
from her home her now 10-year-old grandson who has lived with her and been
brought up by her since his mother's death when he was less than a year old.
Id. at 1939 (Brennan, J., concurring). Ms. Moore had in fact been convicted of violating
the ordinance, fined $25, and sentenced to five days in jail.
207. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Belle Terre had sustained, in the face of a privacy challenge,
a zoning ordinance which prohibited more than two unrelated persons living together.
The ordinance, however, defined "family" to include any degree of relationship by blood,
adoption, or marriage.
208. Justice Stevens reasoned that the ordinance was an impermissible restriction on
appellant's right to use her own property as she saw fit. 97 S. Ct. at 1943 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Chief Justice Burger objected that the appellant had not exhausted local
remedies. Id. at 1947 (Burger, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and White
argued that the ordinance did not offend due process or the right to privacy. Id. at 1952
(Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); id. at 1957 (White, J., dissenting).
209. The possible exception is Moore v. City of East Cleveland, where only a plurality
of four justices agreed that there was a constitutional privacy right. Three justices dis-
agreed, and two justices rested their respective positions on other grounds.
210. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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Davis had been listed, and his photograph included, in a brochure of
"active shoplifters" distributed widely to merchants in the Louisville,
Kentucky, area. At the time the brochure was distributed he had been
charged with shoplifting and had pled not guilty, but the charge had
not been disposed of. Davis brought an action in federal court under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his civil rights, including a
violation of his constitutional right of privacy.
The Court responded by enumerating briefly the constitutional
rights of privacy previously recognized and noted that Davis' cause of
action was not among them.2 11 His interest in reputation was "simply
one of a number which the State may protect against injury by virtue
of its tort law, providing a forum for vindication of those interests by
means of damages actions."2 12 To provide relief, said the Court, "would
make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be super-
imposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the
States." 213
In Kelley v. Johnson,214 another action brought under section 1983,
a county regulation limiting hair length of county policemen was
challenged. Insofar as a constitutional privacy claim was made, the
Court dismissed it in two sentences, again saying that there was no in-
fringement with regard to "basic matters of procreation, marriage, and
family life." 215 In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,2 1 the Court was
confronted with a direct appeal from a three-judge district court, which
had sustained the validity of the Virginia sodomy statute as applied
to consenting sexual behavior between adult males in private. The
three-judge district court had divided 2-1 over the validity of the
statute; the majority and dissenting opinions devoted the bulk of their
attention to the interpretation of Griswold' 17 The Supreme Court
211. Id. at 712-13.
212. Id. at 712.
213. Id. at 701. While the latter two quotations are taken from the Court's discussion
of Davis' claim that there was an infringement of a protected liberty interest, the con-
siderations are equally applicable to an expansion of a constitutional privacy right, and
suggest the reasons why the Court has chosen not to expand it.
214. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
215. Id. at 244.
216. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'd 403 F. Supp. 1199 (1975).
217. The majority relied on Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold, an
opinion that had been joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan. Goldberg
wrote:
Finally, it should be said of the Court's holding today that it in no way inter-
feres with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct. As my
Brother Harlan so well stated in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman . . .
"Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the
State forbids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution
1977]
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summarily affirmed, though three justices would have noted probable
jurisdiction and set the case for argument. 218 The summary affirmance
provided no guidance to the Court's views, though the action was a
ruling on the merits.
2 1 9
The precise significance of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney re-
mains unclear. In its 1977 opinion in Carey v. Population Services
International, the majority stated in a footnote, " 'the Court has not
definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent
the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual
sexual] behavior among adults,' . . . and we do not purport to answer
that question now.
' 22 0
To date, then, the Court has maintained the general trend of post-
Griswold decisions by confining the right of privacy within previously
existing constitutional boundaries. Case like Paul v. Davis, Kelley v.
Johnson, and Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney reflect continuing ad-
herence to the Katz view that the protection of one's general right to
privacy must be left largely to the states. To this general pattern, how-
over, two recent decisions may constitute exceptions. In neither of the
two did the Court actually recognize any extension of the right of
privacy, but some of the dicta suggested the possibility.
Perhaps the most intriguing of these privacy decisions was Whalen
which the State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it
has fostered and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts its power
either to forbid extra-marital sexuality . . . or to say who may marry, but
it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies
inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the
details of that intimacy."
381 U.S. at 498-99 (citation omitted). The second paragraph was quoted in full in the
majority opinion of the district court. 403 F. Supp. at 1201.
The dissenting district court judge reasoned:
I view [Griswold, Roe v. Wade, and Doe v. Bolton] as standing for the principle that
every individual has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern. A mature individual's
choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her own home, would
appear to me to be a decision of the utmost private and intimate concern. Private
consensual sex acts between adults are matters, absent evidence that they are
harmful, in which the state has no legitimate interest.
403 F. Supp. at 1203 (footnote omitted). The dissenting judge pointed out that the marital-
nonmarital distinction articulated by Goldberg and Harlan was repudiated in Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), which extended the right of privacy to individuals who
were married or single. Thus the continuing validity of that portion of Goldberg's con-
currence was open to serious doubt. 403 F. Supp. at 1204.
218. They were Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. 425 U.S. at 901.
219. For an analysis of the precedential value, see Comment, The Constitutionality
of Sodomy Statutes, 45 FORD. L. Riv. 553-56 (1976). Doe was a declaratory judgment
action; appellants were not defendants in a criminal prosecution.
220. 97 S. Ct. at 2018 n.5 (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
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v. Roe.2 2 1 Whalen involved a challenge to a New York statute for the
control of dangerous prescription drugs. Under the New York scheme,
the most dangerous category of prescription drugs could only be pre-
scribed by use of an official form. The form required identification of
the patient, drug, prescribing physician, pharmacy, and dosage. One
copy of the form was sent to the state health department to be entered
into a computer system. The purpose of this elaborate reporting pro-
cedure was to prevent the diversion of dangerous prescription drugs to
unlawful purposes. A three-judge district court had enjoined enforce-
ment of these provisions of the law.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the
New York law valid. The Court reviewed the extensive legislative
studies leading to enactment of the New York law, as well as the
privacy safeguards included in the reporting system. The privacy safe-
guards included secure vault storage; mandatory destruction of records
after five years; operation of the computer "off-line," so that no
terminal outside the records room could obtain access to the informa-
tion; limitation on the number of persons having physical access to
the records room; and criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure
of the records. 2 2 The Court concluded that the statute was rationally
related to a vital state interest in controlling dangerous drugs and
did not unreasonably infringe privacy interests. 2 3
In its approach to the privacy issue, the Court categorized its privacy
decisions in a new way:
The cases sometimes characterized as protecting "privacy" have in fact
involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is
the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions. 224
221. 97 S. Ct. 869 (1977).
222. Id. at 873-74.
223. Id. at 875-76, 877.
In part of its opinion, the Court addressed the doctrine of substantive due
process. According to the Supreme Court, the district court had "found that the State
had been unable to demonstrate the necessity" for the statute. Id. at 875. The Court ruled
that failure to show "necessity" for a statute was not a proper ground for its invalida-
tion; such a standard of review was, in essence, the discredited standard of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The states should "have broad latitude in experimenting
with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern." 97 S. Ct. at 875-76.
224. Id. at 876 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote the Court added:
Professor Kurland has written:
"The concept of a constitutional right of privacy still remains largely undefined.
There are at least three facets that have been partially revealed, but their form
and shape remain to be fully ascertained. The first is the right of the individual
to be free in his private affairs from governmental surveillance and intrusion. The
1977]
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While the Court did not attach shorthand labels to these two basic
types of privacy interests, another writer developed a virtually identical
categorization several years ago. 2 5 Professor Beardsley's schema is
explored in section VI below, but at this point it may be helpful to
introduce her terminology. The "individual interest in avoiding dis-
closure of personal matters" Beardsley would call the "right to selective
disclosure," while the "interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions" she would call the principle of "autonomy. ' ' 2 1
Under the heading of "selective disclosure," or "the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," the Court cited
portions of Olmstead and Griswold, as well as with lesser weight, Stanley
v. Georgia227 and portions of California Bankers Association v. Shultz.228
second is the right of an individual not to have his private affairs made public
by the government. The third is the right of an individual to be free in action,
thought, experience, and belief from governmental compulsion." Kurland, The
Private I, The University of Chicago Magazine 7, 8 (Autumn, 1976).
Id. at 876 n.24. The Court continued, "The first of the facets which he describes is
directly protected by the Fourth Amendment; the second and third correspond to the
two kinds of interests referred to in the text." Id.
225. Beardsley, Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, in PRIvACY, supra note
190, at 56.
226. Id.
227. 97 S. Ct. at 876 n.25, citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
228. 97 S. Ct. at 876 n.25. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), pre-
sented a challenge to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and regulations promulgated there-
under. These require that banks engage in large-scale recordkeeping and reporting on
banking activity of depositors which exceeded certain relatively low dollar amounts. (For
example, copies must be retained of personal checks exceeding $100.) The challenge was
brought principally under the first, fourth, and fifth amendments. Relief was denied
plaintiff banks; the individual depositors were held not to have standing.
Subsequently, when an individual depositor with standing brought the individual dis-
closure issue to the Court, the Court ruled that an individual has no fourth amendment
interest in his banking records, such as checks and deposit slips, that are in possession of
his bank. Rather those are business records of the bank. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435 (1976). The Privacy Protection Study Commission subjected the Miller case to vigorous
criticism. Calling the Supreme Court's decision "a fateful day for personal privacy," the
Commission said,
[I]nstitutional policies and the legal system failed individuals in their efforts to
limit the impact of records on their lives. . . . [The Miller decision] warns that ...
anyone, public or private, can gain access to an individual's bank records if the
bank agrees to disclose them.
... [I]f Americans still value personal privacy, they must make certain changes
in the way records about individuals are made, used, and disclosed.
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMISSION, supra note 35, at 8.
The Whalen Court's citation of California Bankers Association is remarkable, for the
Whalen Court cited Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion, 416 U.S. at 79, as well as
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, 416 U.S. at 78, but not the opinion of the Court.
The Douglas opinion asserts, and the Powell opinion suggests, that there is a protected
privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Since the Whalen Court's
citation appears behind the weak "see also" signal, it is impossible to know whether there
has been any change of viewpoint in the Court on matters of disclosure, or whether
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In the latter category, that of "autonomy" or "independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions," the Court cited Griswold, Roe v.
Wade, Doe v. Bolton, and several other cases. 229 With regard to the
latter group, the Court reiterated its standard formulation:
In Paul v. Davis the Court characterized these decisions as dealing
with "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child rearing and education. In these areas,
it has been held that there are limitations on the States' power to
substantively regulate conduct. '" 230
The Whalen plaintiffs-patients who utilized dangerous drugs and
doctors who prescribed them--complained of both kinds of privacy in-
trusion. With regard to disclosure, they argued that creation of a central
data system carried with it risks of unauthorized disclosure and possible
stigmatization of patients who take dangerous drugs. With regard to
autonomy, they contended that some patients would decline needed
medication because of a desire to avoid being memorialized in the data
system. Indeed, the record indicated that there had been some decline
in utilization of dangerous drugs. 231
The Court ruled that the New York statute did not on its face "pose
a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitu-
tional violation. ' 2 2 After reviewing the confidentiality arrangements,
the Court pointed out that the disclosure of private medical informa-
tion to physicians, insurance companies, or state authorities is often
required. Statutory schemes commonly mandate reporting of venereal
disease, child abuse, deadly weapons, and fetal death;2 3 additionally,
recordkeeping requirements in abortion laws-an area definitely within
the zone of constitutional privacy-had been sustained in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth.2 3 4 With regard to the autonomy argument,
the Court responded that the New York statute-unlike the elaborate
there was merely an intention to cite the Douglas and Powell opinions for illustrative
purposes. Further discussion of this issue is found below in this section.
229. The other cases were Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidation of Vir-
ginia anti-miscegenation statute); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalida-
tion of Oregon statute compelling attendance at public schools and prohibiting attendance
at private or parochial schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidation of
Nebraska statute forbidding the teaching of any modem foreign language to students
below the eighth grade level); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (right of citizens
to enter contracts) (scope of fourteenth amendment "liberty" described, id. at 589-90). 97
S. Ct. at 876 n.26.
230. 97 S. Ct. at 876-77 n.26.
231. Id. at 878.
232. Id. at 877.
233. Id. at 878 & n.29.
234. Id. at 878 n.29, citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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direct restraints on abortion decisions imposed by the state laws in-
validated in Doe v. Bolton-posed no direct interference with the
physician's decision to prescribe, or the patient's decision to use, a
medication.2 5
Having denied relief to the New York plaintiffs, the Court con-
cluded its opinion with these intriguing words:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumula-
tion of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks or other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the
distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of
public health, the direction of our armed forces and the enforce-
ment of the criminal laws, all require the orderly preservation of
great quantities of information, much of which is personal in
character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The
right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid
unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances
that duty arguably [has] its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless
New York's statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative
procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the
individual's interest in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not,
decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted
disclosure of accumulated private data-whether intentional or un-
intentional-or by a system that did not contain comparable security
provisions. We simply hold that this record does not establish an
invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.23 0
Until Whalen, the Supreme Court's decisions reflected an adamant
refusal to expand the scope of the right of privacy beyond the categories
235. 97 S. Ct. at 878 & n.31, citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
236. 97 S. Ct. at 879-80 (footnote omitted).
Justices Brennan and Stewart each filed a concurring opinion which dealt generally
with the disclosure issue and particularly with the final paragraph. Justice Brennan said,
Broad dissemination by state officials of such information, however, would clearly
implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be
justified only by compelling state interests. . . .
I am not prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate
the necessity of some curb on such technology.
Id. at 880 (citations omitted).
Justice Stewart sharply disagreed with Justice Brennan's view that "broad dissemina-
tion" would implicate constitutionally protected rights. Reviewing the authorities relied
on by Brennan, Stewart asserted that they in no way supported Brennan's position. He
reiterated the view he had stated in Katz that "a person's general right to privacy . . .
is . . . left largely to the law of the individual States." Id. at 881 (citation omitted). He
added that he had joined the Court's opinion on the understanding that the Court
asserted nothing contrary to those views. Id.
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developed in the Griswold line of cases. Whalen represents an un-
expected two-fold departure. First, while its categorization of privacy
cases into "disclosure" and "autonomy" groupings accurately reflects
major subdivisions in the cases, "disclosure" has not been an item of
substantial constitutional privacy protection apart from associational
privacy cases under the first amendment and wiretap or search and
seizure cases under the fourth amendment. Otherwise, the most sub-
stantial legal protection of disclosure interests has developed as part of
the invasion of privacy tort. Indeed, the Court refused to afford
protection in the disclosure area when the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
was challenged in California Bankers Association v. Shultz237 and United
States v. Miller.2 38 In order for the Whalen Court to illustrate protection
of disclosure interests, it was forced to cite Justice Douglas' stinging
dissent and Justice Powell's cautious concurrence in California Bank-
ers.
239
The second unexpected development is the Court's apparent open-
ness to considering the constitutional implications of computerized or
other large data systems. The Court's treatment of the subject may
simply represent recognition that consideration of the issue is inevitable.
Lower federal courts have already concluded that data systems abuses
can in some circumstances be of constitutional dimension; two such
cases, involving a school district drug project and the FBI arrest record
systems, were discussed in section II of this note.
Nonetheless, Whalen's treatment of data systems could have been
left on much narrower ground. The Whalen plaintiffs fell into two of
the traditional Griswold groupings. First, they were participants in
doctor-patient relationships involving important decisions about medical
treatment; they argued that the statute interfered with that re-
lationship. Second, the protected sector of child-rearing and family
relationships was involved, as parents testified that they were con-
cerned their children would be stigmatized by inclusion in the state
data bank.24 0 Just as the district court in Merriken v. Cressman2 41 had
based its disapproval of the school district data bank on the theory
that it unduly interfered with protected family relationships, so also
the Supreme Court could have restricted its attention to the traditional
categorical relationships. Absent the final paragraph, Whalen would
rest almost entirely within the traditional Griswold pattern.
There appear to be at least two possible explanations for the Court's
237. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). See note 228 supra.
238. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See note 228 supra.
239. 97 S. Ct. at 876 n.25.
240. Id. at 874 n.16.
241. Merriken is reviewed in detail in section II supra.
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opinion in Whalen. The first is that the Court's apparent shift of posi-
tion is just that: apparent, not real. One can read the Court's language
about "disclosure" and "decision" as being purely descriptive. The
Court may have used this terminology solely to systematize the multi-
tude of ways in which the term "privacy" is used in constitutional ad-
judication. There may have been no intention to elevate the "dis-
closure" interest to any greater dignity than it already had, even though
there is a natural tendency to read "disclosure" in conjunction with
the Court's final paragraph on data systems. Moreover, the final para-
graph is carefully qualified. The Court merely recognizes that "in
some circumstances [the duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures] arguably
[has] roots in the Constitution .... We therefore need not, and do not,
decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted dis-
closure of accumulated private data .... 142 It is no very substantial con-
cession to say that in some circumstances there is arguably a duty and
that a constitutional issue might be presented. Even so, the full final
paragraph intimates more than passing concern about data systems,
and it is surprising that the Court's opinion evoked nothing more
substantial by way of disagreement than a small skirmish between
Justices Brennan and Stewart.2 41
The other possible explanation is the pendency, during the same
term, of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.144 Decided four
months after Whalen, Nixon involved the former President's challenge
to the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act. That
Act provided for the Administrator of General Services to screen
Nixon's presidential papers and tapes. Nixon's personal and private
papers were to be returned to him; the balance were to be retained
in the public domain. Nixon challenged the legislation as a violation
of separation of powers, presidential privilege, privacy, first amend-
ment associational rights, and the bill of attainder clause. By a 7-2
vote, the Court sustained the validity of the Act.
Section V of the Court's opinion dealt with Nixon's privacy claim.2 45
Citing Whalen, the Court said, "One element of privacy has been
characterized as 'the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters...' 6 Citing Katz, the Court concluded that Nixon had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in his presidential materials.247 For
242. 97 S. Ct. at 879-80 (emphasis added).
243. See note 236 supra.
244. 97 S. Ct. 2777 (1977).
245. Since the privacy theory was offered against the federal government, the argu-
ment was made under the first, fourth and fifth amendments only, the fourteenth being
inapplicable.
246. 97 s. Ct. at 2797, citing Whalen v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. at 876.
247. 97 S. Ct. at 2797, 2801.
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the majority, however, the crucial fact was that Nixon's private papers
composed an extremely small proportion of the 42 million pages of
documents and 880 tape recordings. Thus the problem was one of
conflict between a legitimate public interest in the vast majority of the
materials and a legitimate privacy interest in some of the documents,
including personal correspondence and diary dictabelts. The regula-
tions promulgated under the Act contemplated screening of the docu-
ments by professional archivists, with personal items to be returned to
the Nixons. The district court had adopted a balancing approach. It
concluded that the Act was a "reasonable response" to the inter-
mingling of public and private documents and that the regulations
constituted the "least intrusive" means for protecting the public
interest.2" The Court took much the same view. The Court reasoned
that the privacy claim could not be considered in the abstract; rather
the specific provisions of the Act must be examined, and "any intrusion
must be weighed against the public interest in . . . archival screen-
ing."24 9 The Court concluded, "Under this test, the privacy interest
asserted by appellant is weaker than that found wanting in the recent
decision of Whalen v. Roe ... ."5o The regulations would protect
Nixon's privacy interests, much as the New York statute and regula-
tions protected the Whalen plaintiffs. Moreover, the federal law con-
templated that private papers would be turned over to Nixon, whereas
in Whalen the prescription reports would be retained by the state
health department for five years. With regard to Nixon's associational
privacy under the first amendment, the majority concluded that "a
compelling public need that cannot be met in a less restrictive way
will override those interests .... "251
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist each dissented
vigorously. 52 Chief Justice Burger explored Nixon's privacy claim at
248. Id. at 2797.
249. Id. at 2798 (citations omitted).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2802 (citations omitted).
252. Both justices had consistently resisted the expansion of the constitutional right
to privacy beyond established boundaries. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the
Court, in which Chief Justice Burger joined, in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976);
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); and California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21
(1974). Both dissented in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977), Justice
Rehnquist on the merits and Chief Justice Burger on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Justice Rehnquist has been antagonistic toward the "disclosure" aspects of privacy. In
a law review article he inveighed against any expansion of the privacy concept-in part
because any expansion of the right to privacy would be at the expense of reducing
the latitude available to the legislative branch of government, and in part because of a
fear that constitutional restrictions on information systems would impair the effective-
ness of law enforcement. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy, Consistent with
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length. In his view, Whalen should be distinguished on the ground
that "the public interest in regulating dangerous drugs outweighed any
privacy interest in reporting to the State all prescriptions, those reports
being made confidential by statute. No personal, private business, or
political confidences were involved. '" 25 3 Justice Rehnquist concentrated
on executive privilege. In his view, "the Act is a serious intrusion upon
the type of 'privacy' that is protected by the principle of executive
privilege." 25 4
In sum, the pendency of the Nixon case may have had an impact on
the privacy analysis in Whalen. Disclosure was at issue in Nixon; this,
coupled with the Whalen factual setting, may have prompted the Court
to be specific about "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, "255 even though the constitutional case law (aside
from traditional fourth amendment issues) could hardly be described
as well-developed.
Where, then, can the right of privacy be said to rest as a matter of
United States constitutional law, after the Supreme Court's 1976 Term?
With regard to matters of disclosure, one must leave a large question
mark. When read in isolation, Whalen and Nixon appear to state an
unequivocal recognition that the right to privacy extends protection in
some circumstances against disclosure of personal matters. While
neither decision actually sustains the privacy interest that was asserted,
both decisions treat at some length the particular privacy safeguards
provided for in the statutes and regulations there challenged.
But when one reviews the Court's privacy decisions, Whalen and
Nixon stand out more clearly as aberrations than as the logical conclu-
sion of a trend. The really substantial earlier disclosure cases were
California Bankers Association, in which the Court's aggressive use of
the standing rules prevented any consideration of individual depositor
contentions that the Bank Secrecy Act violated disclosural privacy in-
terests, and United States v. Miller, which did reach the merits and
held that there was no legitimate individual expectation of privacy in
one's banking records. Paul v. Davis reflected a disclosure issue of a re-
lated type, yet the Court flatly refused to entertain the privacy claim.
Thus, although the Court reached agreement on Whalen's well-hedged
dicta about disclosure and data systems, it remains to be seen whether
the Justices will in fact extend the constitutional right of privacy be-
yond its present boundaries.
Fair and Effective Law Enforcement? or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23
KAN. L. REv. 1 (1974). Both justices had, however, joined the majority in Whalen.
253. 97 S. Ct. at 2835 (emphasis in original).
254. Id. at 2841-42 n.1.
255. Id. at 2797.
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In the area of autonomy, the right to privacy has persisted without
substantial change. Carey v. Population Services International, like Dan-
forth, continued the focus on individual decisionmaking in matters of
contraception and abortion. The Court continues to experience internal
disagreement on the degree of permissible regulation of the activities of
minors. While refusing to allow the states to diminish the sector of in-
dividual decisionmaking, the Court has consistently refused to expand
it, declining to include hair length regulations or private consensual
sexual conduct within the right of privacy. Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land may well represent the Court's outer limit in this area. In short,
the Whalen identification of "the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions" '56 represents no substantial change
in the Griswold line of cases.
The Supreme Court's privacy cases lead inexorably to a single con-
clusion: the protection of privacy is now primarily the responsibility of
the states. As if to underline the point, the Whalen Court chose to
quote Justice Brandeis:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This
Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down
the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion,
the measure is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We have power
to do this, because the due process clause has been held by the
Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters
of procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be ever
on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If
we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be
bold.257
The inference seems inescapable that the overall policy continues to
be that stated in Katz: "[Tihe protection of a person's general right to
privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the protec-
tion of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the
individual States." 25
256. Id.
257. Id. at 875 n.20, citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted).
258. 389 U.S. at 350-51 (footnotes omitted).
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VI. THE QUEST FOR A DEFINITION OF PRIVACY
The previous sections have traced the development of the privacy
idea. After its origin in Warren and Brandeis' law review article, the
right of privacy gradually achieved recognition in tort law. The term
"privacy" began to be used in connection with constitutional adjudica-
tion and in 1965 the process culminated in the recognition of a constitu-
tional right of privacy.
Despite growing acceptance of the privacy idea, there have been
persistent currents of criticism. For example, some social scientists assert
that courts and legislatures make sweeping assertions about privacy
while having virtually no empirical information with which to assure
themselves that their generalizations are correct.2 59 They have also
argued that "privacy directs our attention away from the real problem
which is loneliness, serves as a rationale for anti-social behavior, raises a
false consciousness that impedes social instincts, and acts as a shield for
exploitive behavior by a propertied elite.
' ' 280
While the trend of legislation and court decision is clearly in the
direction of an expanded right of privacy, there has also been strong
criticism from several legal writers. The most consistent objection is
that the term "privacy" or "the right to be let alone" covers entirely
too much. As one student put it, the phrase "the right to be let alone" "is
not rich enough in content to be useful as an analytical tool. The con-
cept of the zone of privacy within which one is said to have a right to
be let alone, without more clarity of definition, lacks discriminatory,
descriptive, and predictive power." ' '6 1
William Prosser asserted that the term "invasion of privacy" had no
conceptual unity at all;2 62 rather,
the law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the
common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except
that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff
"to be let alone. ''263
Prosser argued, therefore, that the right of privacy should be broken
259. H. LATIN, PRIVACY i (1976) (selected bibliography). This criticism is directed as
much at social scientists for failure to develop and collate the information in a meaning-
ful way as it is at courts and legislatures for failure to use the information.
260. P. DIONISOPOULOS & C. DUcAT, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 3 (1976) (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted).
261. Taxonomy, supra note 184.
262. PROssER, TORTS, supra note 19, at 804.
263. Id.
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down into four component torts.264 At least one advocate of the right
of privacy agrees, suggesting an analogy to free speech analysis under the
first amendment.265
Much ink has been spilled in an effort to develop a satisfactory
definition of privacy. "Few values so fundamental to society have been
the subject of such vague and confused writing by social scientists,"
Westin states.26 Writes another: "There is something more appealing
than clarifying in the phrase 'the right to be let alone.' "27 Like Justice
Stewart, stating his position on obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 28 no
one can satisfactorily define privacy but everyone seems to "know it
when [he] see[s] it."269 While political scientists, sociologists, and moral
philosophers have attempted to describe privacy and its role in our
society, lawyers have attempted the more modest task of categorizing
the plethora of cases into manageable and logical categories.2 7 0 The
success of both enterprises has been limited.
The commentators, including those who do not favor a common-law
or constitutional right of privacy, seem to agree that privacy is a value
of fundamental importance to our society. 271 "Why is privacy of the
person important?" asks one writer. "This calls mainly for consideration
264. Id. at 804; see section III supra.
Even though his fourfold division of the invasion of privacy into appropriation, intru-
sion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light in the public eye gained general
acceptance, Prosser still fretted. He regarded as unanswered the question whether "false
light" invasion of privacy was capable of "swallowing up and engulfing the whole law
of defamation": any false libel would also be actionable on privacy grounds, and an
action for invasion of privacy would have some procedural advantages over a libel action.
PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 19, at 813.
265. P. DIONOSPOULOS & C. DUCAT, supra note 260, at 13, suggesting the approach used
in Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
266. A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 7.
267. Beardsley, supra note 225, at 57-58. Compare: "This paper is an inquiry into the
formulation and possible disintegration of a legal concept, right of privacy, inviting com-
parison with the life history of a scientific concept like 'ether' or 'atom.'" Freund, supra
note 190, at 182.
268. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
269. Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring):
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within that short-hand description [hard-core pornography]; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.
270. See, e.g., the symposia in PRivAcY, supra note 190, and Privacy, 31 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 251-435 (1966); Prosser, Privacy, supra note 83; Bloustein, supra note 92.
271. E.g., Professor Kalven, certainly one of the most outspoken critics of the very
existence of the "right to privacy" tort, began his attack by reviewing some of the societal
implications of privacy: "Privacy is one of the truly profound values for a civilized
society, . . . deeply linked to individual dignity and the needs of human existence."
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw AND CONTEMP.
'ROBS. 326 (1966).
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of what is necessary to maintain an integrated personality in a social
setting.' 
272
Professor Westin has formulated the functions of individual privacy
under four headings:
Personal Autonomy: "The autonomy that privacy protects is . . .
vital to the development of individuality and consciousness of individual
choice in life .... 'Privacy is a special kind of independence, which
can be understood as an attempt to secure autonomy in at least a few
personal and spiritual concerns, if necessary in defiance of all the
pressures of modern society.' "273
Emotional Release: "[P]hysical and psychological health demand
periods of privacy for various types of emotional release," including
"relaxation . . . from the pressure of playing social roles," "respite
from the emotional stimulation of daily life," "protection . . . [for]
minor non-compliance with social norms," giving "vent to .. .anger
at 'the system,' " performing "bodily and sexual functions," and restora-
tion from "loss, shock, or sorrow."27 4
Self-Evaluation: "[I]ndividuals need to process the information that
is constantly bombarding them," to assess it, to have time to be creative,
and to engage in reflection for the exercise of conscience. 275
Limited and Protected Communication: "Privacy for limited and
protected communication .. .provides the individual with the oppor-
tunities he needs for sharing confidences and intimacies with those he
trusts . . . [and] serves to set necessary boundaries for mental distance
in interpersonal situations ranging from the most intimate to the most
formal and public."276
One writer has proposed a "general theory of individual privacy.
'
"
277
His formulation, while ambitious, sheds little additional light: he argues
that the right of privacy protects against "an intrusion on personality,
an attack on human dignity.
'
"
27 8
If there is no generally accepted definition of privacy, and one is
forced to beg that particular question, at least one can beg it elegantly,
as did Professor Freund:
27 9
272, Gross, supra note 190, at 172-73. Consider also this formulation: "It is my thesis
that privacy is not just one possible means among others to insure some value, but that
it is necessarily related to ends and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love,
friendship and trust." Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968).
273. A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 33-34 (footnote omitted).
274. Id. at 34-36.
275. Id. at 36-37.
276. Id. at 37-39.
277. Bloustein, supra note 92, at 963.
278. Id. at 995.
279. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 19, at 816.
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The choice need not be limited to simple adoption or rejection of the
legal concept. There are levels or orders of statement in law as in
science. There are principles and there are rules. A higher order of
generality is not only tolerable in the statement of principles; it is
to be encouraged . .. [as] . ..a more plastic formulation, useful
for predicting and shaping the course of legal development. It is in
the latter context that the right of privacy is of cardinal worth.2 10
It was left to a professor of philosophy to formulate a description
which is more specific and hence more useful for our purposes:
Alleged violations [of privacy] seem to fall into two main categories:
conduct by which one person Y restricts the power of another person
X to determine for himself whether or not he will perform an act
A or undergo an experience E, and conduct by which one person Y
acquires or discloses information about X which X does not wish
to have known or disclosed. I shall say that conduct of the first sort
is a "violation of autonomy," and of the second sort, a "violation
of the right to selective disclosure." 2ssl
As indicated in section V, the Supreme Court adopted a similar classi-
fication last Term in Whalen v. Roe.
The foregoing discussion illustrates that no consensus has yet
emerged on a useful general definition or general theory which will
integrate the various interests that fall under the rubric of privacy. It
may be observed that privacy is not the only constitutional or common-
law concept which does not readily lend itself to precise definition;2 12
280. Freund, supra note 190, at 197.
281. Beardsley, supra note 225, at 56. Beardsley argued that of the two, autonomy is
the more general norm. Id. at 65, 70. "I see no alternative to justifying the norm of selec-
tive disclosure directly in terms of the norm of autonomy, and to recognizing the latter as
an ultimate moral principle, standing on its own feet." Id. at 70. However, Beardsley
reasoned that confusion is caused by using "privacy" in conjunction with issues of autonomy
as well as issues of selective disclosure. "[C]larity of thought would be promoted if we
restricted the concept of privacy-violating conduct to violations of the right of selective dis-
closure .... [S]elective disclosure constitutes the conceptual core of the norm of privacy."
Id. Unfortunately, in the legal system the usage of "privacy" for issues of autonomy and
for issues of selective disclosure is so well-established that one must simply abide the
confusion. Although Beardsley's classification scheme was not designed for the purpose, it
is a useful tool for grouping the cases.
282. With reference to constitutional concepts, see note 182 supra, in which Professor
Emerson delineated two basic, but unanswered, questions about substantive due process.
With reference to common-law concepts, compare Prosser's view of defamation:
It must be confessed at the beginning that there is a great deal of the law of
defamation which makes no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for which
no legal writer ever has had a kind word, and it is a curious compound of a strict
liability imposed upon innocent defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything found
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indeed, some lack of conceptual clarity may be inherent in the develop-
ment of any set of legal rights through case-by-case adjudication.
One further possibility may be suggested. Although he did not use
the term "privacy," John Stuart Mill may have come closest to articulat-
ing the set of relationships that is meant by the word. Mill's classic
effort at delineating the respective spheres of individual and society
was his 1859 essay, On Liberty.8 3 "[T]he practical question," said Mill,
"where to place the limit-how to make the fitting adjustment between
individual independence and social control-is a subject on which
nearly everything remains to be done. . . . No two ages, and scarcely
any two countries, have decided it alike; and the decision of one age
or country is a wonder to another."2-84 Mill then proposed "one very
simple principle":
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action
of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others ...
Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign. 2s s
Mill believed that each person who lives in society receives the
benefits of its protection; thus each person owes the society the affirma-
tive duty not to injure others as well as the social responsibility to
bear certain burdens, such as assisting in its defense and well-being. 28
The society, on the other hand, should not subject the individual to
social control unless the individual's actions are directly harmful to
others or, in some cases, his failure to act likewise causes direct harm,
as where he fails to assist with the common defense. The society is
healthier and more creative, argued Mill, when governed by this
principle. "No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole,
respected, is free . . ..
Mill's formulation of the elements of human liberty bears a striking
resemblance to the idea of privacy. Mill's realm of human liberty com-
prised "first, the inward domain of consciousness," including liberty of
in the law, with a blind and almost perverse refusal to compensate the plaintiff for
real and very serious harm.
PROSSaR, TORTS, supra note 19, at 737 (footnote omitted).
283. J.S. MILL, supra note 181.
284. Id. at 8.
285. Id. at 13.
286. Id. at 14-15.
287. Id. at 16.
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conscience, thought, feeling, opinion, and expression; "[s]econdly. ...
liberty of tastes and pursuits," including planning one's own life and
"doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow"; and
"[t]hirdly,... the liberty of combination among individuals."2'
The essential feature of Mill's formulation is his emphasis on the
freedom of the individual. The burden is on the society to demonstrate
that it will be affirmatively injured in order to justify the placement
of restraints on the individual. As H.L.A. Hart has stated, "it is a
question of justification .... [WIe are committed at least to the general
critical principle that the use of legal coercion by any society calls for
justification as something prima facie objectionable to be tolerated
only for the sake of some countervailing good.
' '2 89
288. Id.
289. H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 20 (1969). The most prominent con-
temporary antagonist to Mill and Hart is Lord Devlin, whose position is set forth in P.
DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1970). Devlin argued that a society should legis-
late on the basis of the common morality, i.e., the set of moral values held by a majority
or the society, without regard to the process of justification suggested by Hart or Mill.
Enforcement of the common morality is needed, according to Devlin, for the cohesive-
ness of the society. Id. at 114-15. Devlin's test for the propriety of legislation is the
strength of popular feeling.
Nothing should be punished by law that does not lie beyond the limits of tolerance.
It is not nearly enough to say that a majority dislike a practice; there must be a
real feeling of reprobation . . . . [B]efore a society can put a practice beyond the
limits of tolerance there must be deliberate judgment that the practice is injurious
to society. . . . We should ask ourselves . . . whether . . . we regard it as a vice
so abominable that its mere presence is an offense. If that is the genuine feeling
of the society in which we live, I do not see how society can be denied the right
to eradicate it.
Id. at 16-17. It is difficult for this writer to see how Devlin's reasoning would prevent
the majority from adopting the most extreme measures at will, such as the segregation
of even eradication of minority groups on the theory that their very presence was
morally offensive and therefore injurious to society. Devlin's answer would probably be
that right-thinking people would not make such a judgment:
Can then the judgment of society sanction every invasion of a man's privacy,
however extreme? Theoretically that must be so . . ... Society must be the judge
of what is necessary to its own integrity . . . . In a free society men must trust
each other and each man must put his trust in his fellows that they will not inter-
fere with him unless in their honest judgment it is necessary to do so .... [C]hecks
are usually put upon the government [e.g., through the constitution or trial by
jury] . . . so that it is difficult for them to enact and enforce a law that takes
away another's freedom unless in the honest judgment of society it is necessary to
do so .... But the only certain security is the understanding in the heart of every
man that he must not condemn what another does unless he honestly considers that
it is a threat to the integrity or good government of their society.
Id. at 118.
Since Britain does not have a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights, protection
of individual liberty depends substantially upon the observance of tradition. The tradi-
tional documents relating to British liberty do not have constitutional status in the
American sense and can be overridden at any time by a parliamentary majority. Thus
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Mill dealt not only with governmental intrusions on the liberty
of the individual, but with private intrusions as well. Mill fully
recognized that social pressure is as effective a means of social control
as is the enactment of laws.-O Mill did not deal with invasions of privacy
in the same way that Warren and Brandeis did; Mill was concerned
with the coercive power of public opinion to enforce conformity to
values and behavior patterns prescribed by the majority. But the
Warren and Brandeis view would be consistent with Mill's way of
thinking. Mill argued, in essence, for a realm of individuality-a zone
of privacy, if you will-to be respected by the government and by the
society at large.
The phrase "right of privacy" is attractive because it expresses some-
thing very much akin to Mill's idea. At its most general level, privacy
embraces the idea of a zone of autonomy, a protected sector for in-
dividual decisionmaking, which can only be infringed to protect vital
societal interests. That protected zone bears a substantial resemblance
to Mill's realm of human liberty.
But if there is a striking parallel between contemporary ideas about
privacy and Mill's concept of liberty, is there a need for the privacy idea
at all? Presumably liberty is the more general principle, and the pro-
tection of liberty is an objective of the existing federal and state con-
Devlin may be accurate in describing the British reliance on the self-restraint of the
majority for the protection of rights.
The United States Constitution rests on a different set of assumptions:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is,
no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison), in 43 GREAT BooS OF THE WESTERN
WoRLD 162, 163 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952). From this follows the doctrine of separation of
powers. "[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others ...
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." Id. Unlike the British system, the
American Constitution was specifically designed to include provision for judicial review
of the constitutionality of legislative enactments. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
The overriding difficulty with Devlin's argument is that it provides very little guidance
about the proper sectors for individual privacy and governmental control. Indeed, Devlin
is driven to concede, as quoted above, that his theory sanctions any invasion of privacy
felt socially necessary. Devlin provides a theoretical justification for any action the
society might choose to take; Mill and Hart, by contrast, attempt to locate a dividing line
between the individual and the society.
290. J.S. Mill, supra note 181, at 13.
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stitutions. Is a constitutional privacy right needed to protect interests
which could be protected under the rubric of liberty?
Perhaps, in theory, Mill's concept of liberty should inform the
constitutional analysis engaged in by federal and state courts. Mill's
essay may, in general terms, reflect the notion of liberty held by the
general public. But there are practical difficulties with the application
of the Mill and Hart approach to constitutional litigation.
The constitutional term "liberty" is potentially one of unlimited
elasticity. The content of constitutional "liberty" continues to change
with changing times and conditions; as indicated above, it was
fourteenth amendment liberty that served as the source for the recent
development of the federal constitutional right of privacy. At the same
time, however, the term "liberty" has come to possess a rather specific
meaning in state and federal case law. It has been the subject of ex-
tensive constitutional exegesis and the object of exhaustive doctrinal
dispute. While in theory constitutional "liberty" is infinitely elastic, in
fact its elasticity is limited by long lines of state and federal constitu-
tional cases.
Privacy has been recognized as an attribute of the liberty guaranteed
by the United States Constitution, but the scope of the privacy right
has been strictly limited. "Liberty," and the privacy guaranteed thereby,
have not been given the expansive reading that Mill's analysis calls
for. The United States Supreme Court's caution in the liberty-privacy
area is a necessary result more of a federal constitutional system than
of the ideological viewpoint of the Burger Court; it was the Warren
Court in Katz that pointed out the primary role of the states in pro-
tection of privacy, property, and life itself.2 1 Given the restricted
charter of the federal courts, and the primary responsibility of the states
for the protection of individual rights, Mill's concept of liberty is sus-
ceptible of only the most limited application in federal constitutional
cases.
When one turns to the state judicial systems, one encounters difficul-
ties as well. While there are notable exceptions,2 9 2 many state courts do
not take care to make clear whether their decisions rest on the state
constitution, the federal constitution, or both. Federal cases are fre-
quently used as the beginning points for analysis.23 Constitutional litiga-
tion in state courts has not always resulted in a coherent body of state
constitutional law, nor an expansive view of personal rights protected
291. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350-51, quoted in text accompanying note
26 supra.
292. See Brennan, supra note 32, at 498-502.
293. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 933-34 (1976).
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by the state constitution. Thus the state-court conditions for Mill's
concept of liberty are not necessarily favorable; cautiousness, deference
to the legislature, and reliance on federal analysis are likely to yield a
limited view of "liberty," even under a state constitution. 2 4
The case for a state constitutional right of privacy begins to emerge.
A state court may be reluctant to innovate by taking an expansive view
of existing constitutional terminology, especially a frequently inter-
preted concept like "liberty." But the same courts will almost certainly
respond to a constitutional mandate. Addition of an express right of
privacy to a state constitution may therefore serve as a clear directive
for judicial action to protect what Mill would have called liberty and
what in privacy parlance would be rights of autonomy and selective
disclosure.2 5
One may persuasively argue that any reasonable definition of liberty
must include the concepts Mill expressed. The practical problem, how-
ever, is enforcement-judicial recognition and action, as well as legisla-
tive and executive deference, to a zone of individual privacy. Express
constitutional language is a direct method to secure recognition of in-
dividual privacy, whether or not privacy is considered to be inherent
in the concept of liberty.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, the privacy idea takes its con-
tinuing vitality from its close relationship to our ideas of individual
freedom. That close relationship accounts for the favorable reception
of privacy language in the constitutions of ten states. Thus, when
Montana decided in 1972 to say in its constitution that "[t]he right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest," citizens as well as lawyers have an intuitive grasp of the
idea being communicated. It is an idea that Mill would have called
"liberty."
VII. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The constitutions of ten states expressly protect privacy.2 97 Most of
the state constitutional rights of privacy are of recent vintage: eight of
the ten have been adopted since 1968. Two, however, are considerably
older: Washington's measure was adopted in 1889, and Arizona's in
1910. All of these states have placed the privacy section in the declara-
294. See id. at 933.
295. See id. at 935-36.
296. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
297. The privacy provisions of the ten states are reproduced in the Appendix. Seven
of the ten protect "privacy." Florida protects "private communications," while Arizona and
Washington protect "private affairs."
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tion of rights, but there is great variety in the nature of the privacy
interest being protected and the precise formulation within the con-
stitution.
The approaches taken by the states fall into three main groups. In
the first group are the states that have created a "free-standing" right
of privacy. Three states have given privacy separate status that highlights
it as an independent right. Alaska provides that "[t]he right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. ' ' 298 The Mon-
tana Constitution states that "[t]he right of individual privacy is es-
sential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest."299 California lists
privacy among the inalienable rights: "enjoying... life and liberty,...
possessing . . . property, and pursuing . . . safety, happiness, and
privacy." 00
In the second group are the states that have integrated the privacy
right with the section prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.
Five states have done so, thus affording an intermediate level of pro-
tection to their citizens. The narrowest provision is Florida's, protect-
ing only against "unreasonable interception of private communica-
tions." ' 1 The constitutions of Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, and South
Carolina are more expansive, protecting against "unreasonable invasions
of privacy.". 0 2 All five differ from those in the first group by being
anchored within the search and seizure section of the state constitution.
The privacy provisions of the states comprising the third group are
the equivalent of the classic prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The Washington and Arizona constitutions are identically
worded: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his
home invaded, without authority of law." 30 3
The Alaska Constitution directs the legislature to implement the
privacy section, although, as explored below, its privacy section has
been construed to be self-executing. The Montana Constitution specifies
the standard of review: privacy is not to be infringed except upon the
showing of a compelling state interest. The Illinois Constitution not
only creates a privacy right, but also includes privacy in the right-to-
remedy section. Louisiana expressly confers standing to challenge an
illegal search on anyone wronged by such a search. Wiretapping is an
298. ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 22.
299. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
300. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
301. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
302. HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10.
303. Aalz. CONST. art. II, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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evident concern: the constitutions protect communications in Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, and Louisiana.
With that brief overview, there follows an examination of the
constitutional provisions of the ten states. The Appendix may be con-
sulted as needed for the full text of state privacy sections or for com-
parison among the states. Quotations will be from the relevant constitu-
tional provision unless otherwise indicated.
A. States Having a Free-standing Right of Privacy
Alaska, Montana, and California are the states affording the most
extensive protection to privacy. Each has adopted a constitutional pro-
vision giving privacy the status of a separate right. Each state will be
considered individually.
1. Alaska.-Alaska developed a state constitutional right of privacy
by judicial interpretation prior to the addition of article I, section 22,
to the state constitution in 1972. In Breese v. Smith,304 the Alaska Su-
preme Court considered the appeal of a junior high school student who
had been expelled from school for refusal to cut his hair in conformity
with the school dress code. In an extremely thorough opinion, the
court declined to enter "the federal thicket, '" 3 0 5 preferring instead to
decide the case as a matter of state constitutional law.
After reviewing the positions of the various state and lower federal
courts, the Alaska court held "that under article I, section 1 of the
Alaska constitution's affirmative grant to all persons of the natural
right to 'liberty,' students attending public educational institutions
in Alaska possess a constitutional right to wear their hair in accordance
with their personal tastes."30°6 The court went on to mention Judge
Cooley's right "to be let alone," as reiterated by the United States
Supreme Court in Botsford,30 7 and continued, "The spectre of govern-
mental control of the physical appearance of private citizens, young
and old, is antithetical to a free society .... 38
Having established that privacy is a protected aspect of a citizen's
liberty under the Alaska Constitution, the court then considered the
appropriate standard of review. Looking to Griswold as persuasive
304. 501 P.2d 159 (Alas. 1972).
305. Id. at 166.
306. Id. at 168.
307. Id. Botsford is reviewed in section IV supra.
308. 501 P.2d at 169. The court also quoted Judge Mann in Conyers v. Glenn, 243
So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971): "'We would surmise that many who are not
offended in the slightest by the imposition of the collective will on the long-haired boy
of today would be early advocates of the short-haired individual's right to be different
in a long-haired society." 501 P.2d at 175 (footnote omitted).
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authority, the court adopted the compelling interest standard, to be
applied "where a person's individual liberty, as guaranteed by the
Alaska constitution, allegedly has been encroached upon."' " Reviewing
the record as a whole, the court concluded that the school system had
not demonstrated a compelling state interest in its hair regulation.
In 1972, the privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution was
adopted. Article I, section 22 provides:
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.
There was "no available recorded history of this amendment" for
guidance to its exact scope and meaning.31 While the language of the
amendment is susceptible to an interpretation that the provision does
not take effect without being implemented by the legislature, from the
outset the Alaska courts have treated the provision as self-executing. 11
309. 501 P.2d at 170 (footnote omitted).
310. Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alas. 1974).
311. The point is not discussed in the Alaska privacy decisions; the cases simply
assume that the privacy section is directly applicable. Breese had already established a
self-executing privacy right under the Alaska Constitution, independent of the privacy
amendment. Had the amendment been construed to be non-self-executing, it would have
had the paradoxical effect of reducing, rather than extending, the Alaska right of privacy.
A general review of state statutes relating to privacy is beyond the scope of this
paper, as is a particular review of Alaska's response to the constitutional mandate that
the legislature implement the privacy amendment. However, Alaska is one of several states
that have enacted legislation based on a model state act for criminal offender record in-
formation. The model act was drafted in 1971 by a task force of the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the United States Department of Justice. The
intent of the model act was to protect the security and privacy of criminal justice records.
See, Towe, supra note 39, at 70-73.
The Alaska statute is patterned after the model act. It lists those crimes (identified
by statute) for which the police agencies may collect criminal justice information. The
Governor's Commission on the Administration of Justice is directed to adopt rules and
regulations under the administrative procedure act for the "security and privacy" of that
information, taking into account the interests of law enforcement and each individual's
right to privacy. There are more stringent standards for "intelligence information"-in-
vestigative information not directly connected with the commission of a particular crime.
Each state or municipal law enforcement agency must file an annual report with the
Commission, certifying compliance with the confidentiality requirements. Specific rights
are conferred to inspect criminal justice information relating to oneself. In case of viola-
tion of the chapter, the injured party has a civil cause of action for actual damages plus
costs and attorney's fees; a fine and one-year criminal penalty are available also. ALAS.
STAT. tit. 12, ch. 62 (1962 & Supp. 1977). The statute was enacted in 1972 at the same
session that proposed the privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution. See Act of
July 3, 1972, ch. 161, 1972 Alaska Sess. Laws (microfilm edition not consecutively
paginated); Alas. S.J. Res. 68 (1972), id. Thus the statute cannot strictly be regarded as a
response to the constitutional mandate that "[t]he legislature shall implement [the privacy
amendment]."
For an extensive, though not necessarily exhaustive, listing of state statutes and cases
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Alaska's leading case under the new privacy section is Ravin v.
State.812 There, a defendant challenged the validity of the state mari-
juana possession law on the theory that it violated the right of privacy.
Ravin argued that the compelling state interest test was the proper
standard is and that the state could not demonstrate a compelling
interest in prohibiting possession or use of marijuana by adults.
The court began by reconsidering its position on the standard of
review to be applied where a fundamental right is involved. Recogniz-
ing "considerable dissatisfaction with the fundamental right-compelling
state interest test,"3 14 the court adopted a new approach. The court
decided the appropriate test to be
whether there is a proper governmental interest in imposing restric-
tions on marijuana use and whether the means chosen bear a sub-
stantial relationship to the legislative purpose. If governmental
restrictions interfere with the individual's right to privacy, we will
require that the relationship between means and ends be not merely
reasonable but close and substantial.3 15
Rather than continue the traditional two tiers of rational basis and
strict scrutiny, Alaska opted, in effect, for a middle tier. Its "close and
substantial means" or "means-ends" test amounted to a "'less specula-
tive, less deferential, more intensified ... inquiry when . . . applying
the traditional rational basis test .... ' "316
In considering Ravin's privacy claims, the court carefully reviewed,
as persuasive authority, the United States Supreme Court's privacy de-
cisions, finding therein "a right of personal autonomy in relation to
choices affecting an individual's personal life."31 7 The court concluded
that there was no fundamental constitutional right to possess or ingest
marijuana since marijuana possession involved no substantial issue of
personal autonomy. However, the court did determine that privacy in
the home is a fundamental right. Reasoning by analogy to Stanley v.
Georgia,"'8 the court concluded that one's basic right of privacy in the
relating to recordkeeping and information management in the public and private sectors,
see PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PRIVACY LAW IN TH4E STATES (1977) (Appendix
I to the Commission's final report, printed separately).
312. 537 P.2d 494 (Alas. 1975). For an excellent treatment of this decision, see 1976
Wis. L. REV. 305.
313. The Alaska Supreme Court had expressly so stated in an earlier case, Gray v.
State, 525 P.2d 524, 527-28 (Alas. 1974), but was unable to reach the merits of the
constitutional issue for want of a properly developed record.
314. 537 P.2d at 498.
315. Id.
316. Id. (citations omitted).
317. Id. at 500.
318. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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home encompasses "the possession and ingestion of substances such as
marijuana in a purely personal, non-commercial context ... unless the
state can meet its substantial burden and show that proscription of...
marijuana in the home is supportable by achievement of a legitimate
state interest.I' s19 After a detailed review of the scientific evidence re-
lating to marijuana, the court held that the state had not met its
burden. The magnitude of the danger did not outweigh the intrusion
into the home. The court conceded that use of a strongly debilitating
drug on a massive scale could conceivably be so damaging to the society
that even private usage could be prohibited; in such circumstances
the state's burden would be met. Private marijuana possession, however,
did not constitute such a menace.
The court was careful to limit its holding. It noted legitimate state
interests in prevention of marijuana use by drivers and adolescents.
There was no constitutional protection for purchase or sale, nor any
"absolute" protection for possession or use in public. Possession, even
in the home, of amounts that indicated an intent to sell would also be
unprotected.,2
In reaching its decision, the court expressed its view of the proper
relationship between government and the individual:
[A] state cannot simply decide what is in a person's best interest and
compel it.
... [T]he authority of the state to exert control over the individual
extends only to activities of the individual which affect others or the
public at large as it relates to matters of public health or safety,
or to provide for the general welfare. We believe this tenet to be
basic to a free society.321
Concurring, two justices emphasized that, while the home was the focus
of discussion in Ravin, there should be no implication that the right
of privacy protected only that physical zone.32
Subsequent decisions have further defined the Alaska privacy right.
The court has held that the right of privacy applies only when there
is state action; it does not operate directly with reference to any
actions by the private sector which infringe privacy. 2 3 Dictum in an-
other case clearly suggests that the right of privacy protects consenting
sexual behavior between adults, at least within the home."' The court
319. 537 P.2d at 504.
320. Id. at 511.
321. Id. at 509 (footnotes omitted). Compare John Stuart Mill's formulation, text
accompanying notes 285-87 supra.
322. Id. at 513-16.
323. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 416 (Alas. 1976).
324. Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351, 358-59 (Alas. 1977).
1977]
696 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.5:631
reaffirmed that juveniles have a right to privacy and autonomy, but
noted that somewhat greater restraints may be justified than for
adults. 32 5 The right of privacy was considered in search and seizure
cases, but the cases were decided on standard search and seizure grounds;
the privacy issue did not add materially to the decisionmaking process . 26
And, true to its word in Ravin, the court sustained the marijuana pro-
scription against a defendant engaged in sale.3 27
In Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Commission,32s the supreme
court considered the constitutionality of Alaska's conflict of interest law,
as applied to a physician-officeholder. The law required disclosure of
the sources of all income in excess of $100. This was construed to re-
quire disclosure of the names of patients who had paid the requisite
amount.
Dr. Falcon was found to have standing to assert the privacy rights
of his patients. He successfully argued that at least in some circum-
stances, disclosure of patients' names would violate their rights of
privacy. These circumstances would include disclosure of consultation
with a psychiatrist, psychologist, or a physician specializing in abortion,
contraception, sexual problems, or veneral disease. Privacy rights would
also be implicated where a married person visits a general practitioner
without the spouse's knowledge or a minor child does so without the
parents' knowledge. The opinion emphasized, however, that such situa-
tions are the exception, rather than the rule. The court held that the
conflict of interest law could not be enforced to require reporting of
patients' names by physicians-until the Alaska Public Offices Commis-
sion promulgates rules to prevent invasion of patients' rights of privacy.
In summary, the significant features of the Alaska experience are
the development of a free-standing right of privacy; the beginning of a
conceptual framework for privacy-that is, an explicit philosophy about
the individual's relationship to the government; the development of
an appropriate standard of review, the "means-ends" standard; and the
actual demonstration that the provision operates independently of the
federal constitutional right of privacy. Despite a constitutional directive
for implementation of the privacy provision by the legislature, the
privacy right has been construed to be self-executing. While the results
reached in some of the cases have been striking, the most impressive
325. Id. In another case, the right of privacy was held not to prohibit the commitment
to a juvenile facility of a child in need of supervision. L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827
(Alas. 1976).
326. Anderson v. State, 555 P.2d 251 (Alas. 1976); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alas.
1973). But see dissenting opinion, 510 P.2d at 799.
327. Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206 (Alas. 1975).
328. 570 P.2d 469 (Alas. 1977).
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feature is the craftsmanship of the Alaska opinions, which have laid a
solid foundation for its state constitutional law.
2. Montana.-Like Alaska, Montana has a free-standing right of
privacy. Montana's right of privacy was proposed by its 1971-72 Con-
stitutional Convention and was approved when the revised constitu-
tion was ratified in 1972.329 Article II, section 10, now provides:
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest.
A closely related provision, article II, section 9, establishes the "right
to know":
No person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents
or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of
state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the
demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public
disclosure.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Convention have been
transcribed and provide insight into the intent of the framers. 3 0 The
Convention's Bill of Rights Committee proposed the privacy section,
which initially read, "The right of privacy is essential to the well-being
of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest."33' The committee's goal was to expand the
rights of the individual at a time when technological development and
the growing complexity of society threaten "the right to be let alone.' 3'3
The proposal was amended by the Convention to say, "the right of in-
dividual privacy," rather than "the right of privacy," to make it clear
that the right of privacy extended only to individuals, and not to
329. Montana had previously recognized the invasion of privacy tort, Welsh v.
Pritchard, 241 P.2d 816 (Mont. 1952), and a right of privacy against electronic eaves-
dropping, State v. Brecht, 485 P.2d 47 (Mont. 1971). Both were based on one's constitu-
tional right to liberty and pursuit of happiness. 241 P.2d at 819; 485 P.2d at 51.
330. The Convention had the benefit of a background study on the right of privacy
and the right to know: MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, BILL OF RIGHTS
111-17, 215-48 (1972) (Constitutional Convention Study No. 10). The study reproduced
a proposal by Professor Westin which bears a distant resemblance to the provision finally
adopted. Westin proposed: "The right of privacy of persons, communication, and associa-
tion shall not be abridged." Id. at 241, citing Westin, supra note 40, at 1231 (Part II).
331. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1971-72, TRANSCRIPr OF PROCEEDINGS 5179
(1972) [hereinafter MONTANA PROCEEDINGS].
332. Id. at 5180-83.
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governments or corporations. 3 3 The committee reasoned that a corpora-
tion could be considered a person for some purposes, but could not be
included within the term "individual." 3 3
4
The committee recommendation that privacy "not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest" was explained as
creating a "semi-permeable wall of separation between individual and
state . . . ."" The barrier between the individual and society was
not to be absolute; it could be penetrated, but only upon the requisite
showing.33 6 The Convention voted to delete the compelling state in-
terest standard, thereby leaving the unequivocal statement that the
right of privacy "shall not be infringed." The movant of the amend-
ment argued that the compelling state interest test could weaken the
privacy right; he reasoned that the decision about what constitutes a
compelling state interest "may be interpreted by whatever state agency
happens to have an interest in invading my privacy at that particular
time. ' '3 3 7 The Bill of Rights Committee acquiesced in the amendment,
believing that case-by-case definition of the scope of the privacy right
would be sufficient.sss Opposition to the amended version soon de-
veloped. Objection was made that "we have now made [privacy] an
absolute right." 339 The majority evidently took the view that litiga-
tion and confusion could be avoided if a specific standard of review
333. Id. at 5179-80. In adding the modifier "individual," the Convention did not
consider whether by implication it had excluded associational privacy from the protection
of the Montana provision. Presumably a court would take the view that freedom to
associate and privacy of association are fundamental attributes of the autonomy pro-
tected by the right of individual privacy. The formulation by Professor Westin, quoted in
note 330 supra, expressly includes "privacy of association."
334. Id. at 5183. Despite this construction of the word "individual," the Montana
Attorney General "stated that the exception from the right to know which reads, 'except
in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public
disclosure,' protects corporations as well as natural persons." Towe, supra note 39, at 85
(footnote omitted). The Montana right to know is considered in greater detail below.
335. MONTANA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 331, at 5181.
336. Id. One question never directly discussed was whether the right of privacy was
intended to protect consenting sexual behavior between adults in private. The Convention
did consider an individual member proposal to add a new section to the declaration of
rights providing that "[p]rivate sexual acts between consenting adults do not constitute a
crime." Id. at 5703. The movant asserted that the provision was to deal with the "problems
of homosexuality." Id. at 5704. While the proposal was defeated, the total absence of de-
bate gives no clue to the views of the Convention. The delegates' action was consistent
with a number of hypotheses, including the view that the matter was already embraced
in the basic right of privacy adopted by the Convention; the view that it was not; and
the view that the issue was politically too volatile to deal with expressly.
337. Id. at 5183-84.
338. Id. at 5184, 5711-12.
339. Id. at 5710.
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were articulated for the courts. The compelling state interest standard
was restored.3 40
Hotly debated was the question how to strike the balance between
the individual right to privacy and the public "right to know." The
Bill of Rights Committee proposed the new article II, section 9, as
quoted above, with the intention of establishing a strong "open govern-
ment" policy. The panel expressed its approval of existing Montana
statutes regarding open meetings and public documents. A constitu-
tional measure, it believed, would establish a stronger and more lasting
policy. Thus the inclusion of the privacy language was motivated by a
desire to strike a balance between the right of privacy and right to know;
it was not motivated by an intention to increase the sector of privacy
at the expense of existing open meeting and public documents laws.3 4 '
The committee expected the right of privacy to be "fully respect-
ed." 2 However, the right of privacy was to prevail only when it
"clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure. ' '3 4 The committee
"added the word, clearly, with the intention of tipping the balance in
favor of the right to know. ' ' 3 4 State income tax records would remain
confidential, but state personnel records, which are normally closed,
could be opened in cases of great public interest, such as a dismissal
of a department head for cause.8 45
The committee proposal had originally been drafted with the
participation and approval of representatives of the press. The press
changed its position, however, and vigorously opposed the proposal.4"
The basic concern was that government agencies might use the new
language to increase government secrecy, since they would have an
opportunity to weigh the "demand of individual privacy" and the
340. Id. at 5716; see id. at 5713.
341. Id. at 5145-50.
342. Id. at 5148.
343. Id. at 5146 (emphasis added).
344. id. at 5149.
345. Id. at 5149-50. One delegate inquired whether the state's interest in secrecy
was included within the term "individual privacy." The chairman of the Bill of
Rights Committee asserted that it was. Id. at 5172-73.
That answer seems unsatisfactory. The state has an interest in the confidentiality of
certain matters where there may be no individual privacy interest at all. For example, the
state clearly has an interest in maintaining the secrecy of competitive bids until time
for the bid opening. Clearly there is a state interest in maintaining the secrecy of answers
to civil service examination questions. In neither instance does the state interest in
secrecy operate primarily to vindicate an individual privacy interest. Rather, secrecy
in both instances is essential for carrying out a vital governmental function. It would
seem preferable for a right-to-know provision to recognize expressly that there is
occasionally a public interest in nondisclosure, even though individual privacy interests
are absent.
346. See id. at 5153-57, 7577, 7614,
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"merits of public disclosure." Opponents of the measure preferred to
leave such decisions to the legislature and the courts.3 4 7 As the Conven-
tion neared the completion of its work, press opposition to section 9
seemed to threaten the entire constitution. '4 8 The Bill of Rights Com-
mittee proposed a modified version that would have left the delineation
of exceptions in the hands of the legislature and the courts. 4 9 The Con-
vention chose instead to stand by its original language, apparently per-
suaded by the view that the scope of constitutional principles should
not be left for definition by the legislature and that the original pro-
posal had struck the proper balance.3 50
Smaller tempests surrounded two other privacy-related issues. With
regard to wiretapping, the position of the Bill of Rights Committee was
unusual. The committee's rough draft of the declaration of rights had
included language to address the problem of electronic surveillance.3 51
Public reaction, however, was hostile to electronic surveillance of any
sort. Law enforcement felt that such eavesdropping was not needed
and maintained that it was not being used in Montana.3 52 Moreover,
while the matter was not entirely clear, wiretapping was believed to be
illegal under Montana law.3 53
The committee concluded that the addition of constitutional
language about electronic eavesdropping would "make something
constitutional that we may someday want to regulate or even abolish."
'3 4
The item was deleted from the committee recommendation, with the in-
tention of leaving the matter to the legislature. 5 Indeed, the commit-
tee indicated it would be receptive to an amendment to prohibit
electronic surveillance entirely.3 56 After an unsuccessful effort to develop
more stringent language short of outright prohibition, the Convention
accepted the committee recommendation to delete the item.3 57
Closely related was the general issue of the treatment of privacy in
the search and seizure section. The committee's original formulation of
article II, section 11, read in part: "The people shall be secure in their
persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and
seizures and invasions of privacy, and no warrant . . . shall issue . . .
347. See id. at 5168-76, 7575-7619.
348. Id. at 7591-92.
349. Id. at 7575-77, 7591-92.
350. See id. at 7575-7619.
351. Id. at 5186.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 5188; see note 329 supra.
354. Id. at 5186.
355. Id. at 5187.
356. Id. at 5200.
357. Id. at 5189-5201.
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without probable cause .... -858 It soon became apparent that this
language was in conflict with the right of privacy established in article
II, section 10. The Convention had been at pains to establish a strong
privacy right in section 10, with a very high standard to be met before
any infringement would be permitted. In section 11, however, in-
vasions of privacy were permitted under a less stringent standard of
"reasonableness": only "unreasonable" invasions of privacy would be
forbidden. Having recognized the conflict, the Convention struck the
"invasion of privacy" language from section 11, leaving the right of
privacy for coverage in section 10.3 59
With the indicated modifications and minor stylistic changes, the
Bill of Rights Committee's proposals were adopted by the Convention
and approved by the electorate. Despite the sound and fury over the
potential reach of the right of privacy, it has played a part in only one
reported Montana decision.360 While that case involved a search and
seizure issue, the right of privacy was one of the considerations cited
in support of a strong exclusionary rule. The right to know has been
the subject of two reported decisions, but neither involved the asser-
tion of a claim of individual privacy.3 1' The Montana Constitutional
Convention's thoughtful analysis of the right of privacy awaits applica-
tion in future cases.
3. California.-Like Alaska and Montana, California has a right of
privacy that can be described as free-standing. The California privacy
right does not stand alone in a separate section of the constitution;
rather it is included in an enumeration of inalienable rights. Article I,
section 1, provides:
All people are by nature free and independent and have in-
alienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.
Privacy was added by amendment in 1972.36" The "legislative
history" of the amendment is found in a statement by proponents in-
358. Id. at 5185 (emphasis added).
359. Id. at 5203-05.
360. State v. Coburn, 530 P.2d 442 (Mont. 1974). The case involved the applicability
of the exclusionary rule to evidence acquired in a search by a private individual, where
the private individual had consulted with the police before making the search.
361. See State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Finance Comm., 543 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1975);
Montana Consumer Counsel v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 541 P.2d 770 (Mont. 1975).
362. California had previously recognized the invasion of privacy tort, Melvin v.
Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931), as well as privacy rights in other contexts. See
White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233 n.10 (Cal. 1975).
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cluded in the state election brochure.3 3 The election brochure argu-
ments are set out in the margin.3 64 The thrust of the privacy amend-
363. See White v. Davis, 533 P.2d at 233-34.
364. The privacy amendment was Proposition 11 on California's general election ballot
of November 7, 1972. The election brochure stated, in relevant part:
RIGHT OF PRIVACY. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.
Adds right of privacy to inalienable rights of people.
Financial impact: None.
Detailed Analysis by the Legislative Counsel
The Constitution now provides that all men are by nature free and independent,
and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defend-
ing life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing
and obtaining safety and happiness.
This measure, if adopted, would revise the language of this section to list the
right of privacy as one of the inalienable rights. It would also make a technical
nonsubstantive change in that the reference to "men" in the section would be
changed to "people."
Argument in Favor of Proposition 11
The proliferation of government snooping and data collecting is threatening to
destroy our traditional freedoms. Government agencies seem to be competing to com-
pile the most extensive sets of dossiers of American citizens. Computerization of
records makes it possible to create "cradle-to-grave" profiles on every American.
At present there are no effective restraints on the information activities of
government and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right
of privacy for every Californian.
The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and com-
pelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions,
our expressions, our personalities, our freedom of communion, and our freedom
to associate with the people we choose. It prevents government and business
interests from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and
from misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other
purposes or to embarrass us.
Fundamental to our privacy is the ability to control circulation of personal
information. This is essential to social relationships and personal freedom. The
proliferation of government and business records over which we have no control
limits our ability to control our personal lives. Often we do not know that these
records even exist and we are certainly unable to determine who has access to them.
Even more dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy of government and
business records on individuals. Obviously, if the person is unaware of the record,
he or she cannot review the file and correct inevitable mistakes. Even if the
existence of this information is known, few government agencies or private
businesses permit individuals to review their files and correct errors.
The average citizen also does not have control over what information is
collected about him. Much is secretly collected. We are required to report some
information, regardless of our wishes for privacy or our belief that there is no
public need for the information. Each time we apply for a credit card or a life
insurance policy, file a tax return, interview for a job, or get a drivers' license, a
dossier is opened and an informational profile is sketched. Modern technology is
capable of monitoring, centralizing and computerizing this information which
eliminates any possibility of individual privacy.
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The right of privacy is an important American heritage and essential to the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This right should be abridged only when
there is compelling public need. Some information may remain as designated
public records but only when the availability of such information is clearly in
the public interest.
Proposition 11 also guarantees that the right of privacy and our other constitu-
tional freedoms extend to all persons by amending Article I and substituting the
term "people" for "men." There should be no ambiguity about whether our consti-
tutional freedoms are for every man, woman and child in this state.
KENNETH CORY
Assemblyman, 69th District
GEORGE R. MOSCONE
State Senator, 10th District
Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 11
To say that there are at present no effective restraints on the information activi-
ties of government and business is simply untrue. In addition to literally hundreds
of laws restricting what use can be made of information, every law student knows
that the courts have long protected privacy as one of the rights of our citizens.
Certainly, when we apply for credit cards, life insurance policies, drivers' licenses,
file tax returns or give business interviews, it is absolutely essential that we furnish
certain personal information. Proposition 11 does not mean that we will no longer
have to furnish it and provides no protection as to the use of the information that
the Legislature cannot give if it so desires.
What Proposition 11 can and will do is to make far more difficult what is
already difficult enough under present law, investigating and finding out whether
persons receiving aid from various government programs are truly needy or merely
using welfare to augment their income.
Proposition 11 can only be an open invitation to welfare fraud and tax evasion
and for this reason should be defeated.
JAMES E. WHETMORE
State Senator, 35th District
Argument Against Proposition 11
Proposition 11, which adds the word "privacy" to a list of "inalienable rights" al-
ready enumerated in the Constitution, should be defeated for several reasons.
To begin with, the present Constitution states that there are certain inalienable
rights "among which are those" that it lists. Thus, our Constitution does not
attempt to list all of the inalienable rights nor as a practical matter, could it do
so. It has always been recognized by the law and the courts that privacy is one of
the rights we have, particularly in the enjoyment of home and personal activities.
So, in the first place, the amendment is completely unnecessary.
For many years it has been agreed by scholars and attorneys that it would be ad-
vantageous to remove much unnecessary wordage from the Constitution, and at
present we are spending a great deal of money to finance a Constitution Revision
Commission which is working to do this. Its work presently is incomplete and we
should not begin to lengthen our Constitution and to amend it piecemeal until at
least the Commission has had a chance to finish its work.
The most important reason why this amendment should be defeated, however,
lies in an area where possibly privacy should not be completely guaranteed. Most
government welfare programs are an attempt by California's more fortunate citizens
to assist those who are less fortunate; thus, today, millions of persons are the bene-
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ment was to combat the "proliferation of government snooping and
data collecting," which was "threatening to destroy our traditional
freedoms. "3 65 Compilation of dossiers and computerization of records
were seen as particular evils. The privacy right embraced the protection
of "our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expres-
sions, our personalities, our freedom of communion, and our freedom
to associate with the people we choose,"366 as well as "the ability to
ficiaries of government programs, based on the need of the recipient, which in turn
can only be judged by his revealing his income, assets and general ability to pro-
vide for himself.
If a person on welfare has his privacy protected to the point where he need
not reveal his assets and outside income, for example, how could it be determined
whether he should be given welfare at all?
Suppose a person owned a house worth $100,000 and earned $50,000 a year
from the operation of a business, but had his privacy protected to the point that
he did not have to reveal any of this, and thus qualified for and received welfare
payments. Would this be fair either to the taxpayers who pay for welfare or the
truly needy who would be deprived of part of their grant because of what the
wealthy person was receiving?
Our government is helping many people who really need and deserve the help.
Making privacy an inalienable right could only bring chaos to all government
benefit programs, thus depriving all of us, including those who need the help most.
And so because it is unnecessary, interferes with the work presently being done
by the Constitution Revision Commission and would emasculate all government
programs based on recipient need, I urge a "no" vote on Proposition 11.
JAMES E. WHETMORE
State Senator, 35th District
Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 11
The right to privacy is much more than "unnecessary wordage". It is funda-
mental in any free society. Privacy is not now guaranteed by our State Constitu-
tion. This simple amendment will extend various court decisions on privacy to in-
sure protection of our basic rights.
The work of the Constitution Revision Commission cannot be destroyed by
adding two words to the State Constitution. The Legislature actually followed the
Commission's guidelines in drafting Proposition 11 by keeping the change simple
and to the point. Of all the proposed constitutional amendments before you, this
is the simplest, the most understandable, and one of the most important.
The right to privacy will not destroy welfare nor undermine any important
government program. It is limited by "compelling public necessity" and the
public's need to know. Proposition 11 will not prevent the government from
collecting any information it legitimately needs. It will only prevent misuse of
this information for unauthorized purposes and preclude the collection of ex-
traneous or frivolous information.
KENNETH CORY
Assemblyman, 69th District
Proposed Amendments to Constitution, General Election, November 7, 1972, at 26-28
(compiled by California Legislative Counsel; distributed by California Secretary of State).
365. Id. at 26.
366. Id. at 27.
TOWARD A RIGHT OF PRIVACY
control circulation of personal information."3 67 The privacy right would
prevent the collection of unnecessary information and the misuse of in-
formation. It would assist citizens in determining the existence of
records, controlling access to them, and assuring the accuracy of the
contents.68
The right of privacy was intended to be self-executing; moreover,
it was to operate directly not only against government action but also
against the private sector. The brochure said: "At present there are no
effective restraints on the information activities of government and
business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right of
privacy for every Californian."' 6 9 The brochure concluded with an
assertion of the "fundamental" nature of the right, saying that it "should
be abridged only when there is compelling public need."37 0
Several cases involving the privacy amendment have reached the
California Supreme Court. In White v. Davis,371 a professor at U.C.L.A.
brought suit to enjoin intelligence-gathering activities by the Los
Angeles Police Department. He alleged that police officers had posed
as university students, enrolled in classes, and compiled dossiers and
intelligence reports about class discussions, which documents were then
turned over to the police department. Because the trial court dismissed
the complaint, actual findings of fact were not made. The California
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the allegations stated a prima
facie violation of the recently enacted right of privacy.
The court noted that "the full contours of the new constitutional
provision have . . . not even tentatively been sketched.'" 372 It then
quoted at length from the election brochure on the 1972 constitu-
tional amendment, pointing out that it was "in essence, the only 'legisla-
tive history' . . . available to us"3 73 and that the propriety of using elec-
tion brochure arguments to construe constitutional amendments was
well-settled.3 7 4 Since the thrust of the brochure was to condemn "govern-
ment snooping and data collecting," the right of privacy was clearly
applicable.
The court noted the intended application of the amendment to
"government and business interests ''3 7 5 and ruled that intrusions on
367. Id. (emphasis omitted).
368. See id. at 26-27.
369. Id. at 26 ( emphasis in original).
370. Id. at 27.
371. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975). See generally Note, Privacy: The New Constitutional
Language and the Old Right, 64 CAL. L. REv. 347 (1976).
372. 533 P.2d at 233.
373. Id. at 234 (footnote omitted).
374. Id. n.l1.
375. Id. at 234.
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privacy could be justified only by a "compelling interest. ' '3 7 6 The
court's treatment suggested a willingness to inquire not only into the
necessity for information-gathering, but also into "improper use [or
disclosure] of information properly obtained for a specific purpose"
and "the lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy of an existing
record."'77
In Valley Bank v. Superior Court s 7 the California Supreme Court
held that the right of privacy under Article I, section 1, protects an in-
dividual's banking records. The court ruled that "the right of privacy
extends to one's confidential financial affairs as well as to the details
of one's personal life."3 79 In balancing the civil litigant's need for dis-
covery against the individual right of privacy, the court established dis-
closure rules for banks. Before disclosing confidential customer informa-
tion sought during discovery, "the bank must take reasonable steps to
notify its customer ... and to afford the customer a fair opportunity
to assert his interests .... ."380 Protective orders are to be fashioned,
where necessary, to protect privacy rights.3 1
Financial disclosure requirements for public officers and candidates
have been considered by the California courts in the context of
privacy. Prior to the adoption of the privacy amendment to the Cali-
fornia Constitution, the California Supreme Court invalidated a 1969
law requiring disclosure of the existence and amount of any invest-
ment in excess of $10,000. Any such investment of spouse or minor
child was also to be disclosed. In that case, City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v.
Young,382 the court relied primarily on federal privacy and first amend-
ment cases to hold that the measure swept overbroadly into the privacy
of personal financial affairs. The court objected that the statute
covered all public officers and all investments, regardless whether such
investments bore a reasonable relationship to the duties and scope of
376. Id. In this particular case, the standard was a "compelling governmental interest."
377. See id.
378. 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975).
379. Id. at 979.
380. Id. at 980.
381. Valley Bank followed logically from the court's 1974 decision in Burrows v.
Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974), a criminal proceeding. The court held that
the state search and seizure clause protects an individual's banking records. Thus the
court did not need to reach the question whether the fourth amendment would protect
such records. The court reasoned that one's expection of privacy in banking records is
reasonable; that the financial disclosures one makes to a bank are not always entirely
voluntary; and that the transformation of banking records by a bank for business
purposes does not render the records any less private. Burrows rested solely on the
search and seizure provision of the California Constitution; it did not treat the right of
privacy of article I, section 1.
382. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1970).
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the office. The court noted that the 1969 statute might be defensible as
applied to the legislature itself and a narrower class of public officers,
and clearly indicated that a more narrowly drawn statute would pass
constitutional muster. Where privacy was involved, a two-pronged test
must be met: the statute must serve a compelling state purpose and
must be drafted with narrow specificity 83
In 1973 the California Legislature enacted a new, more narrowly
drawn disclosure law, which the court sustained in County of Nevada
v. MacMillen.38 4 The 1973 law, as amended in 1974, appears to have
been tailored to meet the court's objections in Carmel. The class of
officials required to report had been narrowed. The law aimed at "sub-
stantial" conflicts of interest and required disclosure only if an official's
interests could be materially affected by public service. Disclosure was
limited to sources of income and investments, but not amounts. The
identity of clients or customers need not be disclosed, but only the busi-
ness entity that produced the income.
The court found that its two-pronged Carmel test had been met.
In so doing, the court approved requirements for disclosure of invest-
ments by spouse and minor children, finding that this was "reasonably
necessary" to the act's purpose. Likewise the court sustained the re-
quirement of disclosure by officials who resigned, indicating that such
disclosure might reveal past conflicts of interest. Left unclear was the
extent to which the court would approve a statute which required dis-
closure of exact amounts of income or investments. While the court in
Carmel had indicated the law might be constitutional as applied to a
smaller class of officials, the MacMillen court suggested in a footnote
that disclosure of the "extent" of investments had been one of the
primary objections.3 8 5 Curiously, although MacMillen arose after the
1972 privacy amendment and was clearly a constitutional privacy case,
the court nowhere in its opinion made express reference to the Cali-
fornia Constitution.
While the California Supreme Court has shown itself amenable to
privacy issues relating to academic freedom and financial matters, a
different pattern emerges with regard to arrest records. Loder v.
Municipal Court16 was an action for expungement similar in many
ways to Menard v. Saxbe,3 1 the FBI arrest records case reviewed earlier
in this note. In Loder, the curtain rose on a police officer beating
plaintiff's wife with a nightstick. Plaintiff attacked the police officer
383. Id. at 229.
384. 522 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1974).
385. See id. at 1353 n.10.
386. 553 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1976).
387. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Menard was reviewed in section II supra.
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and was arrested for battery, obstructing a police officer, and disturbing
the peace. Apparently the officer's attack on the plaintiff's wife was
wrongful, for the officer was suspended and charges against the plaintiff
were dismissed in return for plaintiff's covenant not to sue. Plaintiff
then sought to have the record of the arrest expunged. Unlike fellow
Californian Menard, plaintiff Loder failed.
Observing that the right of privacy "is not absolute," the California
Supreme Court reviewed the numerous ways in which arrest records
are used by law enforcement and correctional authorities, concluding
that maintenance of such records constitutes "a substantial government
interest" sufficient to overcome the right of individual privacy.38 8 The
court acknowledged the detrimental effects of arrest records in employ-
ment and professional licensing, but then reviewed California's statutes
limiting access to arrest information. The statutory provisions include
provisions for individual access to one's own arrest records; measures
for expungement or sealing of records in certain cases; a requirement
for recording the final disposition in each case; penalties for un-
authorized disclosure; limitations on use of arrest records in licensing;
and a prohibition against any inquiry by a public or private employer
seeking information about an arrest or detention that did not result in
conviction. The legislative history of the statutory scheme suggested
that there had been an intention not to allow expungement beyond
the listed catagories-for which plaintiff could not qualify. In denying
relief, the court unanimously held that "limited retention and dissemi-
nation of arrest records does not violate the right of privacy."3 89
The Loder decision is unsettling. While the court's position, taken
in the abstract, is a rational statement of policy, virtually no attention
was given the extraordinary situation in which Loder found himself.
The California Constitution confers the right of privacy on individuals,
yet Loder was left without a remedy. It is unreasonable to expect the
legislature to anticipate and provide in advance for the class of persons
attacked by policemen. The granting of equitable relief to Loder would
certainly have been distinguishable on its facts in any later arrest
records litigation, and would not have undercut the constitutional
foundations of the arrest records system. The court's lengthy catalog
of socially desirable uses for arrest records were inapplicable to Loder's
case, a point the court simply ignored.
More unsettling is the court's enthusiasm for the use of arrest
records by courts and law enforcement and correctional agencies.
While the court's list of permissible uses is too long to repeat here, the
388. 553 P.2d at 628, 630.
389. Id. at 637 (footnote omitted).
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court betrayed no concern that arrest records may be given more weight
than they deserve. In a lengthy and unconvincing digression, for
example, the court discoursed on the utility of refusing to seal juvenile
detention records, despite the fact that similar detention records would
have been sealed had the juveniles been adults. After observing that
such records allow juvenile authorities to look for patterns of behavior,
the court remarked, " 'the retention of the records of even the innocent
juvenile serves certain salutary purposes.' "390 One can only wonder what
happened to the right of privacy.
The attitude reflected in Loder stands in curious contrast to the
approach taken in the court's other privacy cases. The court that was
willing to subject financial disclosure statutes to the most exacting
scrutiny, fashion protection for banking records, and prevent surveil-
lance in universities does not seem to be the same court that decided
Loder. One is prompted to observe that although judges can identify
with measures for financial disclosure, banking records secrecy, and
academic freedom, they rarely find themselves in the position of
arrestees. California's privacy cases have a distinctly "white collar"
character.
Aside from the blind spot for arrest records, the California Supreme
Court has undertaken active enforcement of the new privacy right. Its
position on banking records is particularly important in filling the void
created by the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the federal
right of privacy does not protect banking records.391 In this regard, it is
noteworthy that California has adopted an express state constitutional
"declaration of independence" in article I, section 24. Added in 1974,
it reads:
Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on
those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
While this provision is merely declaratory of the existing relationship
between the federal and state governments, its inclusion in the state
constitution underlines the primacy of the states in the creation and
protection of the rights of citizens. It virtually mandates the creation
of a body of state constitutional decisions distinct from federal prece-
dent.
The most intriguing feature of California's right of privacy is the
clear intention to reach private action, unlike Alaska and Montana,
where state action is a prerequisite.3 912 Since the California right is self-
390. Id. at 629-30 n.12 (emphasis supplied by court).
391. See note 228 supra.
392. While the Alaska courts have so held, see note 323 and accompanying text
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executing, it could be used to remedy intrusions by private individuals
or groups. There are, as yet, no cases decided by the California Supreme
Court on this point. The banking records case involved state action:
discovery in civil litigation under the rules of procedure. Insofar as
the California Constitution provides a self-executing right of privacy
against government and private intrusion, it is the most far-reaching
of the state constitutional measures.
B. States Integrating the Privacy Right with the Prohibition
Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Five constitutions include the right of privacy in some form as
part of the traditional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Despite the similarity of approach, the five states vary in the
scope of the privacy protection conferred. The proponents of the
privacy provisions of Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, and South Carolina
have expressed the intention to confer protection on privacy beyond
the context of search and seizure, though the courts have not always
effectuated that intent. Florida stands at variance: its main objective
was to strengthen the search and seizure section by limiting the inter-
ception of private communications.
1. Hawaii.-In 1968 Hawaii revised its constitution. Article I,
section 5, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, and in-
vasions of privacy shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized or the communications sought to be intercepted.
Read in its entirety, the constitutional language suggests that the
primary concern was protection against wiretapping. The proceedings
of the Hawaii Constitutional Convention confirm that wiretapping
was one of several concerns; the intent of the Convention was to permit
electronic surveillance if a warrant was obtained.3 93 However, the draft-
supra, the Montana Constitutional Convention proceedings are silent on the point. State
action is implicit, however, since the standard to be satisfied is "a compelling state
interest."
393. I HAWAII, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONsTrTuTIONAL CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1968,
at 253-34 (1973) (journal and Documents); II HAWAII, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF HAWAII OF 1968, at 5-9 (1973) (Committee of the Whole Debates). While
the delegates differed in their views of Hawaii wiretapping law, id. at 5-6, the Conven-
tion's background study reported that wire interception and eavesdropping were pro-
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ing committee felt that "a specific protection against communications
interception . . . may be somewhat narrow and limiting and therefore
recommends a broader protection in terms of a right of privacy.' '3 9 4 It
continued:
[I]nclusion of the term "invasions of privacy" will effectively protect
the individual's wishes for privacy as a legitimate social interest.
The proposed amendment is intended to include protection against
indiscriminate wiretapping as well as undue government inquiry
into and regulation of those areas of a person's life which are defined
as necessary to insure "man's individuality and human dignity." 3 95
Since adoption of the privacy provision, the Hawaii Supreme Court
has construed it on several occasions. In State v. Baker,96 the court
considered a challenge to the Hawaii statute prohibiting possession of
marijuana. The defendants articulated a private possession theory like
that of Ravin, but the court reached a contrary result. Applying a pre-
sumption of constitutionality to the statute, the court concluded that
invalidating the marijuana proscription would have similar implications
for health regulations directed at the consumption of other substances.
Unlike the Alaska court, the Hawaii Supreme Court also concluded
that prohibition of private possession was a reasonable incident to pro-
hibition of sale and trafficking. The court commented that, while the
Hawaii Constitution did have a privacy right, "we do not find in that
provision any intent to elevate the right of privacy to the equivalent
of a first amendment right."3 97 Unreasonable invasions of privacy were
prohibited; the marijuana possession law was not, in the court's judg-
ment, unreasonable.
In other cases, the court has ruled that there is no invasion of
privacy when a defendant unknowingly invites an informer to his home
to purchase marijuana;9 8 and that it is no defense to a charge of in-
hibited by Hawaii statute in the absence of consent by the sender and receiver of a
communication. HAWAII LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, HAWAII CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION STUDIES, ARTICLE I: BILL OF RIGHTS 75-76 (1968); accord, I HAWAII, supra at 233.
The question was debated whether a photograph taken by a law enforcement agency
from a public place could be deemed a communication and thus be forbidden if taken
without a warrant. The question was answered in the negative, under a "plain view"
theory that the photograph could not capture any information which a law enforcement
officer could not legally observe anyway; the photo merely recorded the officer's observa-
tions. II HAWAII, supra at 7-8.
394. I HAWAII, supra note 393, at 233.
395. Id. at 233-34. See also Christensen, Suppression of Evidence Without the Aid
of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 8 HAWAII B.J. 109, 109 (1972).
396. 535 P.2d 1394 (Hawaii 1975).
397. Id. at 1399.
398. State v. Roy, 510 P.2d 1066 (Hawaii 1973).
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decent exposure for nude sunbathing on a public beach to assert that
one had an expectation of privacy.3 99 The court rejected an effort to
halt a school sex education program on privacy grounds, primarily be-
cause the school system had arranged to excuse from attendance those
students whose parents objected. Since the program was thus non-
compulsory, there was no basis for the objecting parents to argue that
the school system interfered impermissibly with parental decision-
making about child-rearing and education."'
As one might expect, the largest single category of reported cases
has involved search and seizure questions. The Hawaii Supreme Court
has expressly decided to confer greater privacy protection in search and
seizure cases than that required by the Federal Constitution, but the
Hawaii court has, curiously, declined to base this pro-privacy view on
the "invasions of privacy" language of article I, section 5. Instead, the
court has chosen to construe Hawaii's prohibition against "unreason-
able searches [and] seizures" more broadly than the identical phrase in
the United States Constitution.
4 0
'
1
It is not yet clear whether the Hawaii right of privacy will have any
impact on laws regulating sexual behavior. In a 1971 case, a dissenting
justice suggested that the right of privacy invalidates laws proscribing
sexual intercourse between unmarried persons.4 0 2 The majority failed
to address the privacy issue at all, perhaps because they felt a statutory
rape case was an inappropriate one for exploring the boundaries of
sexual behavior and privacy. The majority did, however, provide some
clue to its views in saying the defendant's act was " 'unlawful and highly
immoral even under the facts as the offender supposed them to be,' "403
an apparent rejection of the dissenting argument that "morality" was
not a proper concern of the legislature.
To date the addition of a right of privacy to the Hawaii Constitu-
tion has made little apparent difference in its judicial decisions, though
399. State v. Rocker, 475 P.2d 684 (Hawaii 1970).
400. Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 478 P.2d 314 (Hawaii 1970).
401. State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 (Hawaii 1974). "We have not hesitated in
the past to extend the protections of the Hawaii Bill of Rights beyond those of textually
parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights when logic and a sound regard for the
purposes of those protections have so warranted." Id. With regard to the right of privacy,
the court continued:
In addition to the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Hawaii Constitution guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable invasions of
privacy. We need not decide the exact meaning or scope of this latter protection
here, however .... since we are of the opinion that as a search and seizure, the con-
duct of the police in this case was unreasonable.
Id. n.6 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
402. State v. Silva, 491 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Hawaii 1971) (Levinson, J., dissenting).
403. Id. at 1217 (citation omitted).
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one is tempted to speculate that it may have indirectly influenced the
construction of the search and seizure clause by causing the justices to
be more "privacy conscious." The minimal impact of the privacy right
is not surprising. The submersion of the right of privacy in the search
and seizure section has led to the inference that there was no intention
to afford privacy the same status as has been afforded major constitu-
tional provisions like the first amendment. Moreover, the prohibition
against "unreasonable... invasions of privacy" has anchored the privacy
section firmly to the rational basis test. The efficacy of Hawaii's right
of privacy provision remains to be demonstrated.
2. Illinois.-The Illinois Constitution of 1970 contains two pro-
visions which treat the right of privacy. The first, article I, section 6,
provides:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches,
seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by
eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue without
probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The prohibition against unreasonable "interceptions of their com-
munications by eavesdropping devices or other means" was intended
"to create a right in respect to interception . . . that is akin to the
prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and seizures.' "404 The Bill
of Rights Committee had originally proposed a complete ban on all
interception of communications by eavesdropping devices, even though
an Illinois statute permitted wiretapping done with the consent of one
party.40 5 Upon further reflection a majority of the committee concluded
that wiretapping would be essential in some cases and opted for "a
more flexible provision" tied to the standard of reasonableness. 40 6
The omission of "interceptions" from the warrant requirement in
the second sentence was intentional. The Committee reasoned that
it would be impossible to describe with sufficient particularity the com-
munication sought to be intercepted, at least not with the particularity
required for the issuance of a warrant for the seizure of "persons or
things." Instead, all interceptions would be judged by the standard of
reasonableness. At the time of the Convention, Illinois law did not
provide for judicial authorization in the absence of consent by one of
404. VI SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 30 (1972).
405. Id.
406. Id.
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the parties to the communication. If the legislature chose to amend
the law to allow wiretapping with prior judicial authorization, the
statutory procedure would have to meet the reasonableness standard-
if the Illinois Supreme Court could be persuaded that the concept of
unconsented-to wire-tapping was itself reasonable. Clearly the framers
contemplated that a writ, though not a warrant, would need to be
obtained before an unconsented-to interception could be undertaken.41 7
The phrase "or other means" could conceivably be read to extend
the prohibition against "interceptions" to other contemporary sur-
veillance techniques. The debates, however, indicated an intent to
anticipate future technological developments. 40 8 Visual surveillance
would not be forbidden, unless performed in an unreasonable
manner.4 0 9 Interception of letters or other written communications was
already forbidden by the right to be secure in one's "papers.''410
The insertion of the phrase "invasions of privacy" was intended to
establish a privacy right against governmental intrusion. The Bill of
Rights Committee stated:
It is doubtless inevitable that any person who chooses to enjoy the
benefits of living in an organized society cannot also claim the
privacy he would enjoy if he were to live away from the institutions
of government and the multitudes of his fellow men. It is probably
also inevitable that infringements on individual privacy will increase
as our society becomes more complex, as government institutions are
expected to assume larger responsibilities, and as technological
developments offer additional or more effective means by which
privacy can be invaded. In the face of these conditions the Committee
concluded that it was essential to the dignity and well being of the
individual that every person be guaranteed a zone of privacy in
which his thoughts and highly personal behavior were not subject
to disclosure or review. The new provision creates a direct right to
freedom from such invasions of privacy by government or public
officials. 411
As in Hawaii, only "unreasonable" invasions of privacy are pro-
hibited.41 2
The Convention considered, but by narrow votes rejected, amend-
ments to proscribe invasions of privacy by private entities. One amend-
ment would have added, after "privacy," the phrase "by the state or
407. See id. at 32; III id. at 1526-39; V id. at 4276-78.
408. III id. at 1526-27.
409. Id. at 1529. See also id. at 1541 (infra-red photography).
410. Id. at 1531-32.
411. VII id. at 31-32.
412. III id. at 1525, 1528.
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any person."41 3 The other amendment would have created a free-
standing right of privacy in a separate section, reading: "All persons
shall be free from any unreasonable invasion of privacy by any other
person, group, firm or corporation.."414 The movant of both amendments
was concerned with the growth of data banks, the sharing of credit in-
formation, the increasing use of the computer, and the growing practice
of subcontracting government investigations to private organizations. 415
The amendments were intended to provide a self-executing constitu-
tional basis for legal or injunctive relief for private invasions of
privacy. Additionally they would provide a constitutional foundation
for the developing decisional law of privacy and possibly spur legisla-
tive action. Another objective was to guarantee individual access to
records maintained about oneself by the private sector, such as credit
files.416
The primary objection to both proposals was that they were un-
necessary. Illinois courts had developed a body of privacy law by
court decision, and the legislature was free to act if it chose to do so.417
Although the amendments failed on 41-49 and 35-40 votes,418 the
Convention did agree to amend its "Right to Remedy and Justice"
section to include privacy. Article I, section 12, now reads:
Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all in-
juries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property
or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and
promptly.
The change was intended to make completely clear the power of the
courts to continue to develop privacy law; it was designed to counter-
act any possible argument that an invasion of privacy was not an in-
jury to "person," "property," or (with some exceptions) "reputa-
tion."419
The Illinois Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of the
article I, section 6, right of privacy must have been a rude shock to the
drafters. The court's behavior illustrates the serious hazard in the
placement of an independent privacy right in a section dealing primarily
with searches and seizures. In 1972, in Stein v. Howlett 20 the court
413. Id. at 1539.
414. Id. at 1733.
415. Id. at 1539, 1735.
416. Id. at 1541, 1736-37, 1739.
417. Id. at 1540, 1542, 1733-39.
418. Id. at 1543, 1739.
419. IV id. at 3652.
420. 289 N.E.2d 409 (111. 1972), app. dismissed, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
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upheld the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act, which required dis-
closure of sources of income and identity of assets in excess of specific
amounts. In that case the court took an expansive view of the new
right of privacy, but concluded that there was a "compelling govern-
mental interest" in the financial disclosure statute which was sufficient
to overcome individual privacy interests. 4 1 Two years later, in Illinois
State Employees Association v. Walker, 2 the court took a different view.
Illinois Governor Daniel Walker had, by executive order, created a
Board of Ethics and an extensive financial disclosure system. Each
gubernatorial appointee, each person who received more than $20,000
per year from the state, and certain designated individuals were re-
quired to file a Statement of Economic Interest and copies of their
most recent federal and state income tax returns. The tax returns were
to be kept confidential, but the Statements of Economic Interest, con-
taining sources and amounts of all income as well as a statement of net
worth, were to be public.
The simplest avenue by which to sustain the executive order would
have been to find a compelling governmental interest in financial dis-
closure, thus following Stein. Instead, the court chose to disavow its
earlier construction of the right of privacy. In a clearly erroneous read-
ing of the constitutional convention proceedings, the court concluded
that the rephrasing of section 6 by the Convention's style and drafting
committee reflected an intention to restrict its substantive scope.
As the section was initially reported to the Constitutional Convention
by its Bill of Rights Committee, an argument could have been made
that it established an independent right of privacy rooted in the State
Constitution . . . . During its progress through the Constitutional
Convention, however, the provision was altered so that as submitted
to and approved by the people it was restricted . . . . Not all mem-
bers of the court are convinced that this provision should be inter-
preted as asserting anything beyond protection from invasions of
privacy by eavesdropping devices or other means of interception. 423
Two justices dissented vigorously, correctly pointing out that the style
and drafting changes were nonsubstantive and that the court's position
was contrary to the manifest intent of the Convention. 42 4
The mischief in Illinois State Employees is not necessarily in the
result reached but in the extremely restrictive reading given the right
421. 289 N.E.2d at 413.
422. 315 N.E.2d 9 (Ill.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1058 (1974).
423. Id. at 15. Apparently the absence of a comma after the word "privacy" led the
court to this bizarre conclusion. See id.
424. Id. at 20-21.
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of privacy language. If this construction is followed literally in future
cases, the right of privacy will be reduced to a nullity. Some hope may
remain, for the court rested its decision in part on a financial disclosure
provision of the constitution.4 25 The way is conceivably open for the
court to restrict its holding to matters of financial disclosure only.
From later cases it is difficult to divine the court's exact position on
privacy. The court followed Illinois State Employees without elabora-
tion in another financial disclosure case.426 In St. Louis v. Drolet,421 the
court granted expungement of the arrest records of a juvenile who had
been detained but released without being charged. The opinion ex-
pressed concern about confidentiality of such records and also noted
that an adult would be granted expungement as a matter of right under
the same circumstances. In another case, a criminal defendant argued
that the addition of privacy to article I, section 6, created a more
stringent test for the reasonableness of a search and seizure than the
standard required by the fourth amendment. Rejecting that argument,
the court saw "no reason for construing the section as imposing addi-
tional conditions which must be met before a search may be deemed
a reasonable one.' '4 28
While the reports of the demise of article I, section 6, may be pre-
mature, the prognosis is poor.
3. South Carolina.-In 1971 South Carolina amended its constitu-
tion to include a privacy statement within the search and seizure
section. Article I, section 10, now reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and
unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
the person or thing to be seized, and the information to be obtained.
The privacy language was proposed by the Committee to Make a
Study of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895, which formulated a
comprehensive revision to be undertaken by the legislature through
an article-by-article amendment process. The Committee recommended
that the traditional search and seizure provision be retained. It con-
tinued:
425. Id. at 15.
426. Buettell v. Walker, 319 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. 1974). While the financial disclosure
measure passed muster from a privacy standpoint, it was invalidated for other reasons.
427. 364 N.E.2d 61 (111. 1977).
428. People v. Clark, 357 N.E,2d 798. 801 (Ill. 1976).
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In addition, the Committee recommends that the citizen be given
constitutional protection from an unreasonable invasion of privacy
by the State. This additional statement is designed to protect the
citizen from improper use of electronic devices, computer data banks,
etc. Since it is almost impossible to describe all of the devices which
exist or which may be perfected in the future, the Committee
recommends only a broad statement on policy, leaving the details
to be regulated by law and court decisions. 42 9
This sparse statement of intent awaits elaboration by the courts. There
are, as yet, no reported decisions on the newly added right of privacy.
4. Louisiana.-The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides, in
article I, section 5:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communica-
tions, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches,
seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be
seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person
adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of
this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropri-
ate court.
Two commentators have differed sharply about the scope of article
I, section 5.430 One of them, Convention Delegate Louis Jenkins, de-
scribed the steps taken to expand the coverage of the traditional search
and seizure section.43 1 "Property" was added to assure that all of a
person's possessions would be protected, lest the traditional "houses,
papers, and effects" be given a restrictive meaning. "Communications"
was intended to include "censorship of the mails, wiretapping, eaves-
dropping and other interference with private communications." 32 That
proscription, indicated Delegate Jenkins, was intended to prohibit the
enactment of any law permitting "'the interception or inspection of
any private communication or message.'-433
429. SOUTH CAROLINA, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE
SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION OF 1895, at 15 (1969).
430. Verbatim transcripts of the Constitutional Convention proceedings were made
and, although unavailable to this writer, were relied upon by the writers cited below.
431. Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. REv. 9, 27 (1975).
432. Id.
433. Id. (citation omitted). Another writer agrees that the language of article I,
section 5, is susceptible of that interpretation but argues that a blanket proscription
would be unwise. Miller, The Declaration of Rights: Criminal Provisions, 21 Loy. L. REv.
43, 44-46 (1975).
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With regard to "invasions of privacy," Delegate Jenkins stated that
the new right was "intended to give the courts wide latitude in in-
validating state laws and actions." 4 34 In his opinion, measures which
could be invalidated included requirements to disclose the names of
campaign contributors, stop-and-frisk laws, onerous building and health
inspection requirements, and the use of Social Security numbers for
identification in state court pleadings.
Delegate Jenkins vehemently maintained, however, that the right
of privacy reached only government action, "in accord with the view
of the committee that a bill of rights cannot reach private action.."4 3 1
Thus the new right of privacy would not proscribe privately conducted
searches and seizures; information obtained thereby would continue to
be admissible in court.4 3 6 The privacy right would not limit the use
of privately owned data banks,437 nor would it create a new tort
action.4 8
According to Jenkins, the standing provision was intended to confer
broader protection against "unreasonable searches, seizures, or in-
vasions of privacy" than had been available under previous law. Persons
affected by an illegal search directed against third parties would have
standing to object. Moreover, in Delegate Jenkins' view, a person
could object to seizure of his medical records from his physician or
hospital, or seizure of his financial records from his bank.43 9
A more expansive view of the right of privacy was taken by Professor
Lee Hargrave, coordinator of legal research for the constitutional con-
vention. Making it clear that he expressed a personal view only, Har-
grave differed with Jenkins on several important points.4 4 0 While con-
ceding that a contrary interpretation was possible, Hargrave argued
that the right of privacy applied to private as well as government
entities. He noted that section 5 was placed apart from the other
criminal procedure measures, which were grouped together in sections
13 through 21. The phrase "no law shall," which would indicate a
limitation on state action only, was not used. Individual delegates had
434. Jenkins, supra note 431, at 28 (footnote omitted).
435. Id. The writer did not explain how the drafters reconciled that philosophical
view with the freedom of expression section, which confers freedom of speech and press
but holds each person "responsible for abuse of that freedom." LA. CONST. art. I, § 7;
see Jenkins, supra note 431, at 31.
436. Jenkins, supra note 431, at 28, 30.
437. Id. at 28.
438. Id. at 30.
439. Id. at 29-30.
440. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
LA. L. REV. 1, 20-25 (1974). The Hargrave article preceded the Jenkins article, but
Jenkins has been dealt with first because he purports to present the intent of the .con-
vention; Hargrave relies more substantially on textual interpretation.
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expressed concern about private searches and information-gathering
through computer data banks. In Hargrave's view, the privacy section
would be "a fertile ground for development in tort law as well as the
non-criminal aspects of government operations." 441 The standard of
protection would be one of "reasonableness," for only "unreasonable
invasions of privacy" were prohibited.4 1
Hargrave also differed with Jenkins on the subject of wiretapping.
While the Committee on the Bill of Rights and Elections had at one
time drafted a complete proscription on interception of private com-
munications, it was eliminated in favor of the final language. In Har-
grave's view, wiretapping could be permitted if the "reasonableness"
requirement was satisfied, but the warrant requirement would have to
be met as well." s
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not resolved these disputes, since
it has had few occasions on which to construe the right of privacy apart
from the classic search and seizure context.4 4 4 The court has decisively
rejected the Jenkins view that the right of privacy precludes laws re-
quiring disclosure of campaign contributions. In Guidry v. Roberts, the
court sustained a law requiring reporting of contributions in excess of
rather generous stated amounts; any infringement on privacy was held
to be incidental.4 4 5
In another case the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that the
presence of the "invasion of privacy" language in article I, section 5,
was intended "to extend the 'probable cause' requirement to protect
that right, as well as the right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures. ' '"4  The court continued:
It can hardly be argued that the right of privacy protected by Article
1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 does not include at least
that right discussed by Justice Brandeis in his dissent to a case which
permitted the use of wire tap evidence:
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness . . .They con-
ferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. '" 4 7
441. Id. at 21; see id. at 20-25.
442. Id. at 21.
443. Id. at 21-22.
444. The court has cited both writers' views on article I, section 5, for a point on
which both agreed. See State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977, 981-82 (La. 1976).
445. 335 So. 2d 438, 449-50 (La. 1976).
446. State v. Kinnemann, 337 So. 2d 441, 443-44 (La. 1976).
447. Id. at 444, citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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While the context was a search and seizure case, the language suggests
that the Louisiana Supreme Court may take an expansive reading of
the new right of privacy.
5. Florida.-Florida's Constitution of 1968 contains the narrowest
of the privacy provisions considered thus far. Article I, section 12, pro-
vides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
against the unreasonable interception of private communications by
any means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing
the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or
things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the
nature of evidence to be obtained. Articles or information obtained in
violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence.
According to the commentator, the search and seizure provision was
carried forward substantially intact from the previous constitution.4 48
The innovations were the prohibition against "the unreasonable in-
terception of private communications by any means," and the addition
of a constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule prohibiting the use
of "information obtained in violation of this right." The privacy
right clearly was directed at the specific problem of electronic sur-
veillance. Neither the text of the section nor the brief comments ac-
companying it betray any suggestion that privacy was considered in a
larger context.
The Florida Supreme Court has construed the interception pro-
vision of article I, section 12, to afford greater protection than the
fourth amendment. In Tollett v. State,"9 tape recordings were made of
conversations between an informer and the defendant. At trial the state
introduced the tape recordings into evidence over objection, despite the
fact that the informer was inexplicably unavailable to testify about his
consent. Instead, the deputy sheriff from whose office the calls were made
assured the court that consent had been given.
The Florida Supreme Court recognized that the recordings would be
admissible under the fourth amendment4 50 but found that the state
constitution created a higher standard. The only exception to the
448. 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 269 (1970) (Commentary). The debates of the 1965 Constitu-
tion Revision Commission and the legislative deliberations leading to the 1968 revision
have not been reproduced in generally accessible form.
449. 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973).
450. Id. at 492, citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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warrant requirement of article I, section 12, was a valid consent,
which, the court ruled, must be given through the informer's direct
testimony, not by hearsay statements of police informers. The court
expressed concern over the general increase in the use of wiretaps
and "participant recordings," and indicated that uncontrolled eaves-
dropping "has no place in a free state.
'
"
451
Section 12 almost certainly applies only to government-conducted
wiretapping, not to private action. There is, however, some slight con-
trary suggestion in Markham v. Markham.45 2 In that case, a husband
wiretapped and recorded his wife's telephone conversations with third
persons; he sought to introduce them into the couple's divorce and
child custody proceedings. Neither party to the actual conversations
had consented to the interception. The husband's conduct clearly
violated the Florida wiretap statute, since there was not a valid consent
by at least one of the parties to the conversation. 53 The statute con-
tained an exclusionary rule barring the use of such an illegally inter-
cepted communication in a court proceeding,4 54 and the Florida Su-
preme Court held that the evidence must be excluded. Although the
case could have been decided entirely on statutory grounds, the su-
preme court noted with approval that the court below had relied on
constitutional, as well as statutory, grounds. The supreme court went on
to say that section 12 " 'shores up the conclusion that a husband does
not possess the right to invade his wife's right of privacy by utilizing
electronic devices.' "455
One student has interpreted Markham to hold that article I, section
12 reaches private as well as state action. The writer reasoned that
section 12 does not expressly require state action; therefore it reaches
privately conducted searches and seizures, in addition to privately con-
ducted wiretaps.456 This view is almost surely incorrect. The 1968
Constitution carried forward the language of a predecessor provision
451. 272 So. 2d at 493, citing Professor Westin. The court also cited the statement
of intent in Florida's wiretap statute, but the decision rested on constitutional grounds.
See id. at 494. See generally 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 188 (1974).
452. 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973), aff'g 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
453. The Florida wiretap statute was subsequently amended to require consent by
all parties to a communication before it can be intercepted. See FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d)
(1975); cf. Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977) (first amend-
ment does not confer privilege to gather the news so as to allow reporters to record con-
versations without consent of other party). There is a law enforcement exception, whereby
a warrantless interception may take place if the law enforcement officer is a party to the
conversation or if one party to the conversation consents-essentially the rule in Tollet.
See FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c) (1975).
454. See 272 So. 2d at 814; FLA. STAT. § 934.06 (1975).
455. 272 So. 2d at 814, quoting 265 So. 2d at 62.
456. 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 166, 169-70 (1973).
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substantially intact, save the addition of the express exclusionary rule,
the "private communications" provision, and one other minor change.4 7
Cases construing the predecessor language had held that it applied only
to state action . 45  The commentary accompanying the 1968 Constitution
indicated that section 12 "includes the substance of the searches and
seizures section of the Constitution of 1885 as amended . .. in a re-
organized fashion and with new material added." 45 9 Just two weeks
prior to Markham, the Florida Supreme Court held that section 12,
like the fourth amendment, did not apply to "searches and seizures
made by a private individual. "4 0 It appears, therefore, that the Mark-
ham discussion of section 12 merely signifies judicial recognition of a
strong state policy against unauthorized wiretapping regardless of who
does it. The 1968 Constitution "shores up" the statute only by adding
indirect support to the court's decision not to engraft a judicial excep-
tion for the husband-wife relationship, a position which had been ad-
vocated by one dissenting justice.4 6 1
Even in the context of criminal proceedings, the courts may decide
not to apply the constitutional exclusionary rule in a literal way. Florida
was one of the minority of states that had adopted the exclusionary rule
by judicial decision4 2 prior to Mapp v. Ohio.463 One district court of
appeal has regarded the express constitutional exclusionary rule as a
mere codification, not an expansion, of the prior decision-law rule.46 4
In a nonwiretap case, that court ruled illegally seized evidence could
be admitted for impeachment purposes, notwithstanding the apparently
total prohibition of section 12. If that decision were applied to intercep-
tion of communications, the statutory exclusionary rule would afford
457. 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 269 (1970) (Commentary).
458. Jeffcoat v. State, 138 So. 385, 388-89 (Fla. 1931); see Church v. State, 9 So. 2d
164, 166-67 (Fla. 1942) (en banc); Carlton v. State, 149 So. 767, 768 (Fla. 1933).
459. 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 269 (1970) (Commentary). FLA. CONST. OF 1885, Declara-
tion of Rights, § 22, provided:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated and no warrants
issued, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched and the person or persons, and thing
or things to be seized.
460. Bernovich v. State, 272 So. 2d 505, 506-07 (Fla. 1973). In a later decision, the
First District Court of Appeal, which had been quoted by the Florida Supreme Court in
Markham, clearly distinguished the scope of the constitutional and statutory provisions.
See Horn v. State, 298 So. 2d 194, 200-01 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
461. 272 So. 2d at 814.
462. Note, Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Noncriminal Proceedings,
22 U. FLA. L. REv. 38, 52-53 (1969).
463. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
464. Dornau v. State, 306 So. 2d 167, 169-70 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975).
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greater protection than the constitutional one; unlike the constitutional
rule, the statutory exclusionary rule could not be regarded as a codifica-
tion of prior court decisions. That the Florida Supreme Court may take
a different view of wiretapping, however, is suggested by a 1973 case
in which the court relied on constitutional and statutory grounds to
prevent illegally intercepted communications from being considered by
a grand jury proceeding.415
One writer has argued that the constitutional exclusionary rule
applies to all judicial proceedings, civil or criminal. 416 Thus evidence
illegally seized by government agents would be inadmissible in civil
as well as criminal proceedings. That question was not resolved by
the pre-1968 cases under Florida's judicially developed exclusionary
rule.46 7 Another writer has reasoned that the constitutional exclusionary
rule is in terms applicable to such civil proceedings, but doubts that
the Florida Supreme Court would so hold.46 The question must be
regarded as an open one, but the wiretap statute should continue to
secure the exclusion of illegally intercepted communications in civil
litigation, even if the 1968 Constitution does not.469
The debate among commentators about the exact meaning of sec-
tion 12, and the confusion in the aftermath of the Markham decision,
illustrate another hazard in placing a right of privacy within a search
and seizure section. So long as the intent of the framers is to reach
state action only, then such placement of the privacy right may be apt.
Where, however, the intent is to reach private action, and where the
conventional search and seizure section has been held to reach state
action only, confusion is likely to be the result.
The published evidence suggests that the framers of the Florida
provision intended only to reach governmental action with the prohibi-
tion against "unreasonable interception of private communications."
If so, the constitutional mandate has achieved its purpose. Moreover,
as the Markham case illustrates, the constitutional measure has en-
couraged the courts rigorously to enforce wiretapping statutes, even
where the constitutional provision was not directly applicable. It is
conceivable that a more expansive interpretation of article I, section 12,
was intended by the framers, but so long as the wiretapping statute
affords comprehensive protection there is unlikely to be pressure for
constitutional change.
465. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Frank Cobo), 287 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1973) (per
curiam).
466. Levinson, Florida Constitutional Law, 28 U. MIAMi L. REV. 551, 603 (1974).
467. Note, Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Noncriminal Proceedings,
supra note 462, at 53-54.
468. Id.
469. See FLA. STAT. § 934.06 (1975).
TOWARD A RIGHT OF PRIVACY
C. States in which the Privacy Section is the Equivalent of the
Prohibition against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The foregoing eight states can be visualized as occupying a spectrum
in the degree of protection conferred on the right of privacy. At one
end of the spectrum are the states reviewed in part A of this section,
each having a free-standing right of privacy. In the middle of the
spectrum are the states discussed in part B of this section which confer
an intermediate level of protection: something more than the tradi-
tional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, but some-
thing less than a free-standing right.
Washington and Arizona, the two states examined in this section,
occupy the other end of the spectrum. Their privacy sections were de-
signed to serve as the traditional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. On the eve of statehood, both states chose to
eschew the traditional language of the fourth amendment and instead
adopted a more succinct substitute, couched in the language of privacy.
Formulated in 1889 and 1910, respectively, their privacy sections are
the oldest of any in the state constitutions.
1. Washington.-Unchanged since 1889, article I, section 7, of the
Washington Constitution provides:
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law.
The genesis of this unprecedented constitutional provision remains
wrapped in mystery. It was formulated at the 1889 Washington State
Constitutional Convention, which had been called pursuant to a con-
gressional enabling act authorizing Washington to make the transition
from territory to state. There had been a territorial constitution drafted
in 1878, but Congress had failed to approve it; the 1889 effort was to
produce the first official constitution.470
It would be of considerable interest to know the rationale for the
protection of "private affairs." In 1889 the term "privacy" had rarely
been used in legal or constitutional terminology. Thomas Cooley had
written of the right "to be let alone" in 1880, 4 71 and Boyd v. United
States had been decided in 1886,472 but Warren and Brandeis were not
to write their law review article until 1890. 4 73 Were the verbatim
470. JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at iii (B.
Rosenow ed. 1962) (hereinafter WASHINGTON STATE JOURNAL].
471. T. COOLEY, supra note 80.
472. 116 U.S. 616 (1886); the case is discussed in section IV supra.
473. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3.
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transcripts of the 1889 Washington Convention extant, they might
provide much-needed insight into early state views of privacy. But
for want of an appropriation by the Washington Legislature, the re-
porters' verbatim notes of debates languished untranscribed and were
ultimately destroyed.4 74
There remains a journal of convention proceedings which provides
limited information about the 1889 meeting. The Convention had
before it two proposals relating to search and seizure, both of which
tracked the language of the fourth amendment. Likewise, the search
and seizure provision of the premature 1878 Constitution had followed
the fourth amendment.4 75 The "fourth amendment" proposals were
referred to a committee; when the Declaration of Rights emerged, the
search and seizure section had been transformed into its present state.4 71
Clearly the Convention considered the new language the functional
equivalent of the traditional search and seizure proscription. Whether
anything more was intended is not revealed in the convention journal
or in contemporary newspaper accounts. 477
Despite the apparent innovativeness of the 1889 Constitutional Con-
vention in creating a zone of protection for one's "private affairs," the
Washington courts have been anything but innovative in their applica-
tion of the section. The Washington judiciary has consistently construed
article I, section 7, to deal only with search and seizure; the provision
has not served as the source for any other privacy right. So closely is
section 7 held to parallel the fourth amendment that federal and state
precedents are commonly cited interchangeably. The following is a
typical formulation: "It is apparent that the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Washington
State Constitution are comparable and are to be given comparable
constitutional interpretation and effect. Accordingly, in this opinion,
reference will be made only to the Fourth Amendment." 4 8 While
section 7 is much cited, it is invariably mentioned in connection with
a search and seizure issue.
One might expect that the reference to "private affairs" would have
afforded a basis for early recognition of the invasion of privacy tort.
474. WASHINGTON STATE JOURNAL, supra note 470, at vi-vii.
475. WASH. CONST. of 1878, art. V, § 10.
476. WASHINGTON STATE JOURNAL, supra note 470, at 19, 51-53, 153-54, 360, 491, 497,
518.
477. The analytical index to the WASHINGTON STATE JOURNAL, supra note 470, includes
cross-references to contemporary newspaper accounts. See id. at xi, 491.
478. State v. Smith, 559 P.2d 970, 972-73 (Wash. 1977) (en banc); accord, e.g., State
v. Miles, 190 P.2d 740, 743 (Wash. 1948) ("although they vary slightly in language, are
identical in purpose and substance"); State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390, 395 (Wash. 1922)
("these guaranties are in substance the same in both'),
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Quite to the contrary, the Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly
declined to take that step, ruling as early as 1911 that any relief must
be granted by the legislature.4 7 9 In more recent cases the court has been
at pains to avoid the issue.4 80 In lower courts there has been some
erosion of this persistent resistance4 81 but the supreme court has yet to
make a definitive, direct statement about recognition of the tort.
Significantly, when the Washington Supreme Court has on occasion
undertaken to discuss the possible existence of the invasion of privacy
action, it has never mentioned section 7 as even being relevant to the
analysis, much less a potential source of a privacy right.
Some recognition of the right of privacy has occurred when it was
believed that the United States Constitution required it. Thus, when
the Washington Supreme Court sustained the state's financial dis-
closure law, it reasoned:
The right of the electorate to know most certainly is no less funda-
mental than the right of privacy. When the right of the people to
be informed does not intrude upon intimate personal matters which
are unrelated to fitness for public office, see Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, . . . the candidate or office holder may not complain that his
own privacy is paramount to the interests of the people. 48 2
The other source of privacy considered in that case was the first amend-
ment;" 3 section 7 went unmentioned.
Another Washington case won the dubious distinction of being
singled out by the Privacy Protection Study Commission to illustrate
the privacy problems posed by governmental recordkeeping. In State
ex rel. Tarver v. Smith,48 4 a welfare mother sought unsuccessfully to
have removed from her file a social worker's report that recommended
Ms. Tarver's children be made wards of the juvenile court. Ms. Tarver
asserted that the report was "false, misleading and prejudicial"; she
was especially concerned over possible repercussions if the information
were made available to other agencies. 4 5 Ignoring the privacy ques-
479. See Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, Inc., 177 P.2d 896, 897-98
(Wash. 1947); Hillman v. Star Publishing Co., 117 P. 594 (Wash. 1911).
480. See State v. Rabe, 484 P.2d 917, 924 (Wash. 1971) (en banc); Brink v. Griffith,
396 P.2d 793, 796 (Wash. 1964).
481. See State v. Adler, 558 P.2d 817, 820 n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976); Venegas v.
United Farm Workers Union, 552 P.2d 210, 212 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976); Eddy v. Moore, 487
P.2d 211, 217 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
482. Fritz v. Gorton, 517 P.2d 911, 925 (Wash.) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S.
902 (1974).
483. 517 P.2d at 923-25.
484. 470 P.2d 172 (Wash. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1000 (1971).
485. 470 P.2d at 174; see 402 U.S. 1001-02 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tions involved, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that state-
mandated "fair hearings" under the federal AFDC program were
designed solely to contest agency rulings on eligibility and benefits,
not to seek review of the contents of agency files. The United States
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari provoked an angry dissent from
Justice Douglas.486 The Privacy Protection Study Commission chose
Ms. Tarver's case as one of two it used to highlight the perils of un-
regulated recordkeeping.487
Perhaps the foregoing critique is overly harsh. While the Washing-
ton courts' handling of federal privacy cases could definitely be im-
proved, 8 there is no inherent reason why article I, section 7 should
have served as the source of expanded privacy rights for its citizens.
Whether or not the framers of this section intended such a narrow con-
struction, the Washington courts have at least been rigorously con-
sistent in construing it to apply only to searches and seizures. Nonethe-
less, the contrast is striking: a constitutional right against disturbance
in one's private affairs suggests an expansive view of personal privacy,
while the actual body of decisions ranks Washington among the most
restrictive of the states.
2. Arizona.-In 1910, Arizona drafted its statehood constitution.
Its article II, section 8, is identical to Washington's article I, section 7:
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home in-
vaded, without authority of law.
The Arizona measure was adopted without discussion or efforts to
amend it." 9 The only particular in which it differs from the Washing-
486. 402 U.S. at 1000.
487. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 6-8. The other case
was United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), holding that a bank's records regarding
individual depositors are business records of the bank rather than private records of the
individual accountholder; see note 228 supra.
488. For example, the Washington Supreme Court cited Griswold in holding the
movie "Carmen Baby" obscene, since the film could be observed from some private
residences near the drive-in theater at which it was shown. The court reasoned that
the film was an intrusion on individual privacy and domestic solitude. The United
States Supreme Court promptly reversed. State v. Rabe, 484 P.2d 917, 924-25 (Wash.
1971) (en banc), rev'd per curiam, 405 U.S. 313 (1972). Washington courts persistently
confuse the tort law of privacy with the federal constitutional right of privacy, often
reasoning that the latter mandates the former. See State v. Rabe, 484 P.2d at 924; Venegas
v. United Farm Workers Union, 552 P.2d at 212; Eddy v. Moore, 487 P.2d at 217. See
also Fritz v. Gorton, 517 P.2d at 925.
489. See JOURNALS OF THE [1910] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA 351, 462-75,
573-74, 593 (compiled by C. Cronin 1925); MINUTES OF THE [1910] CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA 234-35, 291-98 (1910).
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ton Constitution is its caption. Arizona called article II, section 8, the
"Right to Privacy" while Washington denominated article I, section 7,
"Invasion of Private Affairs or Home Prohibited."
Arizona's experience with its "Right to Privacy" has been similar
to that of Washington: the vast majority of cases have dealt with search
and seizure. Like Washington, Arizona has consistently viewed the func-
tion of the state provision to be the same as that of the fourth amend-
ment.490 While Arizona has recognized the invasion of privacy tort, the
supreme court relied primarily on the Restatement of Torts; article
II, section 8, was nowhere mentioned as a source.491 One court has indi-
cated that section 8 applies purely to state action and thus could never
provide a constitutional foundation for actions between private in-
dividuals, whether through the invasion of privacy tort or otherwise. 492
In a recent case, the Arizona Supreme Court considered a privacy-
based challenge to state laws forbidding sodomy and lewd and lascivious
behavior.4 93 The court confined its privacy discussion entirely to the
construction of the federal right of privacy, never suggesting that the
state "right of privacy" was even remotely involved. Also typical of its
general approach was the court's decision in State v. Murphy,49 4 a
challenge to the state's possession of marijuana law, as applied to posses-
sion of a small amount in the home for personal use. The court con-
strued section 8 only because law enforcement officers had obtained
the marijuana during a search. The court restricted its analysis to the
question of what level of scrutiny was required for searches of one's
home. Section 8 was not perceived to create any larger substantive right
beyond the traditional notions of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The remainder of the analysis was devoted to federal
privacy cases, culminating in the conclusion that private possession of
marijuana could be proscribed.
To date, Arizona's privacy section has served solely as the functional
equivalent of the fourth amendment.495 In its constitutional language,
as in its case law, Arizona closely resembles Washington.
490. See Turley v. State, 59 P.2d 312, 316-17 (Ariz. 1936).
491. Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 162 P.2d 133 (Ariz. 1945).
492. Cluff v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 460 P.2d 666, 669 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
493. State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6 (Ariz.) (en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 170 (1976).
494. 570 P.2d 1070 (Ariz. 1977) (en banc).
495. One Arizona court considered a challenge to a state financial disclosure law
predicated in part on the theory that section 8 had been violated. The court ruled that
the plaintiffs lacked standing and thus did not reach the merits of that particular claim.
Town of Wickenburg v. State, 565 P.2d 1326 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
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VIII. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Right of Privacy
The twentieth century is hazardous to personal privacy. The nation's
growth into a highly populated, urbanized society has created an urgent
need for individual privacy while at the same time posing its greatest
threat. Scientific advances have made possible greater health and com-
fort in the society while at the same time producing the technology that
threatens our freedom to enjoy it.
We are in the midst of transition. One hundred years ago our ideas
about liberty were closely intertwined with our ideas about private
property. One's rightful property was not subject to search and seizure;
warrants were available only for stolen or forfeited goods. The motion
to suppress illegally seized property was but a replevin or trespass
action against the government, asserting the actual owner's superior
title; a search was valid against a thief because the possessor of contra-
band had no rightful title to assert.496
The fourth amendment, it is often forgotten, establishes "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,"
a provision designed not so much to protect private ownership of
property as to establish a physical zone of personal privacy. The Boyd
decision asserted the inviolability of one's papers; Botsford, the in-
violability of one's body.497 An illegal search was egregious not so much
because it deprived the owner of the beneficial use of property, but
because it took away the physical means by which personal freedom was
protected. Thus an illegal search and seizure constituted compulsion
akin to that of compelled testimony in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. As the Boyd Court said, "In this regard the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments run almost into each other. " 498
To be sure, this system was shot through with anomalies which
became more apparent with time. One's standing to object to an illegal
search and seizure depended on whether one had a sufficient possessory
interest in property to maintain trespass or replevin-a distinction gone,
but not entirely forgotten. For decades the old property concepts pre-
vented interpretation of the fourth amendment to apply to wiretapping;
applied formalistically, the amendment afforded protection only if there
was a physical trespass in the installation of a tap. 49
9
Nonetheless, to state the old rules is to see how far we have moved
from the original notion of an inviolate physical zone-a bubble-of
496. See text accompanying notes 105-16 supra; Kurland, supra note 182, at 7-8.
497. See text accompanying notes 105-20 supra.
498. 116 U.S. at 630.
499. See text accompanying notes 112-18, 126-44 supra.
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personal liberty. With the growth of an increasingly industrial society,
ownership of real property ceased to be the primary source of wealth;
property relationships became increasingly unsatisfactory as a means of
defining the scope of personal rights. Under pressure of economic and
social change, our focus has shifted away from the physical inviolability
of person or possessions and instead has concentrated on the process by
which rights are abridged or enforced. All objects and persons are
vulnerable to search, but only upon observing the proper legal pro-
cedure for doing so. Our notions about liberty have broken loose from
their moorings in the concept of private property, but they have not
yet found anchor in a new harbor.
The persistent vitality of the privacy idea stems from the effort to
describe the place of the individual in a society that has undergone
fundamental change. Privacy expresses the idea of sanctuary, a zone of
security in which one is free from physical and psychological intrusion
and in which one has the latitude to make important decisions about
one's liberty. But liberty is an attribute of a group, of the people at
large, as well as an attribute of the individual. Privacy is personal;
the word connotes a physical and psychological zone possessed by each
individual alone. This is more than a mere play on words: how else
can one explain the extraordinary resiliency of the privacy idea in a
society whose constitutions have protected liberty for two hundred years?
The uncertainty over the content of the right of privacy arises in
part because of the inherent difficulty in defining broad legal principles;
the content of the term "liberty" is likewise difficult to define with
specificity. More fundamentally, however, the difficulty in defining
privacy arises because we are at this moment still involved in defining
the relationship of the individual to the society, in a time in which
societal and scientific realities have undergone and continue to under-
go profound change. The definition is unsettled because social re-
lationships are unsettled. While the federal right of privacy has entered
a stage of arrested development, the states have begun to give new
shape to the concept.
B. Privacy in the States
Express rights of privacy, considered in a modern sense, have been
provided for in state constitutions for ten years or less.5 °0 The only
exceptions, the states of Washington and Arizona, have confined their
500. See Appendix for the texts of the state constitutional provisions and dates of
adoption. The state constitutional developments discussed in this section are reviewed in
detail, by state, in section VII supra.
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privacy sections to a strictly traditional concept of search and seizure;
they may be ignored for purposes of this analysis.
Free-standing rights of privacy are an even more recent innovation,
entering state constitutions in 1972 and 1974. Because express privacy
rights are of such recent vintage, there are comparatively few cases to
reveal their dimensions and test their efficacy. But enough evidence is
available to support some tentative conclusions.
From an examination of state constitutions, constitutional conven-
tion proceedings, and case law, several basic privacy issues emerge.
These include the protection of private communications from inter-
ception by government; the protection of private communications from
interception by private persons; the protection of one's general right
of privacy from governmental intrusion; and the protection of one's
general right of privacy from private intrusion.
1. Protection of Private Communications from Interception by
Government.-Where a state desires to regulate electronic surveillance,
but not to prohibit it entirely, the simplest and most direct method is
that followed by Florida, Hawaii, and Illinois: incorporation in the
search and seizure section of an express prohibition against unreason-
able interception of private communications. Search and seizure sections
usually reach state action only; inclusion of the unreasonable intercep-
tion proscription would likewise reach state action. Such placement
automatically incorporates existing standards of reasonableness as well
as requirements for a warrant or other writ. While there has not been
an abundance of litigation under state constitutional sections of this
type, Florida's experience suggests that an interception provision can be
quite effective in conveying a clear statement of state policy to the
judiciary, thereby prompting a firm line in constitutional and statutory
enforcement.
Where a state is in the dilemma faced by Montana, the path is less
clear. Montana constitutional convention delegates were inclined to
believe that wiretapping should be banned entirely, but were unwilling
to take the step of adopting a flat constitutional proscription. They
feared, however, that constitutional language prohibiting only "un-
reasonable interceptions" would create an authorization for wiretapping
where none previously existed, thus overriding any blanket proscription
that might be enacted by the legislature. Montana's decision to opt for
silence on the subject was reasonable under the circumstances. As an
alternative, an express policy statement could have been devised, per-
mitting legislative proscription or regulation, subject in the latter event
to the reasonableness and warrant requirements of the search and
seizure section.
TOWARD A RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The virtues of silence about surveillance will also be tested in
Louisiana. One Louisiana constitutional convention delegate suggested
that the omission of any reference to the subject indicated an intention
to prohibit all electronic surveillance; any law permitting it would be
beyond constitutional authority and void. It seems unlikely that the
state courts would draw any such inference, save perhaps with the
clearest statement in the convention proceedings. The more likely
course would be to regard Katz v. United States501 as persuasive au-
thority, thereby permitting surveillance subject to the warrant re-
quirement. Clearly, if a state wishes to adopt a constitutional prohi-
bition against electronic surveillance, it should do so expressly, as
Puerto Rico has done.s12 Trusting in an inference to be drawn from
silence is hazardous at best.
As in the modification of any constitutional section, the inclusion of
communications in the search and seizure section should prompt a
careful review of existing constitutional doctrines that may be implicitly
adopted. As the discussion of the Florida provision indicates, one should
consider the extent to which the search and seizure section reaches
private action, if at all; whether illegally seized evidence is admissible
before grand juries, in civil litigation, or other proceedings; and whether
state rules of standing restrict the ability of adversely affected persons
to challenge an illegal search or seizure. While constitutional convention
proceedings invariably reveal an intention to adopt strong measures
against unregulated wiretapping, the preexisting gloss on the search
and seizure section may severely weaken the efficacy of the surveillance
provision. Express constitutional language dealing with problems of
standing or exclusion of evidence may be needed in order to make a
surveillance measure fully effective; a collateral advantage would be the
strengthening of the search and seizure provision generally.0 3
501. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
502. PUERTO Rico CONsT. art. II, § 10, provides in part, "Wire-tapping is prohibited."
503. It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the
role of the search and seizure section in the protection of personal privacy. A few ob-
servations may be in order, for with the passage of time the search and seizure section
is likely to take on increased importance.
The usual search and seizure section has two branches. First, there is a right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Second, there must be a warrant in order
to conduct a search or seizure. Aside from certain exceptions, it is hornbook learning
that a warrantless search is unreasonable per se. There is also an unfortunate con-
temporary tendency to believe that the converse is true: that every search with a warrant
is reasonable per se.
But the two branches of the search and seizure section are conceptually distinct. If,
for example, one's papers are inviolate (as in Boyd), then a search, even with a warrant,
is unreasonable. With the demise of the older concepts of property and liberty, the two
branches have tended to converge: any person, object or area is vulnerable to search and
seizure, provided only that the relevant (and low) standards of probable cause and
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particularity are met. For a generation accustomed to security clearances, credit investiga-
tions, stop-and-frisk, airline security screens, domestic surveillance, compulsory blood test-
ing for alcohol consumption while driving, body cavity searches, wiretapping, and dossiers
of all description, it is hard to imagine a time when something was inviolable, when a
search or seizure was unreasonable even when conducted with due process of law.
Whether ever observed so fully in practice as in concept, the idea of an absolutely in-
violable physical barrier between individual and society is not a contemporary one.
The weakness of procedural definitions of liberty-the notion that any governmental
intrusion is acceptable if it is accomplished with a warrant or other procedural due
process-becomes each year more apparent. Several recent federal electronic surveillance
decisions are especially sobering. Present federal law provides for the interception of
communications, subject to the procedural safeguard of obtaining a warrant. The courts
have now taken the next logical step. Two Circuits have held that the federal statute
not only permits the use of electronic surveillance devices, but also permits surreptitious
entry, under judicial authorization, to install them. Application of United States, 563 F.2d
637 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 751 (1977). The Fourth Circuit case involved installation of three listening
devices in a building, one in a private office and two in a "public" area, for an organized
gambling investigation. The court purported to find, in the federal statute, a "paramount
concern" with "allowing law enforcement personnel to conduct constitutionally in-
offensive, yet effective, surveillance." Id. at 642. Safeguarding privacy was, in the court's
view, a distinctly secondary objective. The fourth amendment was to be satisfied by
issuance of a warrant for the surreptitious entry, when necessary for the installation of
the listening device.
The Eighth Circuit in Agrusa likewise approved surreptitious entry of business
premises, pursuant to a warrant, to install a surveillance instrument. It resolved the
fourth amendment issue by a wholly wooden analogy to "no-knock" entry to prevent
destruction of contraband while executing a warrant. Since the Supreme Court had
approved "unannounced breaking and entering" for that purpose in Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963), it followed that unannounced breaking and entering was permissible
for this purpose as well.
The dissenting judge perceived the more fundamental issue:
I would hope there still exists "a private enclave where [a person] may lead a
private life" without fear of stealthy encroachment by government officials ...
. . The majority, I sense, is uneasy about the precedent set today, and
attempts to limit its holding to business offices rather than to homes. The true
danger of the holding lies there, however, for the distinction between home and
office under the Fourth Amendment is tenuous at best . ..
If this were a private home, then upon what ground, under the majority's
reasoning, could the search be struck down? A warrant was obtained upon probable
cause and the relevant statutes were theoretically complied with. The only ground
for reversal would be that the sanctity and privacy of the home is too great and
therefore that the search was unreasonable. But I suggest that the privacy of a
person within business premises deserves the same consideration. Rather than draw
artificial distinctions, I would hold searches such as this to be unreasonable
per se.
541 F.2d at 703-04 (Lay, J., dissenting) (footnote & citations omitted).
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits both ruled that the fourth amendment required
issuance of a warrant for surreptitious entry, apart from the statutory procedure for
approval of the electronic interception itself. At least three district courts, however, have
pushed the logic one step further, holding that authorization of interception automatically
authorizes covert entry, without the specific prior knowledge or approval of the court.
See Application of United States, 563 F.2d at 644 n.7, citing United States v. Dalia, 426
F. Supp. 862 (D.N.J. 1977); United States v. London, 424 F. Supp. 556 (D. Md. 1976),
abJ'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v, Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977);
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The remaining question is whether a state adopting a free-standing
right of privacy should also adopt a provision on interception of com-
munications in the search and seizure section. Usually, but not always,
the answer is yes. Where the state wishes to permit limited electronic
interception of communications, and where the search and seizure
section is otherwise adequate or can be made so, then the advantages
are all on the side of the express provision. The intent of the framers
will be unmistakably clear to the legislature and courts. Nothing will
be left to chance in the interpretation of a more general right of
privacy.
If, however, the search and seizure section is weak or unworkable,
or if a more restrictive standard is desired than reasonableness and a
warrant, then the search and seizure section is less appropriate. Care-
fully drawn constitutional language could solve the problem, either in
a separate section or as part of a comprehensive privacy section. In
the last extremity, a state may choose to rely on a general privacy
section instead of express language, but there is always the risk that
the state courts will rely on Katz to permit wiretapping, subject only
to the warrant requirement. This writer's bias is toward an express com-
munications provision, if at all possible.
United States v. Altese, No. 75-CR-341 (E.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 14, 1976).
As the Agrusa dissent argued, if these decisions are allowed to stand, then there appears
to be no principled basis on which to bar the most extreme uses of electronic surveillance.
If one may burglarize to install a listening device in an office, then there is no reason why
one may not burglarize a home for the same purpose. If one may install the three listen-
ing devices the Fourth Circuit approved, then there is no reason in principle why one
may not wire for sound every inch of a home, office, or other building. There is judicial
supervision, to be sure: issuance of a warrant upon an ex parte representation of necessity.
Taking this analysis one step further, suppose technology advances to the point that
miniature television transmitters become readily available to law enforcement agencies.
Suppose such transmitters are capable of maintaining constant visual and auditory sur-
veillance wherever installed. Given these suppositions, there would be no reason in
principle why one could not burglarize to install such devices throughout a home or office,
thus keeping every inch of space under continuous visual and auditory observation.
If one may burglarize to install electronic listening devices, is there any reason in
principle why one may not take all of the remaining steps? Would there then be privacy?
Would there then be freedom in the society? True, this scenario does not produce an
exact replica of Orwell's telescreens in 1984, but the parallel is close enough. Yet this result
follows simply by pursuing existing legal principles to their logical conclusions.
At some point the cost to the society in freedom outweighs any conceivable benefit
gained by government intrusion. With judicial burglary, the tolerable limit has cer-
tainly been surpassed, if indeed the limit had not been surpassed already. Extraordinary
intrusions tolerated in the name of a campaign against organized gambling give way to
intrusions for other reasons; reminder is hardly needed of the abuse of the national security
exception during the Nixon administration. Total surveillance of one's home or office,
like that suggested above, would make feasible the scrutiny of one's most intimate activi-
ties, associations, thoughts, and beliefs. There is much merit in the idea that some
searches are inherently unreasonable, even with prior judicial authorization. The notion
is old, but not antiquated.
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2. Protection of Private Communications from Interception by
Private Persons.-Florida cases have shown some confusion about the
extent to which its interception of communications measure reaches
private action. Unless the contrary appears from the language, an
interception of communications provision in a search and seizure sec-
tion will reach private action only to the extent the search and seizure
section reaches it; in the usual case, not at all.
While most state constitutional interception measures have been
directed at government action only, California's free-standing right of
privacy was directed at private surveillance as well. Where this is the
intention, the search and seizure section will ordinarily be an uncomfort-
able resting place. Awkwardness is introduced if the search and seizure
section as a whole reaches state action, but the surveillance portion
reaches private action in addition. Confusion is likely to be the result.
While there is, as yet, insufficient experience with the California
provision to draw any conclusions, something like the California
approach would be the preferred method for a state wishing to adopt
constitutional regulation of private surveillance. The topic could be
dealt with in a general right of privacy, as California has, or in a special
provision dealing only with interception of communications.
3. Protection of the Right of Privacy from Government Intrusion.-
The approach adopted by Alaska, California, and Montana has been to
establish a free-standing right of privacy, either in a separate constitu-
tional section or as part of the statement of inalienable rights. Ex-
perience to date shows that this is an effective way to establish a strong
right of privacy. Court decisions have given effect to the intention of
the voters to establish a constitutional right of equal stature with other
major constitutional provisions. The courts have carefully considered
the standard of review to be applied in privacy cases and the scope of
the privacy right intended to be created. Federal precedent has been
examined whenever helpful for analysis, but the California and Alaska
courts have charted their own courses, thereby affording greater protec-
tion of the right of privacy than that conferred by the federal constitu-
tion.
By contrast, the experience of Hawaii and Illinois shows it is extra-
ordinarily ineffective to try to establish a general right of privacy in
the search and seizure section of the state constitution. Hawaii's cases
reveal this approach submerges the right of privacy, conferring on it a
subordinate status. The protection against "unreasonable" invasions
of privacy anchors it to the rational basis test, a minimal level of
scrutiny which would be applied by the courts in any event as part
of due process or equal protection analysis.
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Placement in the search and seizure section also leaves open the
possibility of confusion about intent; illustrative is Illinois, where the
supreme court has suggested that "invasions of privacy" refers only to
"interceptions of communications." Finally, if there is any intention to
reach private action, hopeless confusion could result, since the search
and seizure section ordinarily reaches state action alone. In sum, the
dismal record to date in Hawaii and Illinois indicates that the search
and seizure section is to be avoided in the establishment of a general
right of privacy.
In mandating a strong right of privacy, therefore, the preferred
approach is to use a free-standing privacy section. The measures adopted
by California, Alaska, and Montana each have something to commend
them.
California's approach has at once both great strength and great
weakness. The placement of the word "privacy" with the other inalien-
able rights gives privacy equal priority with life, liberty, property, and
happiness. It suggests that the courts are to use the same degree of
scrutiny when privacy is threatened as when other inalienable rights are
threatened. Use of the single word affords maximum flexibility for
deciding what privacy means on a case-by-case basis.
On the negative side, the use of the single word "privacy" is cryptic.
There are no textual clues to its meaning. It should be noted that the
strength of the California privacy right stems not from the placement
of the word in the constitution, nor from the deductive powers of the
California Supreme Court, but rather from the court's adoption of
the sponsor's statement as the legislative history of the amendment. It
is doubtful that, without the legislative history, the court ever would
have decided that the amendment reached private action, which is
atypical for a provision in a declaration of rights. California's excellent
system for developing succinct statements of intent for its election bro-
chures is of great value, but the practice is not followed in many states.
More usually, the statements of intent are spread among the pages of
constitutional convention reports and debate, and state courts do not
consistently pay heed to statements of intent, even when available. Thus
the California approach has the advantage of great flexibility, but also
the hazard that courts may construe the privacy right to be a weak one.
The method worked in California, but the unique features of the Cali-
fornia system must be born in mind.
The Alaska and Montana privacy sections are genuinely free-
standing, thus providing considerable prominence to the privacy right
and a somewhat more specific statement of what is intended. The Mon-
tana constitution provides: "The right of individual privacy is essential
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to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without
the showing of a compelling state interest." This is at once the most
elegant and the most uncomprising of the various privacy statements.
It is clearly self-executing. It designates the standard of judicial review.
It is suggestive of a philosophical stance like that taken by Mill. The
right is one of "individual" privacy; it is intended to apply to natural
persons and not to corporations. 0 4 It is limited to state action, for the
standard of review is "compelling state interest."
A potential problem may be created by specifying the standard of
judicial review in the constitution itself. The compelling state interest
standard has been subject to substantial criticism in recent years.50 5 The
Alaska Supreme Court adopted it for privacy matters, then rejected it
in favor of a "means-ends" inquiry. Inclusion of the compelling state
interest standard could prevent future changes in the standard of review;
but the other side of the dilemma is that failure to state a standard of
review could result in subordination of the privacy right, as Hawaii
has done.
In Alaska, the constitutional provision states that, "[t]he right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legisla-
ture shall implement this section." Alaska's "right of the people to
privacy" may serve the same function as the "right of individual
privacy": to indicate that the right pertains to individuals only, not
other entities. There is, as yet, no case on the point.
The most immediate difficulty with the Alaska section is the second
sentence. Alaska has from the outset treated its provision as self-
executing. Under Alaska's reading, the first sentence declares the right;
the second directs the legislature to take action to help effectuate it. It
seems probable to this writer, however, that most courts would take a
different view. The section is susceptible of the construction that the
right of privacy is not self-executing; rather it is to be recognized only
to the extent implemented by the legislature. Thus, if the Alaska
approach were to be followed elsewhere, the second sentence should
be eliminated or rephrased to eliminate any possible ambiguity.
The Alaska provision does not state a standard of review. This
has the virtue of allowing flexibility to the judiciary in deciding the
standard of review, and the Alaska courts have done a very able job
with that issue. But this approach likewise presents difficulties. By its
terms, the Alaska section states an absolute: the right to privacy "shall
not be infringed." But Alaska courts have held the right is not ab-
504. But see note 334 supra.
505. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 464 (Stevens, J., concurring); Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
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solute. The courts have adopted a standard of review and have en-
gaged in balancing of interests to determine when the right of privacy
will prevail and when other social interests will prevail. Use of absolute
language invariably creates the same question that has surrounded the
first amendment: is the provision to be interpreted literally or not?
There is the additional possibility that an absolute "shall not be
infringed" statement will lead to a strained reading of "the right to
privacy." Since the command is that the right of privacy "shall not be
infringed," the analysis could focus on the question, what is a privacy
right? A court could make decisions by determining intuitively whether
the right being asserted is socially tolerable or not. If so, it will be
recognized as a privacy right and will not be infringed. If the right
being asserted is not felt to be socially tolerable, then the court can
simply conclude that it is a mere privacy interest, which does not rise
to the dignity of a privacy right, and which thus can be infringed.
A final difficulty with the Alaska language is that it provides
flexibility for evolving standards of judicial review, thereby allowing
adoption of something other than the compelling state interest standard.
However, this does potentially allow a weakening of the privacy right
by adoption of a lower standard; indeed, there is no apparent reason
why the rational basis standard could not be adopted.
There is, then, something to be said for and against the privacy
formulations of California, Alaska, and Montana. As all three are effec-
tive statements of a strong privacy right, to some degree it is purely a
matter of preference which statement is most appropriate for an indi-
vidual state. For this writer, the optimum combination would be a
combination of the Alaska and Montana language:
The right of the people to privacy is essential to the well-being of
a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest.
This approach expressly recognizes the balancing process. As H.L.A.
Hart described it in commenting about John Stuart Mill's On Liberty,
the essential process is that of "justification .... [W]e are committed at
least to the general critical principle that the use of legal coercion by
any society calls for justification as something prima facie objection-
able to be tolerated only for the sake of some countervailing good." 506
From the Hart-Mill viewpoint, it is vital to include specifically this
justification stage, together with an explicit indication of the relative
weights of the individual and societal interests. The state interest
506. H.L.A. HART, supra note 289, at 20.
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must be compelling, a vitally important interest, before the right of
privacy is overcome.
The proposed language adopts the Alaska "right of the people to
privacy" rather than the Montana "right of individual privacy." Both
phrases signify that privacy is a right of natural persons, not corporate
entities. However, the phrase "individual privacy" could conceivably
be construed to exclude associational privacy; in this respect the Alaska
language may be preferable. The measure reaches state action only; it
is a compelling state interest that must be shown.
The phrase "essential to the well-being of a free society" signifies
that without privacy, a society is not truly free. It does not signify that
privacy is a right to be enjoyed only in groups. Privacy is an individual
right, but the society can only be deemed to be free if each individual
enjoys that right. The Alaska reference to the legislature is omitted;
the section is self-executing.
4. Protection of the Right of Privacy from Private Intrusion.-The
California privacy measure is unique in establishing a self-executing
right that operates against both governmental and private agencies. The
precise impact on the private sector is unknown; the California Supreme
Court has not yet decided a case in which the new right of privacy
was asserted against intrusion by private actors. Its decision on banking
records involved the private sector, but the case dealt with the discovery
rules for civil litigation, a form of state action.
A more conventional and probably more generally acceptable ap-
proach was taken by Illinois. There, "privacy" was included in the
section on "right to remedy and justice." This standard access-to-courts
provision serves in many states as the specific authorization for the
jurisdiction's common law. Illinois intended that the judiciary con-
tinue to fashion remedies in invasion of privacy cases. Thus intrusions
by private actors could be remedied either by judicial or legislative
action. The Illinois inclusion of privacy in the right-to-remedy section
was merely declaratory of the existing situation; Illinois privacy law
had already developed as a matter of judicial decision.
It seems likely that the California provision will result in somewhat
more vigorous enforcement of the privacy right. The "right to remedy"
or "access to courts" provisions of state constitutions are not always
given an expansive reading; Florida's mandate that the courts "be open
to every person for redress of any injury" has never been construed to
mean what it literally says. 501 On the other hand, courts are un-
accustomed to the enforcement of self-executing constitutional pro-
visions against the private sector. Relevant standards are unavailable.
507. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; Bass, Article I, Section 21: Access to Courts in
Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 871 (1977).
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There may be judicial reluctance to engage in a searching examination
of internal business practices to evaluate whether a compelling interest
exists for the maintenance of particular records. While one would
expect the California measure to confer greater protection, only time
will demonstrate whether that expectation is correct.
While it is rare for state constitutional provisions to reach private
action directly, the reasons may in part be historical. True, from a
doctrinal standpoint, the legislature and courts are empowered to deal
with private action; in this view, to reach private action in a state con-
stitution is needlessly to include statutory matter in the organic docu-
ment. But when the first constitutions were drafted in this country,
intrusion by the private sector did not pose a significant threat. Today,
unrestrained information gathering can be equally extensive and equally
objectionable, whether done by the private sector or by government.
The historic purpose of the invasion of privacy tort action was
precisely to remedy private intrusions on privacy. While Warren and
Brandeis directed their ire and most of their thinking to invasions of
privacy by the press, the underlying concept is the protection of one's
right to be let alone, regardless of the source of the intrusion. The
difficulty with the tort action is, ironically, that it has become a rather
widely accepted cause of action. With acceptance comes ossification.
Prosser has catalogued four categories for the invasion of privacy; what
will be the reaction of the courts when someone proposes a fifth? Courts
are often reluctant to innovate; they may confine the invasion of privacy
action within existing boundaries, leaving individual plaintiffs to a
legislative remedy or none at all.
The point of Chief Justice Overton's remarks on privacy at the
opening session of Florida's 1977-78 Constitution Revision Commission
was to ask for guidance for the judiciary.508 Appellate courts are seeing
an increase in privacy litigation in both the public and private sectors;
the courts need guidance for the handling of those cases. The Illinois
approach affords one possible solution. The addition of the word
"privacy" to the "right to remedy" section is a clear directive for judicial
attention to private intrusion. But Illinois intended by that addition to
ratify and encourage the development of existing Illinois invasion of
privacy tort law. There remains the possibility that Illinois courts will
confine their efforts to the traditional boundaries of the tort, rather than
construing the mandate more flexibly. The Illinois constitutional
convention delegate who had pushed for stronger measures expressed a
desire to establish a right of individual access to privately maintained
records about oneself, as well as the means to correct or purge incorrect
508. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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information. Whether invasion of privacy decisional law is elastic
enough to encompass new concepts remains to be seen.
It is not clear what avenue would provide the optimum handling
of private intrusions on privacy. It is not certain that there is a
necessity for a self-executing constitutional measure, nor is it known
what the effects might be. The Illinois approach represents an inter-
mediate step; another alternative would be the adoption of a non-self-
executing policy statement to provide some direction for judicial and
legislative action. And, in states like Washington, some direct state-
ment will be needed even to accomplish the more modest goal of
recognizing the invasion of privacy tort.
CONCLUSION
The experience of the states suggests that the most efficacious ap-
proach to the protection of privacy is the adoption of a "package" of
measures. Subject to the reservations stated above, there are three es-
sential elements. The first is inclusion of a provision relating to the
interception of communications, within the section on searches and
seizures. Second, and most important, is a free-standing right of privacy,
following the Montana, Alaska, or California models, to protect against
governmental intrusion. Finally, appropriate constitutional language
should be added, if needed, to assure that the courts and legislature
have a mandate to fashion remedies against intrusions by the private
sector. For the adventurous, the California approach beckons.
The occasion for the preparation of this note has been the initiation
of Florida's 1977-78 constitutional revision process. Ten years ago,
when the 1968 Constitution was written, Florida gave consideration to
the subject of individual privacy. An important step was taken by adopt-
ing a carefully drafted measure to protect private communications.
The mandate of article I, section 12, has been taken seriously by the
courts and the legislature. A strong and effective policy against un-
supervised or unconsented-to eavesdropping has been the result.
Events of the past ten years have brought to the fore privacy issues
on a larger scale. At the same time, retrenchment by the United States
Supreme Court and the report of the Privacy Protection Study Commis-
sion have made it abundantly clear that the right of privacy will be
fully protected only if there is action by the states. It is time to take
that step. It is vital to a free society to establish a zone of privacy in
which each individual is free from physical and psychological intrusion
and has the autonomy to make vital personal decisions. "[T]he right to
be let alone," Brandeis said, is "the most comprehensive of rights and
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the right most valued by civilized men."50 9 It is time to protect that
right-by establishing the right of privacy as a matter of state constitu-
tional law.510
GERALD B. COPE, JR.
509. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
510. After the completion of its initial drafting in January, 1978, the Constitution
Revision Commission had taken action to establish a free-standing right of privacy as a
separate section of the constitution and had specifically addressed the subject of privacy
in other constitutional provisions as well.
The proposed right of privacy contains two branches: a self-executing right to be
free from government intrusion, and a non-self-executing policy statement against private
intrusion. Proposal No. 132, adopted by the Commission January 9, 1978, provides:
Right of privacy.-
(a) Every individual has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided in this constitution.
(b) The legislature shall protect by law the private lives of the people from
intrusion by other persons.
On the same day, the Commission approved Proposals No. 137 and 188, which
establish constitutional measures on open meetings and public records:
Open meetings.-No person shall be denied access to any meeting at which
official acts are to be taken by any nonjudicial collegial public body in the state
or by persons acting together on behalf of such a public body. The legislature may
exempt meetings by general law where it is essential to protect privacy interests
or overriding governmental purposes.
Public records.-No person shall be denied the right to examine any public
record made or received in connection with the public business by any non-
judicial public officer or employee in the state or by persons acting on their behalf.
The legislature may exempt records by general law where it is essential to protect
privacy interests or overriding governmental purposes.
Proposals 137 and 138 excluded judicial bodies from coverage. The judicial depart-
ment of government was the subject of Proposal No. 133. Adopted January 24, 1978, it
would add the following language to article V, section I:
All judicial hearings and records and all proceedings and records of judicial agencies
except grand and petit juries shall be open and accessible to the people. Where it
is essential to protect privacy interests or overriding governmental purposes, the
supreme court by rule or the legislature by general law may exempt hearings,
proceedings and records from this section.
Proposal No. 133 also deletes those portions of article V, section 12(b), relating to con-
fidentiality of proceedings of the Judicial Qualifications Commission; confidentiality would
in the future be governed by the new language in article V, section 1.
The existing protection against interception of private communications contained in
article I, section 12, remains unchanged. Likewise article II, section 8, the ethics and
financial disclosure section, was retained intact.
A sequel to this note, to appear in a later issue of the Review, will examine in detail
the final version of the Constitution Revision Commission's privacy provisions.
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APPENDIX
The current versions of the state constitutional privacy provisions are given here. The
dates are those on which the right of privacy was added, and not necessarily the date of
the last revision of the indicated section.
ALAs. CONST. art. I, § 22:
Section 22. Right of Privacy.-The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.
Adopted by amendment, 1972.
ARIZ. CONsT. art. II, § 8:
Section 8. Right to privacy.-No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law.
Constitution adopted, 1910.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1:
Section 1. Inalienable rights.-All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among those are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.
Adopted by amendment, 1972.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12:
Section 12. Searches and seizures.-The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means,
shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause,
supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the
person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be inter-
cepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. Articles or information obtained
in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence.
Constitution adopted, 1968.
HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5:
Section 5. Searches, Seizures and Invasion of Privacy.-The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches,
seizures, and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized or the
communications sought to be intercepted.
Constitution adopted, 1968.
ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12:
Section 6. Searches, Seizures, Privacy and Interceptions.- The people shall have
the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communica-
tions by eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue without
probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 12. Right to Remedy and Justice.-Every person shall find a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person,
privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely,
and promptly.
Constitution adopted, 1970.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5:
Section 5. Right to Privacy.-Every person shall be secure in his person, property,
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communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures,
or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the
persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any
person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section
shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
Constitution adopted, 1974.
MONT. CONsT. art. II, §§ 9, 10:
Section 9. Right to know.-No person shall be deprived of the right to examine
documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state
government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual
privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.
Section 10. Right of privacy.-The right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest.
Constitution adopted, 1972.
S.C. CONST. art. I §, 10:
Section 10. Searches and seizures; invasions of privacy.-The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to be seized,
and the information to be obtained.
Adopted by amendment, 1971.
WASH. CONST. art. I, §7:
Section 7. Invasion of Private Affairs or Home Prohibited.-No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.
Constitution adopted, 1889.
1977]

